

SECRET

SUBVERSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

SECRET

SUBVERSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

SECRET

SUBVERSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

SECRET

SUBVERSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Evidence published by the UCPI

SECRET

Mr Heaton.

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

AC(H)(WG)(68) 1

COPY NO. 10

10th May 1968

CABINET

OFFICIAL COMMITTEE ON COMMUNISM (HOME)

WORKING GROUP ON COUNTERMEASURES

SUBVERSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM - SPRING 1968

Note by the Secretary

Attached is a paper by the Security Service on Subversion in the United Kingdom - Spring 1968.

This paper will be considered by the Working Group at their meeting arranged for Friday 17th May at 3 p.m.

(Signed) D. HEATON

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

10th May 1968

SECRET

SUBVERSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM - SPRING 1968

INTRODUCTION

This paper differs from its predecessors in that whereas the subversive threat to the nation's livelihood still lies in the Communist Party's attack on the prices and incomes policy through its penetration of the trade unions which continues on familiar lines with some disquieting success, pride of place is given to the subversive elements behind the various protest demonstrations, some of them violent, which have taken place in the last six months with attendant publicity. The possibility of violent extremism in Wales also deserves mention. Behind lurks the racial situation with the subversive potentialities of Black Power both in its own right and as a stimulant and polariser of Fascism.

PROTEST

2. Since last October about a dozen protest demonstrations have taken place which have had a security significance as well as obvious law and order aspects. The injection of violence for political purposes is a new factor which differentiates these demonstrations from the old C.N.D. marches and even from the more militant activities of the Committee of 100 which were largely confined to the invasion of prohibited areas and lying down in the street. The change has been brought about by an increase in anarchy which is no longer of the arm-chair variety and which thrives on the publicity produced by clashes with the very governmental authority it is out to destroy. The Solidarity Group led by Doctor Christopher PALLIS led the way last year in its attack on the Greek Embassy, but the momentum has noticeably increased since.

3. There is no evidence that these activities have been co-ordinated from any one central point but two organisations have played a prominent part, the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (V.S.C.) and the Radical Student Alliance (R.S.A.).

4. The V.S.C. was founded in December 1965 as an off-shoot of the Bertrand Russell Peace Foundation with which it broke off relations in November 1967. Over half the members of the 1967 National Council and Executive Committee of the V.S.C. are Trotskyists and its most active officials are Patrick JORDAN, Mike MARTIN (Trotskyists) and Tariq ALI. It shares a London office with the Pioneer Book Shop, whose manager is Ernie TATE, the Canadian representative in London of the Trotskyist Fourth International. Both TATE and JORDAN are in regular contact with the Fourth International in Paris and Brussels, and through these Trotskyist links the V.S.C. has been able to build up a wide range of contacts with European Vietnam and student organisations. It was the V.S.C. which was responsible for the violent disturbances in Grosvenor Square on 22 October 1967.

5. The R.S.A. was founded in 1966 on the initiative of the National Student Organiser of the Communist Party as a ginger group within the a-political National Union of Students (N.U.S.) and was composed of Communists, radical elements of the Young Liberals and members of the Trotskyist International Socialism Group, which at the time controlled the National Association of Labour Student Organisation. The Communist target for the R.S.A. was to gain control of the N.U.S. and to force it out of the right-wing International Student Congress and, eventually, into the Communist-controlled International Union of Students. The central organisation of the R.S.A. has remained firmly under the direction of the Communists, but the branches at university level are controlled by students whose political opinions range throughout the political spectrum from Liberal to Anarchist and include many "activists" with no political convictions. Since the R.S.A. has yet to acquire a formal structure it is not possible to give membership figures but the votes cast for its candidates at the N.U.S. elections indicate that it has gained substantial support. It has twice failed to achieve control of the N.U.S. executive, but in 1967 and 1968 two of the ten executive officials elected were on the R.S.A. "ticket". The 1968 results would have been more favourable to the R.S.A. had the elections not taken place shortly after the 17 March demonstration in Grosvenor Square, which from the R.S.A. leadership's point of view "boomeranged".

6. Both the V.S.C. and R.S.A. were responsible for this particular demonstration in which they were assisted by the Stop It Committee, a body which is wholly American in concept and consists predominantly of American students in the U.K. with a fair proportion of emigres avoiding the draft. Despite R.S.A. participation, the Communist Party was opposed to the demonstration but was unable to prevent a contingent of the Young Communist League from taking part although it did not engage in violence. The worst offenders were the Germans, about a hundred strong, who had come as a result of an invitation extended by a V.S.C. delegation at an international Vietnam conference held in February in Berlin. They were the most aggressive and used the occasion to give other demonstrators advice in anti-police techniques.

7. The other disturbances with international ramifications were those which accompanied the Aldermaston March on Easter Monday, one at the German Embassy and the other at the "Daily Mirror" building, where the representative of the SPRINGER Group of German newspapers has his office. Both were again primarily the work of the V.S.C. and R.S.A. On Friday, 12 April, Ernie TATE (see paragraph 4 above) received a message from the Fourth International in Brussels impressing upon him the need for a demonstration in London in support of similar demonstrations then taking place in Germany as the result of the shooting of the student leader Rudi DUTSCHKE. TATE, who was not unresponsive, realised that most of his contacts were on the Aldermaston March and did not want to give the appearance of breaking it up. He consulted some of his V.S.C. colleagues, notably Tariq ALI, Mike MARTIN and Pat JORDAN, and it was decided that there should be a

/demonstration

demonstration at the German Embassy at midday on Easter Monday, shortly before the main assembly for the rally in Trafalgar Square. ALI is also known to have been in contact independently but to the same purpose with the German Socialist Student League (S.D.S.). The demonstration took place as planned.

8. The other disturbance was planned on Sunday, 14 April when Chris GILMORE, the Communist Secretary of the R.S.A., who is known to have extensive European student contacts including links with the S.D.S., told MARTIN of the V.S.C. that he, GILMORE, was organising a demonstration outside the "Daily Mirror" offices for 6 p.m. on the 15th. He was put in touch with Tariq ALI and contact was also made with students from Sussex University. This demonstration was supported by members of the International Socialism Group of Trotskyists and by Anarchists who had caused minor trouble on the Aldermaston March itself. A number of French students were arrested during it, but they had almost certainly come over for the March itself and there is no reason to suppose that they were specially imported for either of the two demonstrations.

9. While these events indicated some degree of international co-ordination, more disquieting perhaps was the spontaneous ability of the protesters, particularly the students, to adapt themselves with speed and efficiency to the protest requirements following the DUTSCHKE shooting. Student participation thus merits further comment.

10. Over recent years the dominance of Communism in radical student affairs has to a considerable extent been superseded by the influence of Trotskyism and Anarchism. Working through Socialist Societies, left-wing Labour clubs and Vietnam Action Groups, the Trotskyists in particular have been successful in exploiting the students' underlying feeling of political frustration and social discontent. The most active students have belonged to the International Socialist Group of Trotskyists (I.S.) which regards students as part of the exploited working-class, trapped in an educational system run by the ruling-class for the production of a successor to itself. They wish to turn the interest of students towards industrial activities, tenants' campaigns and such like in order to identify them with the working class. This policy is similar to that of syndicalists on the continent who regard student unions as working class trade unions. Trotskyists, including the International Socialists, played an important part in the recent demonstrations in Manchester, Sheffield and Cambridge and, through the Northern Universities Co-ordinating Committee, organised student support for the 17 March demonstration.

11. The problem presented by such organisations as the R.S.A. and the Northern Universities Co-ordinating Committee is that they provide a rallying point and in some degree co-ordinate the activities of a relatively small number of left-wing students and hooligans who would otherwise be largely isolated in student life. That they are small in number but can cause serious embarrassment is well illustrated by a recent incident at Sussex University. In February an American Embassy official

/attended

SECRET

- 4 -

attended a "teach-in" at the University on the war in Vietnam. This official was covered in paint thrown by a student; the American flag was burned; and the police vehicle which drove away with the official was pelted with placards and eggs. Only about ten people were actually involved in the disturbance, which was organised by pro-Chinese Communists with the participation of a member of the Trotskyist Socialist Labour League and the support of one of the staff who was formerly prominent in the Young Liberal element of the R.S.L. When the two principal demonstrators were rusticated it was proposed to call a strike of students until they were reinstated. At the meeting held to consider this action only some sixty people voted in favour of the strike out of the thousand students present. This was presumably the maximum support the radicals could assemble.

12. This incident shows the necessity of getting demonstrations into the right perspective. Some of the more recent ones have shown that the organisers are aware of the dangers of alienating public opinion as a result of the violent activities of an extremist minority. The organisers of the demonstration against the Greek regime on 21 April and of that against Cnoch Powell on 26 April appointed sufficient capable stewards to marshal the demonstrators so that the unruly element was prevented from getting out of hand. Although the publicity gained for the respective causes on these occasions was not as great as when violent incidents occurred it is apparent that in some quarters at least violence is considered to be counter-productive. The slow and much less publicised reaction of the majority of students who wish to get on with their studies should not be underestimated. The American Stop It Committee also appears to have been worried about the damage which may have been done to its image by the violence in Grosvenor Square.

13. In view of the number of member countries who have had experience of them, protest movements and demonstrations have been of considerable concern to N.A.T.O., and a comprehensive paper, to which the U.K. is making a contribution, is being prepared on the subject for the Council. It is hoped that the temptation will be resisted to exaggerate unduly the similarities and connections between groups in the various countries and that the paper will treat them in the context of differing social systems, not least in the academic world.

14. The increasingly diffuse nature of the subversive threat, which is the result of these developments, has meant that the Security Service, while keeping its effort against Communism constant, has had to deploy resources in a wider field. Because of the law and order aspects co-operation with the police has been exceptionally close, with Special Branches of the police forces feeding information to their Uniformed Branches and the Security Service briefing the Special Branches. This has led to a pooling of experience on the subject in Security Service training courses with the Police which have brought out the vital need for timely intelligence if the right balance is to be struck between what protection is necessary and what might appear provocative.

/THE COMMUNIST PARTY

SECRET

SECRET

- 5 -

THE COMMUNIST PARTY AND THE TRADE UNIONS

15. The swing in union opinion towards policies which have whole-hearted Communist support has resulted in a reversion to more traditional attitudes on the part of the Party itself. It is using this period of greater acceptability to strengthen its position on the Executive Councils and among fulltime officials of the more important unions. It has consequently been less concerned with unofficial disputes. The decline in the extent of Party penetration which followed the Electrical Trades Union (E.T.U.) trial has been reversed. Although the most startling success has been perhaps in the National Union of Seamen (N.U.S.) where Party representation among 33 elected members of the Executive Council has risen from nothing to eight, the more significant gains have been in the Amalgamated Engineering and Foundry Workers Union (A.E.F.). The election of Hugh SCANLON as President was followed by the election of two Communists to important national posts in the union. Although the Party and its sympathisers are a minority on the Executive Council and National Committee, SCANLON works very closely with the Industrial Department of the Party in leading the union in opposition to the incomes policy of the Government and the T.U.C.

16. In the Transport and General Workers Union (T.G.W.U.) the Party is confident that the ban on Communists and Fascists holding office will be lifted in the summer and that a substantial number of officials in the union will be able to declare themselves as Communists, including such leading Executive Council members as Bill JONES and Vic SELWAY. The Party will support Jack JONES, an ex-Communist, in the election which will follow the expected retirement of Frank COUSINS, and hopes to bring about a Party-influenced alliance on the Left between SCANLON and JONES. JONES however is far less dependent on Party advice and support than is SCANLON. It remains to be seen whether success in the election would bring him overtly closer to the Party.

17. If events in the A.E.F. and T.G.W.U. turn out as the Party hopes, it is likely to concentrate its attention next on the E.T.U. where CANNON's position is far less secure than it at one time seemed. In this union the Party is anxious to bring about a repeal of the ban on Communists holding office and to re-establish its position on the Executive and among office holders.

18. The aim of the Communist Party is thus seen as one of exploiting the temporary popularity of its policies in order to consolidate a position in the centres of power in the trade union movement which could be more durable than the current union consensus on economic policy.

/ELSH EXTREMISM

SECRET

WELSH EXTREMISM

19. A Celtic Youth Congress was held at Bangor, North Wales between 29 March and 1 April 1968 which brought together a number of members of the Free Wales Army and the National Patriotic Front, both extremist organisations. The latter dominated the discussions and the Congress showed itself to be not only hostile to the Investiture and all things "English" but also strongly critical of the Plaid Cymru and in particular of Gwynfor IUVANS, who was described as a "narrow nationalist". There was support for the sabotage attacks which have been made on dams providing water for English towns and for the explosions at the Temple of Peace and the Inland Revenue offices at Cardiff. On the grounds that the establishment of English industries in Wales was a subtle means of perpetuating English influence in the Principality, a resolution was adopted that all possible steps should be taken to prevent the installation of English factories in Wales.

20. The Celtic Youth Congress is a body representative of Welsh, Irish, Scottish and Breton nationalists, but on this occasion, no Bretons were present and the Irish contingent was lightweight and inarticulate. However, there was a fair contingent of Scottish nationalists under the leadership of Major Derrick BOOTHBY, who has come to notice recently in connection with the activities of the 1320 Club, a breakaway group of militants from the Scottish National Party.

21. Until further evidence is received of some coherent direction of Welsh extremists, it is impossible to evaluate the threat with any precision and the police have set up co-ordinating machinery to collect and assess all information about it. Further acts of sabotage directed at water supplies, electricity undertakings and possibly Government offices are to be expected and opportunities will be taken to create a climate of antagonism towards the Investiture. Such activities would be an embarrassment to the Plaid Cymru, committed as it is to a constitutional approach to independence.

THE SUBVERSIVE ASPECTS OF THE RACIAL SITUATION

22. Last October Black Power activities in the U.K. were assessed as being in their infancy and most of its leading protagonists were not of sufficient calibre to attract effective support. There may be significant developments in the aftermath of the Enoch Powell speech, but the importance of these could be exaggerated.

23. At least coincident with but not as a direct result of that speech has been the formation of a so-called Black People's Alliance (B.P.A.) which was announced on 28 April. The aim of this body is to provide a militant immigrant front to combat racialism. Its steering committee consists of Jagmohan JOSHI, a leading extreme pro-Chinese Indian Communist who has some degree of active support in the Indian Workers Association - Great Britain (I.W.A. - G.B.); Roy SAWH, leader of a small Black Power faction styled as the Universal Coloured Peoples and Arab

/Association (U.C.P.A.A.);

SECRET

- 7 -

Association (U.C.P.A.A.); and some leading members of the Standing Conference of West Indian Organisations (S.C.W.I.O.), the National Federation of Pakistani Associations (N.F.P.A.) and the London Branch of the Pakistani Workers Association (P.W.A.). None of the three latter organisations is subject to extreme racist or effective left-wing influence. A few of the minor groups reported to be associated with the formation of the B.P.A. are subject to a variety of extreme left-wing (including pro-Chinese) influence.

24. The Communist Party has had no association with this development, and, with one possible exception, no known Party members are involved. The Black power faction which styles itself the Universal Coloured People's Association (U.C.P.A.) has not (at any rate not as yet) associated itself with the B.P.A. (despite press reports to this effect).

25. Although a desire for militancy on race relations issues may provide a unifying factor, the divergent policies of the individuals involved in the B.P.A. leadership are likely to inhibit its effective development. The degree of broad support forthcoming from the major immigrant organisations with which they are connected, whose rank-and-file have almost certainly not been consulted, must also remain in doubt.

26. A more immediate effect of the Enoch Powell speech, at least in the law and order field, is the stimulus it has given to the Fascists. Colin JORDAN has already tried to exploit reaction in the Midlands, but his following at the moment is negligible. The most significant effect is likely to be a Fascist polarisation round the National Front, which is a merger of two typical Fascist groups, the British National Party and the Greater Britain Movement, with the extreme right-wing League of Empire Loyalists. The National Front's aim is to gain support by adopting, at least publicly, a more respectable programme than that formerly promulgated by its Fascist components and by discouraging violence. Its present membership does not exceed two hundred and fifty, but any Fascist activity, as has already been shown in the case of JORDAN, can provoke opposition from Trotskyists and anarchists with accompanying violence. The mixture is explosive.

10 May 1967

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

SH(69)1

COPY NO. 22

7th January 1969

CABINET

OFFICIAL COMMITTEE ON SUBVERSION AT HOME

COMPOSITION AND TERMS OF REFERENCE

Note by the Secretary of the Cabinet

By direction of the Prime Minister an Official Committee on Subversion at Home has been established, with the following composition and terms of reference.

Composition

Sir Burke Trend, Secretary of the Cabinet (Chairman)

Representatives of - Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Department of Employment and Productivity
Home Office
Department of Education and Science
Security Service

Terms of Reference

"To focus intelligence about communist and other subversive activities in the United Kingdom, to advise Ministers on appropriate measures (other than those in relation to the public service, which are within the purview of the Official Committee on Security) to counter these activities, and to co-ordinate such counter-measures".

Secretariat

The Secretary is Mr. D. Heaton, Cabinet Office.

(Signed) BURKE TREND

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

7th January 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SIR BURE TREND

Mr Heaton

Thank you

31.1.69

Meeting of the Official Committee on Subversion at Home
Friday 31st January 1969, at 3 p.m.

I expect the meeting to be attended by -

FCO	Mr. Peck Mr. Tyrer
DEP	Mr. Kerr
Home Office	Mr. Waddell
DES	Mr. Guppy
Security Service	Mr. Simkins (who has expressed interest and a wish to come) Mr. Thistlethwaite Mr. Elliot

This is of course the first meeting of the new Committee, whose terms of reference are -

"To focus intelligence about communist and other subversive activities in the United Kingdom, to advise Ministers on appropriate measures (other than those in relation to the public service, which are within the purview of the Official Committee on Security) to counter these activities, and to coordinate such counter-measures".

The paper circulated (SH(69)2 - Subversion in the United Kingdom) briefly outlines the pattern of subversion in 1966, and attempts (paragraphs 10 and 11) a forecast for 1969. It's author is Mr. Thistlethwaite who will be ready to introduce it. He has recently attended a meeting in Paris of his European colleagues, and has this week met Hugh Trevor-Roper (an old contact of his) who, he says, is very worried about the situation in Oxford. Almost certainly, student activities will be the chief item for discussion, and a point for decision will be the question of a successor to Jack Wolfenden as an occasional channel for passing information to Vice Chancellors and for informing the Committee of their views. I am not sure whether you know the new Chairman of the UGC (Berrill), but Mr. Thistlethwaite may have a view on his suitability, and I have asked Mr. Guppy to ascertain Sir Herbert Andrew's views in advance of the meeting.


Demonstrations organised by Trotskyist groups seem likely to be less of a preoccupation this year than trouble by students in universities and colleges, but these groups (see paragraph 6) are planning a new series to

CONFIDENTIAL

start next March. Apparently Manchanda has booked Trafalgar Square for 9th March, and Tariq Ali for 16th March.

There is still no indication of any support in the trades unions for anarchist and student activists, and only in one white-collar union (DATA - see paragraph 7) is there a danger of it. The state of the unions and the general subversive picture are described in more detail in the latest Security Service Quarterly Survey of Subversive Activities (attached).

It may be well to reserve for the end of the meeting some consideration of possible counter-measures. Clearly, almost any publicity is likely to do more harm than good. Among students, the problem is the old one of bolstering moderate opinion, presumably through the National Union of Students. You may like to ask whether anyone has any new ideas on how to help the NUS leadership. On the purely political front there is the proposal, which I reported to you earlier, to publicise the opposition within the CPGB to the leadership's anti-Russian line over Czechoslovakia. Mr. Peck might be asked how this stands.



29th January 1969

SECRET

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

SH(69)2

23rd January 1969

COPY NO. 2

CABINET

OFFICIAL COMMITTEE ON SUEVERSION AT HOME

SUEVERSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Note by the Secretary

Attached is a Note by the Security Service on Subversion in the United Kingdom, which is to be considered by the Committee at their next meeting.

(Signed) D. HEATON

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

23rd January 1969

SECRET

SUBVERSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

(Note by the Security Service)

INTRODUCTION

It is many years since subversion has been as much in the minds of the British people as it is today. This is because last year the subversive threat no longer derived solely from political activity and industrial action, largely by the Communist Party, but because it also found expression in major incidents of violence either in the form of demonstrations such as those in London on 17 March, 24 July and 27 October, or of student disturbances or of acts of sabotage by Welsh extremists. All were given maximum publicity by the press, radio and television. The Communist Party of Great Britain (C.P.G.B.) did not fully share this limelight, largely because of its desire to keep in the background. Nevertheless, Communism generally received its fair share of attention, thanks to the activities of the French and Italian Parties in the Spring and still more to the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in the Summer.

COMMUNIST PARTY OF GREAT BRITAIN (C.P.G.B.)

2. By almost any yardstick save that of activity in the industrial field, 1968 was a poor year for the C.P.G.B. Membership at 31 October 1968 was down by about 500 and the noticeably low level of public activity in Party Districts and Branches reflected the continued decline in morale of the individual member. Despite this the Party was anxious to assume the leadership of those campaigns, such as Vietnam, which seemed likely to evoke mass support, but its action was usually hesitant and often counter-productive. Its failure in this field can be attributed to the reluctance of its leadership to endorse, or perhaps more accurately to be seen to be endorsing, public violence. The result was to leave the field open to the Trotskyists and the Anarchists who had relatively little difficulty in representing the C.P.G.B. as a group of burnt-out revolutionaries scarcely distinguishable from the more bourgeois segments of the political establishment.

3. From the C.P.G.B.'s point of view, failure at home was aggravated by disappointment abroad, notably in relation to Czechoslovakia. The Party leadership held no particular brief for DUBCEK and in some degree shared the Warsaw Powers' doubts of his ability and that of his Party to withstand "counter-revolutionary" pressures. Nevertheless as a Party which at its last Congress publicly committed itself to the sovereignty of national and governing Parties, the C.P.G.B. had no choice (nor so far as its national leadership was concerned was there any desire) but to oppose the Russian intervention. Despite a surprising volume of opposition from its intermediate leadership in the Districts,

/where the feeling is ..

SECRET



- 2 -

where the feeling is that the Russian action was unavoidable, the Party leadership remains opposed to it and by so doing almost certainly reflects the views of the membership as a whole. It is this which has saved the Party from defections on the Hungarian scale.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

TROTSKYIST ACTIVITY

5. All the Trotskyist groups can look back on 1968 with some satisfaction. The largest, the Socialist Labour League (S.L.L.), took little part in the demonstrations and preferred to concentrate on improving its own organisation and developing its industrial contacts at shop steward level. It went some way to solving its perennial financial problems and increased the circulation and frequency of issue of its publication 'The Newsletter'. The International Socialism (I.S.) Group made substantial headway in the universities, virtually doubled its membership (now standing at about 1,000), and was notably successful in penetrating the nexus of university labour and socialist clubs. In this it worked in uneasy alliance with the International Marxist Group (I.M.G.). Together they played an important part in much of the unrest inside the universities, and their penetration of university societies was a major factor in bringing on to the streets a large number of students in the series of demonstrations which culminated in that of 27 October.

/6. ..

SECRET

SECRET

- 3 -

6. In general, and certainly in public, the I.M. and the I.M.G. claim that these demonstrations were a success. They argue that the violence anticipated from them was the invention of a hostile Press and they are now planning a new series to start in earnest in March 1969. While it would be foolish to under-estimate the nuisance value of these groups and their student supporters, experience has shown that, given adequate advance intelligence, their demonstrations can be contained by normal police methods. At no time was the aim of some of the organisers, namely to bring about a "revolutionary situation", within measurable distance of attainment and the fragmentation of the Trotskyists suggests that they would not have been able to exploit it even if it had been.

7. Despite the air of confidence which the Trotskyists give in public and their undoubted intentions to resume their efforts in the Spring it is open to question whether they can keep up the pace. Both the I.S. and I.M.G. suspect that Vietnam as an issue is beginning to lose its emotional appeal and while each is anxious to get control of the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign (V.S.C.) for the purpose of the new demonstrations, they both have an uneasy feeling that they may be quarrelling over a sick man, if not a corpse. Their anxieties on this score are aggravated by their recognition that the Marcusian appeal for unity of students and workers has virtually everywhere met with a dusty answer. The only significant exception, the Draughtsmen and Allied Technicians' Association (D.A.T.A.), in which the Maoists have made some headway, affords them scant consolation.

WELSH NATIONALISM

8. The threat of subversion in Wales comes from a small group of Welshmen who are prepared to enforce their demands by criminal acts, predominantly sabotage. In practice there are both short- and long-term threats, the former against the Investiture of the Prince of Wales, and the latter likely to continue beyond it.

9. In 1968 there were changes in police organisation and a substantial increase in the overall investigational effort. This has resulted in the identification of between 40 and 50 extremists who are either prepared to engage in criminal acts or to afford active sympathy. Physical conditions in Wales contribute to the difficulties of investigation, notably when surveillance is required, and at present there is insufficient evidence for prosecution on charges of sabotage. Nevertheless there is an encouraging increase in the flow of information.

/10. ..

SECRET

SECRET

- 4 -

THE LIBELY PATTERN IN 1969

10. There are likely to be further demonstrations on the 1968 pattern which will absorb most of the energies of the I.S. and I.W.O. segments of the Trotskyist movement, and, despite the reservations of the Party proper, the Young Communist League (Y.C.L.) can be expected to take a more active part. Since the Y.C.L. is a more disciplined and potentially less violent body than the Trotskyist groups, its participation is, on balance, a welcome development.

11. The O.P.G.B. seems likely to concentrate on the industrial front and will try to make propaganda out of any friction between the Government and the Trade Union Movement. The S.L.L. section of the Trotskyists will take the same line and its influence among shop stewards may force the O.P.G.B. to adopt bolder and less "official" tactics in the Trade Union Movement. There are indications that the Party is already thinking on these lines.

COUNTER-MEASURES

12. Intelligence coverage is essential and needs to be maintained if not extended. This means the maintenance by the Security Service of the existing intimate relations with Police Forces, particularly the Special Branch of the Metropolitan Police, and continued co-operation with West European Security Services.

13. Education of those in authority who need to know, including the Police, about the nature of the subversive threat should continue. The aim should be to put it into perspective.

14. Publicity is grist to the mill of the subversive groups. What is required is that mass media should portray the subversive threat with accuracy and without exaggeration and seldom.

January 1969.

CONFIDENTIAL

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

SH(69) 1st Meeting

14
COPY NO. _____

CABINET

OFFICIAL COMMITTEE ON SUBVERSION AT HOME

MINUTES of a Meeting held in Sir Burke Trend's
Room, Cabinet Office, S.W.1, on
FRIDAY, 31st JANUARY 1969 at 3.00 p.m.

PRESENT:

Sir Burke Trend,
Cabinet Office (In the Chair)

Mr. J.H. Peck,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr. A.S. Kerr,
Department of Employment
and Productivity

Mr. J.H. Waddell,
Home Office

Mr. R.J. Guppy,
Department of Education
and Science

Mr. C.A.C. Simkins,
Security Service

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT:

Mr. J. Tyrer,
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr. R. Thistlethwaite,
Security Service

Security Service

SECRETARY:

Mr. D. Heaton

S U B J E C T:

SUBVERSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

SUBVERSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

The Committee had before them a Note by the Secretary (SH(69)2), covering a Note by the Security Service on Subversion in the United Kingdom.

MR. THISTLETHWAITE said that with the broadening of the subversive threat there was a danger that the longer-standing threat from the Communist Party might be lost sight of. There was no intention of this being allowed to happen. For the time being the Party seemed likely to concentrate on the industrial front, and would try to exploit the friction between the Government and the trade union movement. The Young Communist League could be expected to take a more active part in demonstrations organised by the various segments of the Trotskyist movement. In general, intelligence coverage of subversive groups would at least be maintained, and the close cooperation of the Security Service with both the police and West European security services would continue.

In discussion the following main points were made:

- (a) The Communist Party. The Party would certainly exploit difficulties over the new trade union legislation likely to be included in the programme for next session. Meanwhile, the motor industry offered them the best opportunities for stirring up trouble with widespread repercussions. There was no dividend for them in the present inter-union dispute in the steel industry. The Party had serious internal differences, and appropriate publicity could be given to the strength of the opposition to the Party leadership over the Czechoslovak issue.
- (b) Demonstrations. A round of further demonstrations had been planned to take place in March. Of these, the biggest would probably be that on 16th March, to be organised by the Vietnam Solidarity Campaign. The main theme of this was to be a welcome to members of the National Liberation Front (NLF) delegation to the Paris talks and a number of North Vietnamese, who were being invited as a challenge to the Government's policy of refusing them visas. At present, there seemed to be no good reason for excluding Madame Binh and members of the NLF delegation, though North Vietnamese (e.g. students from East Berlin) would no doubt be excluded. In general, it was desirable to distinguish between those concerned or negotiating to achieve a settlement in Vietnam, and the

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

Macists and others who simply want to see the Americans done down. Similarly, publicity should concentrate on emphasising the differences between groups concerned with the Vietnam issue, and not on the issue itself. On the whole demonstration front, there was no reason for complacency, and the defensive arrangements made last year should continue at least until the summer.

(c) Students. Not surprisingly, there were differences between Vice Chancellors as to the right policy for dealing with unruly students. In general, though it was true that they had been reluctant to take action against individual students, it was a fact that such attempts as had been made had been greeted with cries of 'victimisation' from even the moderate students. The university authorities should take advantage of the changed climate of public opinion which was now evident, and the recent speech in the House of Commons by the Secretary of State for Education and Science might encourage them to be more resolute. The Committee needed someone to replace Sir John Wolfenden as a link with the Vice Chancellors. The Secretary of the UGC was just leaving, and therefore not suitable, but the new Chairman might be suitable, when he had had more time to settle into the job and to gain the Vice Chancellors' confidence. A disturbing new feature was the increased interest by the Trotskyists and the pro-Chinese communists in secondary school children, and the report that Granada TV had paid the expenses of some delegates to a national conference of sixth form pupils. IRD had just completed a paper on Student Unrest, and a shorter one on the Soviet Attitude to Student Unrest, and the Committee would welcome these unclassified papers being circulated to them.

(d) Welsh Nationalist Extremists. Changes in police organisation made last year were paying off in terms of improved intelligence. The leadership of the extremists was genuinely nationalist, and there was no direct link with France. The links with the IRA were not of great significance, since the extremists needed neither money nor training in the use of explosives.

Summing up the discussion, THE CHAIRMAN said that since the Committee were formally concerned with all aspects of subversion at home, it was right for them to take a look at the whole subversive field from time to time. A good deal was going on, but the arrangements for obtaining and disseminating good intelligence were broadly satisfactory; and the

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
CONFIDENTIAL

principles for our countermeasures should be those in paragraphs 12-14 of SH(69)2. He proposed to report the main developments to the Prime Minister. An outstanding matter was the question of a successor to Sir John Wolfenden as an unofficial link with Vice Chancellors. This could be considered again at the Committee's next meeting, which might appropriately be held towards the end of April.

The Committee -

Took note, with approval, of the Chairman's summing up.

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

3rd February 1969

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

SH(70)1

6th March 1970

COPY NO. 3

CABINET

OFFICIAL COMMITTEE ON SUBVERSION AT HOME

THE CURRENT SITUATION AMONGST BRITISH STUDENTS

Note by the Secretary

I attach a memorandum by the Security Service for consideration at the meeting on 11th March.

(Signed) B.M. DAY

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.
6th March 1970

SECRET

SECRET



THE CURRENT SITUATION AMONGST

BRITISH STUDENTS

Background to the present agitation

The anti-Vietnam demonstration of October 27th, 1968 which was master-minded by Trotskyists and supported by Communists and anarchists, had strong student support from universities all over the country. Its failure left the student extremists in disarray. In spite of the American "moratorium" demonstrations against the war in Vietnam on 15th October and November, 1969 this issue since October 27th has had only a limited appeal to students. The Trotskyist and Communist groups have since been searching for a cause and have tried rents, industrial action and anti-NATO agitation. Nothing however gripped student imagination until the tour of the Springboks at the end of 1969. The issue of anti-apartheid dovetailed into that of anti-imperialism, a cause which has long been put forward as the only common issue upon which both Communists and Trotskyists, usually at daggers drawn, could unite.

South Africa and the Anti-Apartheid Movement

2. Firms and individuals with investments in South Africa have been under attack for a long time. It will be recalled that this was the issue that first started the troubles in the London School of Economics and the issue has had new life breathed into it by the Springboks tour and the forthcoming tour of the South African cricket team this summer. That South African investments are a prime manifestation of "imperialism" is the claim of both Communists and Trotskyists and it is thus a natural step to agitate against the recruitment "on the campus" by firms who have investments in that country. It is this particular issue which has sparked off the new wave of student protest in the universities.

Present discontents

3. The present wave of "sit-ins" sprang from a demand by militant Trotskyist students at Edinburgh to demonstrate at the Appointments Board on 19th January when Barclays Bank D.C.O. were to pay a visit to recruit students. They occupied the premises and broke open the filing cabinets there discovering notes on individuals made by the Appointments officer which, with a Marcusean twist they say, were worded to fit the requirements of employers, i.e. capitalists. They also discovered correspondence concerning recruitment for the Intelligence Co-ordination Service operating from 3 Carlton Gardens, S.W.1. and subsequently publicised extracts which they maintain show that attempts are being made to "spy" in universities and keep dossiers on students recording their "political" views.

SECRET

/4. On

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER N 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

- 2 -

4. On 12th February students at Warwick occupied the Registry and claimed to have found proof amongst the files there that dossiers were being kept by the University on students' "political" opinions. This claim was based on a letter sent to Warwick from the Headmaster of William Ellis School in Highgate about a candidate for the University having been engaged in a campaign on behalf of the Schools Action Union (S.A.U.) (See Appendix A). The S.A.U. is not in intention a political organisation but has strong anarchist support. Its aims are moreover markedly similar to those put forward in November 1968 by the Revolutionary Socialist Student Federation, which was Trotskyist sponsored, and is now virtually defunct. (Appendix B). The "discovery" of these "political dossiers" has been related to other papers showing a high degree of involvement in University affairs by industry and industrialists with a stake in South Africa. A slanted article entitled "The Business University" was published in New Society on 19th February, 1970 about this, written by E.F. Thomson, a Reader in the History of Labour at the University of Warwick.

By an analysis of University expenditure and the composition of the council he purports to show that the work of the University is geared to the requirements of the captains of industry and the capitalist system. It is thus not a "free" university with a dispassionate academic system.

5. As this paper is written students are sitting-in in universities all over the country and throughout Scotland as a protest against the disciplinary measures taken against the students by Edinburgh university.

Subversive Organisations and Groups involved

6. Although their numbers are small in relation to the total student population the Trotskyist and Communist influence is considerable and significant. The principal Trotskyist groups are the International Socialism Group, the International Marxist Group, the Socialist Labour League and the New Left. These are riven by schisms and jockeying for position. The Communists on the other hand, who are more disciplined, judge that, just as they have concentrated on penetrating and influencing the Trade Unions in the industrial field, they should try to penetrate the principal student body - the National Union of Students, and get their members elected to it. In April 1969 a Communist was, for the first time, elected to the N.U.S. Executive Committee. The C.P.'s future prospects appear good.

7. Left wing Trotskyist periodicals and the Communist "Morning Star" support the campaigns against "Imperialism", anti-apartheid, political dossiers and universities free from the dominance of big business interests. The New Left Review has given strong support in the past for the conception of

/universities....

SECRET

SECRET



- 3 -

as "Red bases" and the Black Dwarf, under the editorship of Tariq Ali, has campaigned strongly on all the above issues. The Editorial Board of this periodical has now become rent with dissension so that "the New Left" has just taken over the Black Dwarf and sacked Tariq Ali who will edit a new paper "The Red Mole" as a vehicle for the views of the International Marxist Group.

The Future

Incursions into university offices, allegations of "Spies on the campus" and protest against apartheid and imperialism have set the pattern for 1970. The next main target will be the visit of the South African cricket team and a formidable combination of opponents is already in motion. Students are likely to play an active, if not dominant role.

SECURITY SERVICE

5th March, 1970

SECRET

Is Your School Democratic?

Are you allowed to express your views? Is your future life dependent on the whims of your headmaster and staff (the headmaster must give a report and reference for university, college and first job)? Are school games, especially Rugby, compulsory? Rugby Football is often played just to keep up the school's reputation. Is the cane used in your school? Such punishment should be outlawed. It is a barbaric remnant of the brutality of the last century. Only in a few countries in the world are teachers allowed to use it. Are you victimised for unorthodox appearances? Has your school petty rules about such things as length of hair, length of skirts and coats, the wearing of rings and nail varnish, make-up, style of shoes, the colour of socks and other trivial matters completely unrelated to education? Are your school Society's notices, publications and views censored? Must school Societies have official approval from the Headmaster? Are you allowed to put up notices or posters, even ones connected with school activities, without permission? Does the headmaster censor all material going into the school magazine, the end result being a stereotyped publication? Above all, are you allowed to express your thoughts without risking punishment? Why is educational expenditure so low? Why are qualified teachers after years of training only paid £18 a week? Why do so many classes have over 40 pupils? Why are education cuts being made left, right and centre? We support the teachers' strike. All over the country Schools Action Union Groups are springing up. These are groups of school students who are interested in pressing for a better more democratic education. If you would like to discuss the nature of your education or possibly form a Kenilworth Schools' Action Union, come to a meeting at 7.30 pm. on Tuesday, 2nd December, at.....

(Address given)

Published Coventry S.A.U.

Revolutionary Socialist Students' Federation

Manifesto

1. RSSF commits itself to the revolutionary overthrow of capitalism and imperialism and its replacement by workers' power, and bases itself on the recognition that the only social class in industrial countries capable of making the revolution is the working class.

2. RSSF opposes all forms of discrimination and will lend its support to any group engaged in progressive struggle against such discrimination.

3. RSSF commits itself on principle to all anti-imperialist, anti-capitalist and anti-fascist struggles and resolutely opposes all forms of capitalist domination and class collaboration.

4. RSSF will lend its support to any group of workers or tenants in struggles against the wage freeze and price and rent increases.

5. RSSF's aims cannot be achieved through parliamentary means and it therefore constitutes itself as an extra-parliamentary opposition.

6. RSSF extends to all left students and organizations the invitation to co-operate with it in supporting and organizing for its aims, and extends fraternal greetings to organizations abroad already doing so.

7. RSSF recognizes that the trend of modern capitalism to the increasing integration of manual and mental labour, of intellectual and productive work, makes the intellectual element increasingly crucial to the development of the economy and society, and that this productive force comes into sharpening conflict with the institutional nature of capitalism. The growing revolutionary movement of students in all advanced capitalist countries is a product of this. To organize this vital sector as a revolutionary ally of the proletariat and as an integral part of the building of a new revolutionary movement, RSSF resolutely opposes ruling-class control of education and determines to struggle for an education system involving comprehensive higher education, and the abolition of the binary system, public schools and grammar schools. The transformation of this sector requires the generation of a revolutionary socialist culture.

8. RSSF believes that existing political parties and trade unions cannot either structurally or politically sustain revolutionary socialist programmes. It affirms that it is neither meaningful nor valuable to attempt to capture these organizations. While retaining support for their defensive struggles, it believes that new, participatory mass-based organizations are required to overthrow capitalism.

9. RSSF believes that students will play a part in the building of such organizations and in the linking of struggles of existing militant groups. It sees its particular role as developing socialist consciousness among youth.

10. RSSF believes that the institutions of higher education are a comparatively weak link in British capitalism, and that the ruling class's field of action can be severely restricted by correctly waged struggles for student control and for universities of revolutionary criticism.

11. RSSF will build red bases in our colleges and universities by fighting for the following Action Programme:

—All power to the general assembly of students, staff and workers—one man one vote on the campus.

—Abolition of all exams and grading.

—Full democracy in access to higher education.

—An end to bourgeois ideology—masking as education—in courses and lectures.

—Abolition of all inequality between institutions of higher education—against hierarchy and privilege.

—Break the authority of student union bureaucracies and institute mass democracy.

Adopted by the Second RSSF Conference—London November 10th 1968.

Brief For Tuesday, 10 March 1970

Stop the Seventy Four Committee

The Stop the Seventy Four Committee held a national conference on 7 March in London in order to co-ordinate its efforts against the South African cricket team, which will arrive in Britain on 1 June.

2. The preliminary reports of this meeting indicate that the London branch of the committee, under Peter HAIN, will act as the co-ordinating body. Four other provincial committees will be responsible for the activity in cricket grounds and elsewhere in the country. It is evident that these four committees, and indeed individual branches, will have a great deal of discretion and autonomy.

3. Four major national demonstrations are planned, the first on 6 June, but it is clear that other demonstrations will be held not only at places where games are being played but also on other occasions in order to secure support for the campaign. The activity at the Rothman professional tennis tournament and plans to disrupt a hockey match being played by a Transvaal side on 16 April in Chatham, and also activity in connection with a badminton tournament to be played at Wembley later this month indicate that the committee will demonstrate on any indication that an identifiable South African team will appear in public.

F1

10 March 1970

SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

SH(70) 2nd Meeting

COPY NO 15

CABINET

OFFICIAL COMMITTEE ON SUBVERSION AT HOME

MINUTES of a Meeting held in Sir Burke Trend's
Room, Cabinet Office SW1 on
FRIDAY 27 NOVEMBER 1970 at 10.30 am

PRESENT

Sir Burke Trend
Cabinet Office (In the Chair)

Mr G F N Reddaway
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr A S Kerr
Department of Employment

Mr J H Waddell
Home Office

Mr S H Whyte
Security Service

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT

Mr J Tyrer
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Security Service

SECRETARY

Mr B M Day

CONTENTS

Item No	Subject	Page
1.	WORK OF THE COMMITTEE	1
2.	THE INDUSTRIAL SITUATION	1
3.	STUDENT PROTEST	4
4.	NEXT MEETING	4

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

SECRET

SECRET

SECRET

1. WORK OF THE COMMITTEE

THE CHAIRMAN said that Ministerial and Official Committees had been set up to consider the Government's strategy for dealing with the recurrent wage claims and associated industrial action. The Subversion at Home Committee would therefore be less concerned in future with current industrial unrest, but it would still have to consider longer-term problems of Communism and subversion in industry, as well as elsewhere.

The Committee -

Took note.

SECRET

2. THE INDUSTRIAL SITUATION

Previous Reference: SH(70) 1st Meeting, Item 2

The Committee had before them a note by the Secretary (SH(70) 2 covering a paper by the Department of Employment and the Security Service on the prospects of industrial unrest.

MR WHYTE said that there were signs that the Trade Union leaders were succeeding in outflanking the militants in various areas. The local authority dispute had been settled without any significant successes for the Communists, except briefly at Tower Hamlets. The coalminers' strike had also been ended despite militant pressure. In the power industry, George Wake, the Communist Party's unofficial leader, was following the union line in supporting industrial action short of striking from 7 December. A strike seemed unlikely unless negotiations over the wage claim broke down or an unpopular settlement was reached.

MR WHYTE also said that the demonstrations planned for 8 December against the Government's Trade Union Reform Bill would probably include a newspaper strike and a dock strike on Merseyside. Heathrow would probably also be affected. A complete strike on the London Underground was unlikely,

SECRET

SECRET

and the London dockers and busmen were reluctant to strike, despite pressure from the regional group of the Transport and General Workers' Union. A big march was planned from Tower Hill to Marble Arch, and a mass meeting was to be held at the Central Hall, Westminster. The Trades Union Council disapproved of industrial action in opposition to the Bill, but their disapproval was muted, and forthright condemnation by Trade Union leaders, which could do much good, was lacking.

In discussion the following main points were made -

- a. The march on 8 December might include about 10,000 people, mainly from the London area, though student support could swell the numbers. The police were mainly concerned about the possible course of events after dispersal of the marchers. The Communist Party would probably try to exercise a restraining influence, but they were not in control of the demonstration, which was largely inspired by the Society of Graphical and Allied Trades.
- b. Although the opposition to the Trade Union Reform Bill had attracted considerable publicity, the Government's case had not received a similar airing. Suitable publicity was highly desirable: balanced discussion on television would be invaluable, but it could be strengthened by means of radio broadcasting and selective use of newspapers. Besides publicising the case for Trade Union reform, it was desirable to discourage industrial action and to stress the wisdom of pursuing the problem by discussion in Parliament and elsewhere. The difficulty was to persuade producers and editors discreetly to make time and space available and to obtain suitable contributors to the discussion. It would be helpful to take the whole question up with the Lord President in view of his special responsibilities in the information field.
- c. If the wage claim in the electrical industry could be settled at a reasonable level, this might turn the tide of inflationary increases. A success was also needed in a major sector of private industry. A dispute at Fords, where both sides were fairly well matched, might provide an opportunity in the New Year; but it could be influenced by developments at Chrysler and Leylands, and direct Government intervention was difficult.

SECRET

d. The Foreign and Commonwealth Office had recently produced a paper on "The New Left", and further circulation was under consideration. A complementary paper on right wing influences would be helpful.

THE CHAIRMAN, summing up, said that publicity was of special importance for the Government's case on Trade Union reform, and he would consider an approach to the Lord President to discuss the problem with him.

The Committee -

1. Took note with approval of the Chairman's summing up.
2. Invited the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to consider the further circulation of their paper on "The New Left", and to prepare a complementary paper on the development of right wing influences.

SECRET

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL

3. STUDENT PROTEST

Previous Reference: SH(70) 1st Meeting, Item 1

In a brief discussion it was suggested that the present relative calm among students might only be temporary. The academic year had just begun, the sentences passed after the Garden House Hotel incident were still fresh in students' minds and in the absence of a major issue of immediate importance the militants might be deliberately staging a show of good behaviour because of the Rudi Dutschke affair. On the other hand, students seemed to be consciously looking for a cause, the National Union of Students had declared opposition to the Trade Union Reform Bill and the question of arms for South Africa was still live. The lull might therefore be short-lived, but the situation did not seem to call for a discussion with Mr Fraser Noble at the present time.

The Committee -

Took note.

4. NEXT MEETING

CONFIDENTIAL

The Committee agreed to meet in February 1971, unless the need arose for an earlier discussion.

Cabinet Office SW1
27 November 1970

CONFIDENTIAL

SECRET

Covering

h B Trend

MR. NORBURY

Meeting of SH

I expect the following to attend the twice-postponed meeting, which has now been arranged for 10.30 a.m. on Friday 27th November -

Home Office	- Mr. Waddell
FCO	- Mr. Reddaway
	- Mr. Tyrer
Department of	
Employment	- Mr. Kerr
Security Service	- Mr. Whyte
	- Mr. Woodroffe

Sir Burke Trend may be aware that Dick Thistlethwaite has been sick, and is likely to retire. The DES will not be represented at the meeting, since the only item for discussion deals with industrial unrest, and DES themselves do not wish to raise any other subjects.

Functions of SH

Before going on to the formal agenda, Sir Burke Trend may like to mention the setting up of the new group under Sir Philip Allen following the Prime Minister's reaction to SH(70)2 (which the Committee is to discuss). The new group is concerned with all aspects of labour unrest in industry, of which subversion is only one. The SH Committee is specifically concerned with subversion in this country, and it oversees the subject generally, including subversion outside the industrial field (e.g. among students). There is some value in continuing this oversight by the SH Committee, provided that it does not duplicate the work of the new group. The Committee may not need to look at the industrial situation in such detail as previously, but *unsuitable* periodic review of major developments, e.g. the increasing militancy of labour, and major policy matters, such as the impact of the Government's proposals for Trade Union reform. Outside the industrial field, the SH Committee's activities can remain unchanged.

The industrial situation

SH(70)2, which was written early in October, was prepared by the Department of Employment and Productivity and the Security Service. Mr. Whyte and Mr. Kerr should be invited to comment, and to bring it up to date on major points.

The paper paints a gloomy picture of the pressures on Trade Union leaders to adopt a more militant policy, partly because of the challenge to their leadership and partly because of the Government's proposals on Trade Union reform. The paper suggests optimistically that most Union leaders recognise that the level of wage increases must come down during the next six months. Recent events, e.g. in the local authority dispute, indicate little recognition of any immediate need for restraint, and the settlement of that dispute can only encourage militancy and inflationary wage settlements. Even if Union leaders are disposed to greater moderation, their members are by no means equally amenable. The Committee may wish to consider the factors which might contribute to a more pliant attitude on the part of the Unions and their members and the extent to which the Government can play on these points.

SECRET

Trade Union reform

... I attach a copy of SUBIND A9/70 which deals with the campaign against Trade Union reform and particularly the policy of the Communist Party of Great Britain. The TUC General Council is noticeably avoiding encouragement of industrial action, whereas the CPGB hopes to bring about a series of one-day strikes in selected industries. Their campaign was to be launched at a special conference on 14th November, at which it was hoped that Party influence would lead to substantial support for the first burst of industrial action on 8th December. Mr. Whyte and Mr. Kerr should be asked to report on the outcome of the Conference and the likely developments from it.

SUBIND A9/70 concludes that publicity is the communists' best friend and that the less said about the risk of a strike on 8th December, the less support it is likely to receive. Ministers may wish to save this advice, but it might be more appropriate to channel it through Sir Philip Allen's group than through the SH Committee.

The situation in particular industries

... The Committee may wish to give particular consideration to the mining industry, where the results of the ballot on the Coal Board's offer have still to be announced, and to the power industry, where the Unions have responded to the Electricity Council's offer by calling for industrial action short of striking from 7th December onwards (see SUBIND A12/70 attached). Other sources of trouble include the Post Office, where Lord Hall's departure has provided an unusual twist in industrial action, and the car industry, where the parity question is likely to reappear during next year.

Demonstrations

Although there are no papers on this subject on the agenda, Sir Burke Trend may like to ask Mr. Waddell whether the Home Office see any major risks arising over the next few months from political demonstrations, e.g. against the sale of arms to South Africa.

B. M. Day
B.M. DAY

26th November 1970

TOP SECRET

Scanned
1367

Je.031,

Copy No. 1 of 2.

SIR JOHN HUNT

SUBVERSION (HOME) COMMITTEE

MEETING ON MONDAY, 31 JANUARY, AT
3.30 P.M. IN YOUR OFFICE

BACKGROUND

/ 1. I attach, at Annex A, background notes on the
events in 1976 which led to the revival, in reconstituted
form, of the Group on Subversion in Public Life (SPL) and
the Subversion (Home) Committee (SH). Full terms of
reference, membership and distribution of papers of the
// IAG and SPL are at Flag C and D; and some background on
/ SH and other counter-subversion groups is at Annex B.

SH(76)1 (Report by SPL)

2. Until November 1976, SPL had not actually met for
at least two years. In view of this, and the changes
in its membership and terms of reference, the Group
carried out a comprehensive review of the activities
within the scope of their terms of reference from two main
points of view:-

- (a) The threat - as set out in a detailed paper
(SPL(76)1, of which you received a copy) and
as amplified by Departmental comments at the
meeting.
- (b) Reporting on the threat - the extent and
direction of the Security Service effort,
including any gaps in this.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

3. The outcome of their meeting has been satisfactorily reflected in the survey at paragraphs 2-10 of the paper; the Annex it covers is an abridged version of the SPL paper, up-dated and incorporating points made in discussion on it.

4. The following points arise from the report:-

- (a) Do SH agree that SPL have covered all the ground and that the thrust and balance of the Security Service's collection effort, subject to (b) below, is right? [cf recommendation (a)]
- (b) The report identifies one significant gap - in relation to information on the Communist and Trotskyist activities within the Labour Movement. Do SH support recommendation (b)?
- (c) The report indicates the wide field of subversive activity and the interest of Departments generally in being alerted to this and, where possible, associated with action which can be taken to counter it. The report also shows that useful links are already being established between certain Departments and the Security Service. SH may well feel therefore that recommendation (c)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

recommendation (c) would be useful.

- (d) As paragraph 12 shows, SPL only briefly discussed counter-action. Should the arrangements for this be reviewed (recommendation (d))? If so, does SH want SPL to look more deeply into this, and if so, what guidelines should be set for them?

HANDLING

5. You may agree that discussion at SH could fall conveniently into two parts: the report and matters arising directly from it; and counter-action.

6. The report is largely self-explanatory, but you may wish to ask Mr. Armstrong, as Chairman SPL, briefly to introduce it. Are there any fresh developments which he (or DGSS) would wish to bring to SH's attention? Present plans are to produce another general report for consideration by SPL in about four months' time. Is this about right? Does SH agree that this and similar reports should go to all Permanent Secretaries? Are there any reports of a more specific kind which SH would wish SPL to commission? Have SPL any in mind?

7. You may then wish DGSS to initiate discussion on recommendation (b). What precisely has DGSS in mind? What about recent developments - e.g., the Labour Party's NEC decision? How would reporting be done? Could IAG be used,

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

or would a separate Group need to be formed? To whom should reports go? What effect would any additional work of this kind have on the Security Service's balance of effort both generally and on subversion in particular? Are there financial and manpower considerations?

8. If an approach to Ministers is supported, how should this be carried out? Would SH(76)1 serve as a basis or what further material is required?

COUNTER-ACTION

9. The previous history, so far as I can piece it together and as also referred to in Annex B of this brief,

- (a) confirms that counter-action has always been ultimately under the control and co-ordination of a Cabinet Office Committee;
- (b) suggests that counter-subversion has most actively been concerned with subversion in industry.

10. You may find it helpful to know that in discussion on this subject, members of SPL made the following points:-

- (a) consistent with the current threat, targets for counter-action, if contemplated, should not be confined to industry;
- (b) while it was true that IRD expertise still remains, and there could be a role for them to play, future counter-action should look wider than the use of the media. It was suggested, for example, that

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

there was action which the Civil Service itself might take - an illustration of this was the use of posting to disperse concentrations of left-wing employees in Departmental Staff Sides;

- (c) some counter-action might only be effective if it was taken quickly; on the other hand, there were other kinds of action which would be all the more effective if they reflected a mature and co-ordinated response to a given threat.

11. The above suggests that there may be two levels on which a review of counter-action should concentrate: longer-term and quick response. SH would appear to be the right forum for the first, and for overseeing the second; the difficulty arises over quick response, in which at the SPL meeting, (I think not altogether fair) comparisons were drawn between what I now realize to be the activities of the Dean Group and the work of the Heron Sub-Group.

12. The questions therefore seem to be:-

- (a) Does SH agree that a more positive and systematic approach to counter-subversion is called for?
- (b) If so, how and by whom should proposals to this end be prepared?
- (c) Do they in any case agree that it is for SH to continue to control and supervise at official level, all aspects of counter-subversion but are they prepared to delegate authority in cases where quick response might be justified?

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

- (d) If delegation was considered acceptable, to whom should SH's authority be delegated?
- (e) How far, if at all, could any counter-action be taken without reference to Ministers?

Relationship between the work of SH and JIC(76)16.

13. Finally, you asked to be reminded that you proposed that JIC(76)16 (behind) should not be submitted to Ministers (the Prime Minister only in the first place was proposed) until it could go forward with a report from SH. This approach was agreed by Sir Michael Palliser, Sir Arthur Peterson and Sir Frank Cooper, those principally concerned with JIC(76)16; DGSS and Mr. Armstrong have seen the paper but Sir Douglas Allen and Mr. Barnes will not have done so.

D. A. Nicholls

[D. A. NICHOLLS]

28 January, 1977.

Attachments:

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

ANNEX A

You asked to be reminded of the background to the revival of SH and SPL.

2. In January 1976 you were invited to a discussion at the Home Office about subversion. The discussion was abortive, not least of all because there were no papers for consideration by the meeting, but it indicated a Home Office "bid for a good deal of freedom" in the field of counter-subversion (cf. Flag 'A' in S & P 1367 behind).

3. When the relevant papers were ready, they were the subject of a further meeting (Flag G in S & P 1367), which concentrated on the reconstitution of SPL. In the ensuing correspondence, you took up the point about the body to which SPL should report and the outcome was your letter of 6 July 1976 (Flag H in S & P 1367).

4. At the first meeting of the reconstituted SPL, the Chairman drew their attention to the revival and Terms of Reference of SH.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

ANNEX B

1. Activities concerned with countering subversion, including work by IRD in this field, have always been controlled and co-ordinated by a Cabinet Committee. This was the Official Committee on Communism (Home) until January 1969; it then became the Official Committee on Subversion at Home (SH) under the Chairmanship of the Secretary of the Cabinet, with the following Terms of Reference:-

"To focus intelligence about communist and other subversive activities in the United Kingdom, to advise Ministers on appropriate measures (other than those in relation to the public service, which are within the purview of the Official Committee on Security) to counter these activities, and to co-ordinate such counter-measures."

It appears not to have met (formally at least) after 1970 and you approved its dissolution in 1974.

2. However, in July 1972 the Dean Group was set up. You will wish to be reminded, at page 1 of Flag X, of the background to its establishment. You will see, on page 2 of Flag X, that ^{in turn it} ~~its terms~~ considered the establishment of a sub group on Industry co-ordinated by (the then) Mr. Heron; this was set up at the Dean Group's second meeting (Flag Y) and I understand met almost weekly until February 1974. You will also see the references to the Subversion Home Committee at (j) of page 2 and at 3 overleaf on page 3; there appears [to have been

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

to have been no reporting back on these points to the Dean Group, but in August 1972, under Prime Ministerial direction, an inter-Departmental Group under Mr. Waddell (SPL) was set up "to improve the co-ordination of intelligence on subversion in public life and to provide regular and comprehensive reviews on this subject for Ministers." The relationship between the Heron Group, Dean Group and SPL was referred to at Flag Z.

3. The Dean Group last met on 17 December 1973.

4. From reading the Dean Group and SH papers it appears that:-

- (a) ^{The Dean Group} ~~it~~ supervised counter-action generally on behalf of Ministers;
- (b) it did not meet formally to do so in 1973; but
- (c) the Heron Group were also carrying out, from July 1972 till February 1974, its own counter-action ad hoc, based on the information it collected (cf. Minute 1 at Flag Z);
- (d) SH did not play a big role during this period though its interest was recognized;
- (e) despite the broadly drawn Terms of Reference, counter-action by the Group and sub-group was primarily in relation to subversion in industry.

TOP SECRET

SECRET

p.w.



Foreign and Commonwealth Office

London S.W.1

③



27 May 1971

You asked at our meeting on 24 May for some notes on how counter-subversion work at home might be made more effective.

2. I enclose a Memorandum on this subject. I have not cleared it within FCO since the subject is not primarily a FCO concern. FCO's contribution to this work is well established and not under question.

3. As, however, the ideas in the Memorandum derive to some extent from conversations and correspondence between No.10 and FCO, I am copying this letter and Memorandum to Donald Maitland.

Yours ever,

(G. F. N. Reddaway)

Sir Burke Trend, G.C.B., C.V.O.,
Cabinet Office.

COPIED TO:
Sir S. Crawford
Mr Daunt
Mr Crook
Mr Maitland

[Handwritten signatures and initials]
2/6
M. T. (to see)
M. T. (to see)
J. M.

SECRET

SECRET

COUNTER-SUBVERSION

Recent developments, including national industrial stoppages in which subversive forces have played a part, have underlined the need to fill a gap in our existing defences. The well-tried Whitehall machinery for analysing and assessing the subversive danger and for taking low-level and often effective counter-action is in sound working order; what is lacking is a high-level, informal Co-ordinating Group, consisting of Ministers and interested outsiders as well as officials, to consider, recommend and, as necessary, initiate action at critical moments.

2. The existing machinery consists of the Subversion at Home Committee, successor to the Anti-Communist (Home) Committee founded in 1950, which meets at regular intervals under the chairmanship of the Secretary to the Cabinet and on which the Home Office, the FCO (including IPD), the Department of Employment, the Security Service and, on occasion the Department of Education and Science are represented. A subordinate inter-departmental Working Group (the Home Regional Meeting), also meets monthly under the ex-officio chairmanship of the head of IRD. These bodies keep the subversive situation under constant review and have a record of some success, especially in the publicity field and, via IRIS Ltd., in certain key trade union elections. This is useful support activity which should be both continued and encouraged. The Working Group, however, necessarily lacks the weight and outside contacts required for decisive intervention. For this purpose, complementary machinery with positive Ministerial backing is required.

-1-

SECRET

1

217

76

3. The Subversion at Home Committee and the Home Regional Group are essentially official in scope and are governed by the needs of official secrecy. The proposed Co-ordinating Group on Counter-Subversion would include non-officials from the outset and would necessarily be dependent on the discretion of its co-opted members. Such a parallel Co-ordinating Group would try to close the gap between Governmental knowledge and disapproval of subversive activity and effective action to counter it. Much of the present counter-subversion activity, valuable as it is, has been 'responsive', mainly meeting requests for assistance from established contacts in the press and the trade union field. Under the proposed strategy, not only would this activity be stepped up but, by involving such non-official organisations as the CBI and the Trade Unions, it would often be able to intervene decisively before a situation has grown to critical proportions.
4. The proposed Co-ordinating Group would be under Ministerial patronage (the precedent is the Lord President's Committee on the Approach to Europe). It would analyse the problem as a whole and study the range of possible counter-subversion measures, including the dissemination and leakage of information at present practised. It might, of course, decide that in many situations an increase in the dissemination of information was all that was required. But experience with the Lord President's Committee suggests that contact between a very few officials, party officials, MPs, and non-official bodies can produce much better results than can committees restricted to civil servants. Although such a Group would be more careful and discreet than the Lord President's, it would likewise need to co-opt and work through third parties and, to this end, should be flexible in membership.

5. The proposed Group might aim to encourage and support:
 - (a) the dissemination of information, as an extension of the existing work done by the FCO (IRD) under the auspices of the Subversion at Home Committee;
 - (b) the enlivening of the home information machine, especially in relation to the press, the BBC and the ITA; home information officers tend now to be unduly passive;
 - (c) positive counter-action against key subversive groups and individuals on the basis of informed appraisal of the problems involved.
6. Initially such a Group might be drawn from:
 - (a) a senior Minister without portfolio;
 - (b) Junior Ministers of the Departments of State as appropriate;
 - (c) the Secretary to the Cabinet (Chairman of the Subversion at Home Committee);
 - (d) the Prime Minister's Chief Press Secretary;
 - (e) the Home Office;
 - (f) the Department of Employment;
 - (g) the FCO and its IRD (the operational research body enjoying close liaison with the Security Service and with its existing outlets);
 - (h) the FCO Labour Adviser;
 - (i) the DTI Labour Adviser;
 - (j) such outside bodies as the CBI and the Trade Unions;
 - (k) influential anti-Communists (e.g. Lord Shawcross, Mr Woodrow Wyatt and like-minded representatives of the younger generation of politicians).

The Security Service presumably would not wish to be directly involved in the deliberations of the Group, but their covert assistance would, of course, be vital.

7. The difficulties are obvious. It may not be easy to keep at bay interested parties of the extreme right with an exaggerated view of subversion (e.g. Common Cause). It may also prove difficult in a necessarily all-party forum to be both active in controversial matters and neutral in relation to party. It would also be essential to avoid letting such a Group evolve into an organisation merely defending the status quo. Moreover, the Group would need to be sensitive to the changing nature of the subversive problem; it would need to be aware that in modern conditions, the Communist Party is often a force for relative moderation, that indeed it is so regarded by the New Left and that, while owing to its size it must remain the principal threat to national security, it is seldom nowadays the most immediate threat in Britain. The Group would also need to understand that exposure for its own sake can be counter-productive (as it may have been in the recent election of a Communist to the presidency of the National Union of Students) and that exaggerated press campaigns can inflate the standing of irresponsible groups (as at the time of the Vietnam demonstrations of 1968-70). These difficulties, however, should not prove insuperable.

27 May 1971.

SECRET

23rd June, 1971

Ref. A09897

At the meeting Sir Burke Trend held on 24th May it was agreed that papers should be prepared on Subversion in Industry and the Mass Media, and on Counter Subversion in the United Kingdom, and I now write to send copies of these papers, prepared respectively by the Security Service and the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

Sir Burke Trend would like to discuss these papers at the meeting arranged for Monday, 28th June at 4.30 pm.

Copies of this letter go to Reddaway (FCO) and to the Private Secretaries to those also invited to the meeting (Sir Denis Barnes, the Intelligence Co-ordinator and Sir Martin Furnival Jones).

B. M. NORBURY

(B.M. Norbury)

Mrs. J. M. Eden

04 1/6/71



6

I am invited to
attend this
meeting.

With the Compliments
of the
Private Secretary
to the
Secretary of the Cabinet

G.F.N. Reddaway, Esq., CBE

1 Sir S. C. [unclear] 24/6
2 Mr. [unclear] (Ri)

J.F. 25/6
N. Reddaway

25th

Mr. Reddaway again

Cabinet Office,
London, S.W.1.

SECRET

6

Correspondence to this address must be under *double cover*.

The *outer* envelope should be addressed to:—

THE SECRETARY, BOX 500, PARLIAMENT STREET B.O., LONDON, S.W.1.
and *not* to any individual.

Telephone Nos. 01-734 6050 Ext. 130
01-930 6789 Ext.



BOX No. 500,
PARLIAMENT STREET B.O.,
LONDON, S.W.1.

Our Ref.: POL F 299-13/FIB/I

Your Ref.:

John Tyrer Esq.,
I.R.D.



23rd June 1971

Dear John,

When we spoke about the paper
"Subversion in Industry and the Mass Media,
1965 - 1971" today it became apparent that the
version you have is different in length from
the one we are finally to present, and I therefore
attach a copy of our revised version.

Yours sincerely,

R. T. Reed.

FIB/I
RTR/MEW

SECRET

SECRET

SUBVERSION IN INDUSTRY
AND THE MASS MEDIA, 1965 - 1971

INTRODUCTION

The Security Service approach to the study of subversion in industry and the mass media is to work outwards through its central study of identified subversive organisations. Reports have been supplied to Government at intervals over the past six years on the subversive content of industrial unrest and disputes, so that some comparison of developments within that period can be made. Reports on some aspects of subversion in the mass media were made in 1962 and 1969; but only a limited comparison of developments in this field is possible. Security Service coverage of subversion in industry is fairly comprehensive; subversion in the mass media is not investigated in the same depth and conclusions about it must be more tentative.

INDUSTRY

General

2. There has been some increase in industrial disputes, officially recognised and conducted at a national level, during the second half of the period under review; but there has been a marked increase of disruption and militancy, mainly unofficial in the early stages, at the shop floor level. This latter development, although it may be exploited by subversive organisations, has not been created by them. Its extent is variable and may be affected by a large number of factors operating on both sides of industry, for example, the decline in the quality of the national leadership of the trade unions, the erosion of trade union disciplinary procedures, and the tendency to move from national agreements to shop floor bargaining. Particular industrial and geographical traditions play their part - the "Merseyside Militant" who enjoys local solidarity and is independent of political pressures or economic reality. The operation of the welfare state, the tax system and employers' agreements made to encourage the stability of the labour force can reduce the incentives to strike action and temper at least the immediate impact of unemployment. The apathy of the rank and file trade

/unionist

SECRET

1

SECRET



- 2 -

unionist and his gratitude to shop stewards for their welfare work, making him normally ready to follow the leadership of the minority prepared to devote time and trouble to trade union affairs are other factors. The situation is exacerbated when shop stewards lacking negotiating skill have allowed themselves to be driven into untenable positions which more experienced full-time officials would have avoided.

Communist Party of Great Britain (C.P.G.B.)

3. The object of the C.P.G.B.'s activities in industry is to win political power. The importance of the trade union movement to the C.P.G.B. lies primarily in the political influence which it could exercise on the Labour Party through the trade unions' collective voting strength at Labour Party Conferences and their substantial contribution to its funds. Its principal aim is to exploit any positions of strength it can acquire in the trade unions as an indirect means of influencing Labour Party policy; any industrial unrest which may result from its activity in the trade union movement the C.P.G.B. tends to regard as a bonus. The Party's activities in industry and the trade unions are co-ordinated by its Industrial Department which operates largely through secret Party Advisory Committees set up for most of the major unions and industries. These endeavour - usually successfully - to provide an effective electoral machine for candidates supported by the Party and seek to secure the reflection of C.P.G.B. aims in trade union policy.

4. Through this machinery over the period under review, the Party has more than re-established its position of influence in the official trade union movement which had been threatened by the exposure in 1961 of the Party's illicit activities in the then Electrical Trades Union (E.T.U.). After these disclosures the number of Party members and sympathisers amongst the leading officials and Executive Committee members of the 40 largest unions fell from a ratio of about 1 in 10 to 1 in 13. Today Party members and sympathisers hold 1 in 8 of these posts - a position last reached in the early fifties. The ending of the ban on Communists holding office in the Transport and General Workers Union (T.G.W.U.) has contributed to the increase in the Party's strength. The abolition of similar bans in other unions following the enactment of the Industrial Relations Bill is likely further to strengthen the Party's position. This strength at executive level should be set against the facts that at the most 1 in 500 of all trade unionists is a Communist and that there is no union in which the Party could at present be said to exert controlling influence.

/5. Two

SECRET

/0. The

SECRET



- 3 -

5. Two significant developments have been the shift in trade union attitudes towards the industrial policies supported by the Party and the realisation of one of the Party's long standing ambitions - that the leadership of the two largest unions, the T.G.W.U. and the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (A.U.E.W.) should pass into left wing hands. Jack JONES and Hugh SCANLON both have Communist records, are prepared to work closely with the Communist Party on particular issues and stand well to the left of the trade union movement. Neither, however, is a puppet of the Communist Party as both are responsive to the needs of their unions and indeed are at present in some disfavour with the Party over their conduct in the Fords dispute and the campaign against the Industrial Relations Bill.

6. As a result of its national campaign to resist reform of the trade unions begun in 1968 the Party found its leadership becoming more acceptable and criticism of its activities in the trade union movement less pronounced. It had successes in the campaign both through its creature, the Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions (L.C.D.T.U.) and through its position of influence in the official trade union machinery. However, the failure to carry the Special Congress of the T.U.C. on 18th March, 1971, into outright opposition to registration under the Industrial Relations Bill, and into backing national industrial action, was a setback for the Party, although the C.P.G.B. still hopes to organise effective protest once the Bill is enacted.

7. In recent years, the Communist Party as such has had little direct influence on the outcome of major national industrial disputes. This was partly because the leadership of the major unions tended, for their own reasons, to adopt tactics in industrial disputes which were in line with Party policy, and the Party consequently did not feel it necessary to exercise the pressure which was needed in the past when unions were under "right-wing" leadership. The Party has also been preoccupied with the campaign against trade union reform. It has never had the capacity to initiate industrial unrest, and can merely respond to opportunities presented to it. The 1966 Seamen's strike was the last occasion when the Party had a decisive influence on an official strike of national importance, although a somewhat inept attempt was made to influence the Miners' strike at the end of 1970. With the dismantling of the unofficial liaison committee in the London docks, the Party has tended to have less direct influence on dock strikes, and even in areas where it is traditionally well established, e.g. among shop stewards at Fords and in the unofficial leadership of the power industry, it has had decreasing direct influence over the conduct of disputes.

SECRET



- 4 -

8. The Party's activity in trade union affairs is now on the whole discreetly conducted and since most Communist trade union officials, who are not always publicly known or recognised as Communists, discharge their union responsibilities conscientiously, C.P.G.B. involvement in trade union affairs is less subject to the suspicion and criticism which at one time it used to attract. Even when the trade union leadership is less well disposed towards it, the Party's need to protect its investment in the union bureaucracy tends to limit its involvement in unthinking militancy.

Trotskyists

9. There has been an increase in the extent of Trotskyist influence on industrial relations. With the exception of certain members of the International Socialism group (I.S.) Trotskyists have shown little interest in infiltrating the trade union bureaucracy and have concentrated their activities on the shop floor. Here their influence has affected workers' attitudes and on occasion injected an element of violence into disputes; but it would be difficult to identify any particular major dispute as having been directly and effectively exploited by Trotskyist groups. Even in the Pilkington dispute Trotskyist influence was marginal. Influence in smaller local disputes (e.g. the Hull Docks and the threatened occupation of G.E.C. factories on Merseyside) has been more direct. The growing circulation of the organ of the Socialist Labour League (S.L.L.), the "Workers' Press", has had a noticeable influence on shop floor attitudes; it makes union leaders like JONES and SCANLON and the Communist Party itself responsive to criticism from the extreme militant left. The S.L.L. leadership, both directly and through its creature the All Trades Union Alliance (A.T.U.A.), is developing a capacity to exert militant pressures selectively on non-Trotskyists. At a higher level the Institute for Workers' Control (I.W.C.), which was involved in an advisory capacity with the G.E.C. occupation, exercises similar pressures. Trotskyist influence could also make younger workers even less responsive to efforts to re-establish union discipline than they already are. Unlike the Communist Party, none of the Trotskyist groups has even a limited interest in preserving the economy as they cannot foresee the achievement of power except through revolution.

Other Subversive Groups

10. The pro-Chinese groups operating in the trade union movement (mainly confined to the A.U.E.W.) are as yet of minor significance. There is little prospect that they will make much headway against the entrenched interest of the C.P.G.B. unless there is a revolutionary change in the outlook of the majority of C.P.G.B. members.

SECRET

SECRET



- 5 -

THE MASS MEDIA

11. The cinema, theatre and large circulation newspapers and periodicals are not included in this survey, as the professional and economic controls operating in them are likely to inhibit clandestine efforts of employees and contributors to propagate subversive ideas. Political newspapers and periodicals in which the ideals of subversive organisations are openly propagated are also omitted.

12. Anxiety is often expressed at possible subversive manipulation of the mass media and in particular broadcasting but the subversive organisations of the left regard television, radio and the press generally in this country as lying in the control of the capitalist system and as being devoted to its class interests.

13. The C.P.G.B. formerly ran a number of cultural groups concerned with the Party's role and interests in various media. Its Film and T.V. Group, however, has not come to notice since 1965 and is believed to be extinct. The Party maintains a press and publicity department at its headquarters, which, among other duties, considers requests for interviews on T.V. and radio and by the press. This department does not appear to apply itself actively to opening up the mass media to the Party - indeed it suffers from anxieties over the possibility of adverse publicity and it gives offers of programmes featuring the C.P.G.B. most careful consideration, sometimes turning them down.

14. In two B.B.C. T.V. current affairs programmes broadcast in 1971, Communist Party members who outnumbered the rest on opinion panels were represented only as rank and file members of a trade union involved in a particular industrial dispute. In both programmes they appeared to dominate the scene and their views were heard to the exclusion of others. A number of individual trade unionists known to the Security Service as Communists or sympathisers have from time to time been interviewed as representatives of their unions during wage negotiations without reference to their political views. There is no evidence that this reflects the connivance of producers of the programmes in question.

15. There is no indication that the C.P.G.B. is making much effort to influence T.V. or broadcasting for its own purposes or that it is exercising any central direction over its members who work in or contribute to these media with a view to the covert introduction of Communist ideas.

/16.

SECRET



16. There is no indication that any Trotskyist organisation is pursuing a calculated policy of penetrating television or any of the mass media for subversive purposes, but a dozen or so persons with Trotskyist associations have come to notice during the past few years.

17. The influence of a Trotskyist editor on Granada's "World in Action" is thought to have been responsible for a decline in objectivity in that programme in early 1969. The editor in question has said that he is "allergic to the Establishment and to governments" and that he was "fortunate in being able to use television as a kind of therapy for his indignation".

18. A Production Assistant with Trotskyist inclinations who was employed by the B.B.C. in 1969 and posted to the Overseas Service, is said to have admitted that he proposed to use this opportunity to collect material with which to expose the B.B.C. as a dangerous neo-colonial institution when he leaves the Corporation.

19. A small cohesive group of writers and producers, mostly with Trotskyist sympathies has emerged in television. They have achieved some success with their quasi documentary plays, notably on social issues of the day. "Cathy Come Home" shown by the B.B.C. in 1966 was the precursor of the series while more recently two plays portraying strikes of dockers and at a glass factory seen from the strikers' viewpoint have been broadcast. The two plays about strikers have contained a political message consistent with Trotskyism. Gerry HEALY, the National Secretary of the Trotskyist Socialist Labour League was in close touch with the producer, Kenneth LOACH, over the latter's production of the play about the striking glass workers. The members of this group are competent technicians - LOACH made the award-winning film "Kes" - and it is because of their professional reputation that they are used by the B.B.C. and I.T.V.

20. The recently formed Free Communications Group, which comprises authors, playwrights, producers, technicians and executives of various kinds employed not only in television but in all branches of the mass media, is influenced by a number of Trotskyists within it and advocates the control of communications media by writers and producers. It is not at the moment an effective or cohesive body.

21. Two of the Penguin editorial staff concerned with political publications hold left wing revolutionary views. This is probably fortuitous and not the result of deliberate policy by any particular revolutionary group. Persons with such

/sympathies

SECRET

SECRET



- 7 -

sympathies may select and possibly prefer certain revolutionary works for publication at the expense of other more objective material. There is, however, significant public demand for works of social protest and books about revolutionary philosophy. It is good business for publishers to issue such books.

22. The magazine Private Eye is a satirical journal which specialises in deriding institutions and the personalities of what it considers to be the Establishment. It has developed an outlook which is largely destructive and which is often aimed at reducing public confidence in national institutions. It is distinguished from the so-called Underground Press by having in general competent and experienced journalists on its staff with reasonably well informed sources. Paul FOOT, a regular contributor, is a close associate of Trotskyists.

23. The Underground Press consists of such periodicals as Oz, IT, Friends, Rolling Stone and the latest to appear - Ink. These are aimed at the teenager and those in their early 20's, many of whom are students. Issues contain sections on pop music, drugs and on the problems of liberation from some form or other of real or imagined oppression - varying from sexual or racial prejudice and the tyranny of data banks on the one hand, to economic exploitation and police brutality on the other. Obscene language and graphics are commonplace. The political content of these papers is revolutionary but no one revolutionary or subversive group is preferred; Mao, Castro, Guevara, Eldridge Cleaver and the Black or White Panthers are all seen as folk heroes.

CONCLUSION

24. The nature and scale of the threat of Communist subversion in industry have not changed substantially over the past six years, though the situation has to some extent developed in a way favourable to the Party's aims, while its penetration of leading trade unions is now back at its 1950's level. Militancy in industrial relations has increased and has proved particularly troublesome at shop floor level, though its origins lie elsewhere than in the activities of subversive organisations. Trotskyist groups have shown themselves increasingly able to take advantage of shop floor militancy and to exploit disputes which arise at that level, though their influence should not be over-rated. The long-term subversive threat remains the C.P.G.B. with its aim of achieving political power through control of the unions. The impending industrial relations legislation should have a stabilising effect on labour relations by strengthening union organisation and limiting opportunities for unofficial industrial action though it may facilitate open Communist

/penetration

SECRET

SECRET



- 8 -

penetration of some union executives.

25. The Communist subversive threat within the mass media appears to be slight and the threat from the activities of individual Trotskyists cannot be regarded as substantial. Their efforts are subject to the normal restraints of a free society and their ability to propagate subversive ideas undetected is probably limited. They can compensate for this by pursuing an easier but perhaps equally subversive policy of destroying confidence in society. The subversive threat from the Underground Press is similar but so far is limited by the small size of its circulation.

SECURITY SERVICE

10th June, 1971.

Pol F 299-13

SECRET

Reference DH 1/6/71

SECRET

(7)

Mr. Tucker

Mr. Reddaway

MEETING IN SIR BURKE TREND'S ROOM ON 28 JUNE 1971

FLAG A
FLAG B

1. We spoke. As promised, I attach copies of the two papers prepared at Sir Burke Trend's request by ourselves and by the Security Service on home front affairs, together with a covering brief.

J.E. Tyrer
J.E. Tyrer

24 June, 1971

SECRET

SECRET

Meeting to be held in Sir Burke Trend's Room
in the Cabinet Office on Monday, 28 June, 1971.

References: A. FCO paper on Counter Subversion

B. Security Service paper on Subversion in Industry
and the Mass Media, 1965-71

1. The Security Service paper concludes that
 - (a) the CPGB, although an electorally negligible force, remains the main subversive threat to our society by virtue of its size and relative cohesion;
 - (b) the Party's main challenge is on the industrial front, where it has gained ground in recent years and is now, in general, back to the level of the 1950s (para 4);
 - (c) contrary to popular belief, the Party's industrial complex serves a long-term political end, however remote from practical politics (the domination of the TUC and through it the Labour Party Annual Conference) and is not used for merely disruptive purposes (para 3);
 - (d) the Trotskyists, who are in business as wreckers, are too fissiparous to compete with the Party (para 9);
 - (e) in the mass media, where the subversive element is slight, it is the Trotskyists who pose the greater threat, albeit not a substantial one (para 16).
2. On the industrial front, we should not underestimate the longstanding

/anti-Communist

SECRET

anti-Communist operation mounted by IRIS Ltd., little of which receives publicity. Although IRIS' record over 15 years is one of disappointment as well as success, the organisation is highly regarded by the Security Service, the Department of Employment and indeed by Sir Burke Trend, as well as by ourselves. This year, for instance, they have two major successes to their credit; rebuffing the Party (and its TGWU allies) inside the National Union of Seamen, at a time when the militants seemed poised for a take-over, and securing the election of an anti-Communist as president of the National Union of Mineworkers, despite a major effort by the CPGB Industrial Department which the Party was confident would succeed. The Security Service has recently placed on record the view that IRIS is

"... the only anti-Communist organisation for which the Party has any respect; all the others (Economic League, Common Cause, etc.) were regarded as derisory".

3.



2.

SECRET

THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER
SECTION 3 (4) OF THE
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958



SECRET

[REDACTED]

4. In pressing our case for additional liaison on the home front, we should perhaps avoid suggesting that there is any major task of exposure to mount. What is needed is rather the means of ensuring that the most mileage can be made out of any given situation as effectively as possible.

[REDACTED]

THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER
SECTION 3 (4) OF THE
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

3.

SECRET

SECRET

(8)

OH 1/6/71

Sir P. C. C. C. C.

I.R.D.

Sir Burke Trend's Meeting on Counter-Subversion (Home)

Sir Burke convened a meeting to consider two papers:

- (a) a Security Service paper on subversion in industry and the mass media, 1965 to 1971;
- (b) a FCO paper suggesting possible means of countering subversion.

2. At the meeting were Sir Philip Allen (H.O.), Sir Denis Barnes and Mr C. F. Heron (D.E.P.), Mr Furnival Jones, Lord Rothschild, Mr Maitland and myself. *S.M.*

3. There was general agreement that in Britain today there ~~was~~ ^{is} a vast, deliberately engineered subversive conspiracy; but that there was a good deal of subversive activity which was making the country harder to govern and poorer. Subversive people and organisations were considered to be those who did not believe in evolutionary parliamentary government but preferred to work towards a revolutionary situation and a revolutionary/at which the traditional rules would be unable to govern and the governed would be in a position to overthrow them.

/moment

4. Given the abundant knowledge that we had of subversive activity, the question at issue was whether and what action should be taken to exploit it more fully. Sir P. Allen was disinclined to countenance additional positive action. Sir D. Barnes and most of the others were inclined to favour action, though there were differing views of what might be effective and justifiable.

5. It was generally agreed that any action decided upon must involve a few non-governmental people in addition to those officials concerned.

6. Sir Burke said that he would address a note to the Prime Minister suggesting that Mr Whitelaw be asked to consider the problem and perhaps invited to talk to one or two friends and contacts about how to close the gap between knowledge about subversion and action to counter it.

N. Reddaway

(O. F. N. Reddaway)
30 June 1971

COPY

Mr Daunt

Mr. Tucker R.D. Sec

Mr. C. R. C. p.v. 8/7.
8/7.

SECRET

NOTE FOR THE RECORD

Sir Burke Trend held a meeting in his room at 3.15 p.m. on Wednesday, 30th June 1971, to discuss papers circulated by Mr. Norbury on 23rd June about subversion in industry and the mass media. There were present -

Sir Philip Allen	-	Home Office
Sir Denis Barnes	-	Department of Employment
Mr. C.F. Heron	-	" " "
The Director General	-	Security Service
Mr. G.F.N. Reddaway	-	Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Mr. D.J.D. Maitland	-	10 Downing Street
Lord Rothschild	-	Cabinet Office
Mr. B.M. Day		Secretary

In discussion, it was suggested that subversion should be defined as the attempt to overthrow constitutional government by non-parliamentary means. There were no signs of highly organised subversion in this sense in the country, but on the other hand there was evidence of political motivation in the seamen's strike in 1966, for example, and in more recent times there had been reports, which could not be entirely refuted, of groups of militants moving from site to site during industrial troubles. The number of trouble-makers whose motives were deliberately destructive, rather than being aimed simply at procuring improved wage settlements, was now probably no greater than in the past, but they were able to do more damage because of the fresh opportunities provided by inflation.

In further discussion, it was suggested that the present machinery for dealing with subversion needed strengthening at a high level, e.g. by means of a co-ordinating group, comprising a senior Minister without Portfolio and other representatives of Government and influential organisations and individuals outside Government. Such a group might work through its members to expose the existence of subversive effort in the country and to alert public opinion to the dangers. Although this course of action had its attractions, it also presented substantial difficulties and it ran the risk of defeating its own ends. A cautious approach was therefore desirable, and it would be helpful as a first step to interest a senior Minister, such as the Lord President, in the problem and to invite him to make his own assessment through informal, personal contacts with people inside and outside the Government of the extent of the problem and the support which could be expected for taking action to deal with it.

Summing up the discussion, Sir Burke Trend said that the evidence to confirm fears of organised subversion was neither overwhelming nor very clear. On the other hand, there was sufficient to warrant going more deeply into the problem to consider its scope and the desirability of taking action. He therefore proposed to minute the Prime Minister to set out the background, and to seek his authority to approach the Lord President about the possibility of his concerning himself with the subject on the lines indicated in discussion. Sir Burke Trend would consider whether there was advantage in sending the Prime Minister a copy of the Security Service Memorandum of 10th June 1971 about subversion in industry and the mass media since 1965.

The meeting -

took note of Sir Burke Trend's summing up.

30th June 1971

Distribution - Mr. Norbury, Mr. Day.



SUBVERSION IN THE U.K. - 1972

INTRODUCTION

Note: The activities of the I.R.A. and other Irish extremist groups are not considered in this paper.

There are several issues today which provide subversive organisations with opportunities for exploitation, by propaganda and by direct forms of protest. British entry into the E.E.C., the Industrial Relations legislation, the level of unemployment, the conduct of affairs in Northern Ireland, even lesser issues such as the decision to limit free school milk and the proposals for controlling student union funds, are matters on which substantial sections of the community tend to oppose the government. These issues provide causes which subversive organisations have not been slow to seize on but their role and what they have achieved must be seen in perspective. In recent major issues, for example the coal miners' strike, Upper Clyde Shipbuilders and opposition to the Industrial Relations legislation, the efforts of subversive groups represent a small part of a general momentum. While not insignificant, their efforts have not been decisive.

2. The number of people who may be described as committed supporters of the various subversive organisations or who are violently inclined Anarchists, is little more than 40,000 or well below 0.1% of the population. This figure bears little relationship to the temporary, wider support which subversive organisations sometimes obtain when they adopt causes of the day which enjoy a broad appeal. The largely Trotskyist inspired demonstration over Vietnam in

/.....



- 2 -

Grosvenor Square, London in October 1968 was attended by some 25,000 people - at least six times the known number of Trotskyists in the U.K. Similarly the 29,000 strong Communist Party of Great Britain (C.P.G.B.) exercises a disproportionate influence among 10 million trade unionists.

3. All subversive groups view popular causes as opportunities for extending their influence. Although from time to time they find it tactically acceptable to make common cause in joint demonstrations, it should not be inferred that there are 40,000 organised militants, with identical subversive aims, permanently capable of united action and under centralised direction. Experience over the past five years suggests that the more revolutionary groups of the ultra-left, the Trotskyists and Maoists for example, are incapable of forming lasting associations. When they do collaborate among themselves and with the C.P.G.B., their relationship is usually uneasy and ephemeral, punctuated by doctrinal rivalries and power struggles.

THE SOURCES OF SUBVERSION

The Communists

4. The C.P.G.B., which with 29,000 members is the strongest subversive group in the country, aims to create a socialist state through peaceful means. It plans first to bring about a broad socialist alliance which will lead a large scale, popular struggle to improve the social and economic conditions of working people. Once in power it proposes to consolidate its position by filling the leading appointments in the public service, armed forces and police

/.....

with trusted nominees. In practice, having consistently failed to attract the electorate, it is pursuing political power through infiltrating the trade unions. Using union representation, the Communists hope to influence Labour Party policy to the point where an alliance, which they would try to dominate, became possible.

5. The Party's aims are coherent and positive; they are directed to a change in society rather than to its destruction and the Party has an interest in succeeding to a viable rather than a ruined economy. The Party does not advocate violence or lawlessness. Its attitude to promoting industrial unrest, as towards intervention in political, social and economic issues, is calculated in terms of the political advantage likely to accrue from its participation. Although, through its industrial influence, its size and its relatively strong organisation, the C.P.G.B. remains the major long term subversive threat in this country, it is weakened by internal dissension.

The Trotskyists

6. The Trotskyists groups taken together are about 4,000 strong, one seventh the size of the C.P.G.B., but their membership is increasing. Despite constant tactical and doctrinal disputes among themselves they share common basic aims and convictions. They believe that a decaying capitalist system is maintained artificially by an arms economy and that without this prop, which is already weakening, the country will decline into a pre-revolutionary situation. At this stage, because of economic hardship, the working class will be induced to accept Trotskyist leadership, which will steer the proletariat into direct confrontation with the forces of authority until the point of revolution is reached.

/.....



- 4 -

7. The Trotskyists see no need to build mass parties or secure Parliamentary power for this purpose. They aim to identify and make contacts in groups they consider to be currently alienated from society - militant students, Irish activists, Black Power groups and workers in industry are among their present targets. They hope to use these first to hasten the spread of disillusionment with the capitalist system and ultimately to further the cause of revolution. Much of the Trotskyist effort is occupied in manipulating front organisations which they use to maintain what is often a deliberately violent challenge to authority. A characteristic of this front activity is the Trotskyists' ability to attract the support not only of intellectuals and well known personalities such as Bernadette Devlin, John Lennon and Vanessa Redgrave but also of large numbers of students with militant inclinations who sometimes inflate Trotskyist confrontations to dimensions far beyond those of the hard core membership.

Maoists and Anarchists

8. Of the remaining subversive groups only the Maoists and the Anarchists are significant. (Though they have a total membership of about 4,500 the Fascist groups represent only an occasional problem for law and order rather than a threat to national security).

9. The Maoists, who number less than 500, are fragmented; their numerous splinter groups contain a few intellectuals, some businessmen and several trade unionists. Some young people including students have been attracted to Maoism by the revolutionary spirit exemplified in the former Red Guard

/.....



- 5 -

movement in China. This finds reflection in the violence sometimes shown by small groups of Maoists when participating in demonstrations organised by others. All Maoist groups in this country are hostile to the C.P.G.B. and Trotskyist groups. They derive some hospitality and moral encouragement from the Chinese Diplomatic Mission in London.

10. The number of traditional Anarchists in this country is hard to assess as they avoid organisation, but their press suggests that about one hundred small groups often not numbering as many as ten persons now exist - almost double the number five years ago. While all are theoretically dedicated to the overthrow of any system of government in this country, few are prepared to carry their beliefs beyond the bounds of lawful protest and much of their public activity comprises participation in demonstrations or forms of social protest such as squatting in empty accommodation and publicising the alleged injustices of the Social Services. A small number however are prepared to show solidarity with continental Anarchists, for example by creating propaganda explosions in Spanish and Italian government or business premises in this country.

Neo-Anarchism

11. A recent development has been the appearance of what may be called a 'neo-Anarchist' group - The Angry Brigade. Its planting of bombs resembles traditional Anarchist violence but the source of its political inspiration is to be found more in the modern revolutionary philosophies of GUEVARA, MARCUSE and MARIGHIELLA which have encouraged the development of urban guerilla movements in other parts of the world. It is dedicated to the complete overthrow of present society, though its proposals for replacing it are not defined. Apart from the I.R.A., the Angry Brigade's activities in 1971 represent the most

/.....



- 6 -

violent form of active political protest in present day society. Since the arrest of a number of members of the Angry Brigade, there have been three unclaimed and unexplained explosions. It must therefore be recognised that members of the group may still be at large or that other groups may engage in violence of this kind.

12. Neo-Anarchist movements find haven and support in the so-called Alternative Society, a form of personal and cultural protest which has developed on a small scale in this country. Some of its members have established and live in communes, one of which played a part in the Angry Brigade case, and its views and attitudes are represented in the Underground Press. The latter, far from being clandestine, is published openly and offered for sale commercially. It is characterised by its revolutionary and frequently obscene content and its general aim appears to be the undermining of present society by destroying public confidence in its institutions. The precursor was perhaps 'Private Eye' though this is less crude and professionally more competent, enjoying a commercial viability which has eluded 'IT', 'OZ', 'FRIENDZ', 'INK' and the more serious '7 DAYS'. While they exist these publications may achieve a circulation of up to 30,000 though it is usually considerably less. Only the weekly London entertainment guide 'Time Out' which also devotes space to revolutionary articles and to advertising protest meetings appears to be securely established at present.

/.....

Ref: A01361

SECRET AND PERSONAL

File

4 MAR 1972

MR. ARMSTRONG

I am trying to get Subversion in Industry back on to its feet - if you see what I mean! But I think that what we must now ask Ministers to consider is something rather wider - i.e. the extent of organised subversion (if it exists) not merely in industry but also in other influential areas of society such as education, the communications media and so forth; and the means by which, if it does exist, the Government might best deal with it. As a first step I have asked the Security Service to produce a memorandum on this subject within the next week or so; and when I have received it I shall probably suggest that the Prime Minister should ask a few of his colleagues (e.g. the Home Secretary, the Foreign Secretary, the Lord President, the Secretary of State for Defence and, possibly, the Secretary of State for Employment) to meet and to discuss informally the very difficult, elusive and intractable problems involved.

BURKE TREND

29th February, 1972

SECRET

CABINET OFFICE

A

6566

1-MAR-1972

ALONG INSTRUCTIONS

FILE NO.

MR. MORRIS

At yesterday's Home Regional Meeting the Chairman raised informally and without prior warning the question of the functions of the Meetings in the light of the recent coal strike. He suggested that a study of subversive influences affecting the conduct of picketing might be a useful task for the Meetings to undertake.

I suggested that it would be as well to keep the functions of the HR meetings under consideration in the light of any general review of the lessons to be drawn from the coal strike and the developments which might emerge from such a review. Subject to this, the HR Meetings - which take place monthly, usually with the minutes circulated two or three weeks afterwards - should probably continue to be primarily of a stocktaking and ruminative nature. It might be valuable for the HR Meetings to sponsor a series of studies of longer term or continuing interest to the Emergencies Committees as well as the Subversion at Home Committee (to which the HR Meetings look as 'parent'). Picketing was certainly one subject which might repay study, and a continuing watch on union and left wing attitudes towards the industrial relations Act was another. These impromptu remarks were well received, but I think it would be useful for us to give the general question further consideration within the Cabinet Office, particularly as I sense some perplexity about the current mission of the HR Meetings.

Although the meetings theoretically report to the SH Committee, in practice it is a pretty loose relationship and I cannot recollect during my time here any formal communication between the two bodies. The SH Committee has not been active for some time; but when it has required advice on Home Regional matters, it has worked direct with IRD and not through the HR Meetings. Conversely, IRD have raised various matters direct with the SH Committee. A closer working relationship between the HR Meetings and the SH Committee might develop, if it is agreed, as I suggested yesterday, that the HR Meetings might sponsor some longer-term studies in particular aspects of subversion. The SH Committee might have some views on a possible programme of work.

The next point to consider is whether the HR Meetings can make any greater contribution to the work of the Emergencies Committees or any new organisation which may emerge from the current review of the handling of emergencies. The representation of Departments such as the Home Office and the Department of Employment on both the HR Meetings and the Emergencies Committees, together with the circulation (under separate arrangements) of SUBIND papers, may be sufficient, but the point might repay further examination.

I have not discussed any of this more widely within the Cabinet Office at this stage, but Sir Burke Trend may like to consider whether further consultations are desirable.

B. M. Day

B.M. DAY

1st March 1972

SECRET

Ref: A01477.

20. APR 1972

PRIME MINISTER

Subversion

Immediately after the miners' strike I asked the Security Service to produce a study of the present state of subversive activity in this country; and I suggested to them that they should not confine themselves to industry but should deal also with other important spheres of influence such as education and the communications media. You will be interested to read the attached report, which arrived at a very opportune moment immediately after the discussion at Yesterday's Cabinet.

In one sense the memorandum does not take us very far. It analyses the motives and activities of the main subversive groups in this country; and it comes once again to the conclusion that, troublesome though these groups are, they do not constitute anything in the nature of an organised conspiracy against the State. It also endorses (paragraph 26) the view that "there is no panacea for subversive activities. Government is limited in what it can do; and much must be left to natural restraints, such as the weight of public opinion, which operate in a free society". As regards counter action it recommends the appointment of an official Counter Subversion Committee "able to meet both regularly and ad hoc to survey developments, commission assessments and recommend counter action".

I suspect that the Cabinet would feel that they could not dissent from any of these opinions. At the same time I should not expect them to feel satisfied that we are doing all we could to deal with subversive influences in society, even though it is extremely difficult to see what more we can in fact do in this area. I believe that the first step should be to gather together under your chairmanship a few Ministers - the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Lord President, the Secretary of State for Defence and perhaps the Secretary of State for Employment - for an informal discussion of the memorandum at some moment (perhaps towards the end of the Easter Recess) when there may be time (we hope!) for a reasonably relaxed and leisurely examination of the whole subject. I suspect that its outcome would be general agreement that (a) we should know more and (b) we should do more about subversion. It is here that the real difficulties begin. As regards knowing more, there is a very natural disposition on the part of all Governments to believe that the Security Service, if they exerted themselves, could probe more deeply into

the sources of subversion and could tell Ministers more accurately and in more detail what these sinister forces are up to. To any request of this kind the Security Service always give - as they are entitled, indeed bound, to - the same answer, i.e. that their concern is solely with the security of the State and that they would be infringing their Charter (and therefore trespassing on the liberty of the ordinary citizen) if they used their resources to investigate the behaviour of individuals who, however politically repugnant and socially objectionable they may be, are not seeking to overthrow the established Constitution by extra-political means. This is a hard doctrine; and one may sometimes suspect that MI5 interpret it almost too rigidly. But if they must err, it is better that they should err in this direction rather than in the other; and if Ministers wish to use them more vigorously or more extensively in the field of subversive activity in general they will have to keep a wary eye on the Charter (which successive Governments have always reaffirmed without significant amendment). This is not to say, however, that more could not be done to systematise the information which MI5 can properly produce; to keep it under regular review; and to assess from time to time the changes of emphasis and direction which one can sometimes detect. The suggestion of an official counter subversion committee at home - corresponding to the existing Committee on Subversion abroad - is a sound one; and I should like to see it followed up. But, because the subject is politically so sensitive, I am sure that any committee of this kind would need a Minister or Ministers to whom it could report and from whom it could seek guidance. I suspect that either the Home Secretary or the Lord President should take charge of this operation.

As regards doing more to counter subversion in this country, the difficulties are even greater; subversion has so many different forms and crops up in so many different places. But a certain amount of useful counter subversion work is already done - unattributably - by IRD in conjunction with the Security Service; and I should like to see this, too, brought out more into the open (relatively speaking!) and given more conscious and authoritative direction. Here again, a Minister or a small Ministerial body would play an essential part, particularly as regards informal contacts with the "outside" world where much of the work of countering subversion is necessarily to be done. If your initial meeting could agree on the constitution of a body of this kind and could give it its terms of reference, we should at least have made a beginning.

The Home Secretary has a copy of the Security Service's memorandum; but otherwise it has had no circulation apart from yourself and Mr. Maitland, to whom I am sending a copy, together with a copy of this minute.

DUPLICATE

COMMUNIST
AND
NATIONALIST
AND
FASCIST

17th March, 1972

COMMUNIST
AND
NATIONALIST
AND
FASCIST

13

13

SECRET.



22A

SUBVERSION IN THE U.K. - 1972

CONTENTS

Paragraphs

INTRODUCTION

1 - 3

THE SOURCES OF SUBVERSION

The Communists

4 - 12

The Trotskyists

4 - 5

Maoists and Anarchists

6 - 7

Neo-Anarchists

8 - 10

11 - 12

SUBVERSION IN SOCIETY

Education

13 - 25

The Communications Media

13 - 18

Industry

19 - 22

23 - 25

COUNTER MEASURES

26 - 30

ANNEX

SECURITY SERVICE

16th March 1972

SECRET

SECRET



SUBVERSION IN THE U.K. - 1972

INTRODUCTION

Note: The activities of the I.R.A. and other Irish extremist groups are not considered in this paper.

There are several issues today which provide subversive organisations with opportunities for exploitation, by propaganda and by direct forms of protest. British entry into the E.E.C., the Industrial Relations legislation, the level of unemployment, the conduct of affairs in Northern Ireland, even lesser issues such as the decision to limit free school milk and the proposals for controlling student union funds, are matters on which substantial sections of the community tend to oppose the government. These issues provide causes which subversive organisations have not been slow to seize on but their role and what they have achieved must be seen in perspective. In recent major issues, for example the coal miners' strike, Upper Clyde Shipbuilders and opposition to the Industrial Relations legislation, the efforts of subversive groups represent a small part of a general momentum. While not insignificant, their efforts have not been decisive.

I don't agree

2. The number of people who may be described as committed supporters of the various subversive organisations or who are violently inclined Anarchists, is little more than 40,000 or well below 0.1% of the population. This figure bears little relationship to the temporary, wider support which subversive organisations sometimes obtain when they adopt causes of the day which enjoy a broad appeal. The largely Trotskyist inspired demonstration over Vietnam in

a hen of a lot.

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 2 -

Grosvenor Square, London in October 1968 was attended by some 25,000 people - at least six times the known number of Trotskyists in the U.K. Similarly the 29,000 strong Communist Party of Great Britain (C.P.G.B.) exercises a disproportionate influence among 10 million trade unionists.

3. All subversive groups view popular causes as opportunities for extending their influence. Although from time to time they find it tactically acceptable to make common cause in joint demonstrations, it should not be inferred that there are 40,000 organised militants, with identical subversive aims, permanently capable of united action and under centralised direction. Experience over the past five years suggests that the more revolutionary groups of the ultra-left, the Trotskyists and Maoists for example, are incapable of forming lasting associations. When they do collaborate among themselves and with the C.P.G.B., their relationship is usually uneasy and ephemeral, punctuated by doctrinal rivalries and power struggles.

THE SOURCES OF SUBVERSION

The Communists

4. The C.P.G.B., which with 29,000 members is the strongest subversive group in the country, aims to create a socialist state through peaceful means. It plans first to bring about a broad socialist alliance which will lead a large scale, popular struggle to improve the social and economic conditions of working people. Once in power it proposes to consolidate its position by filling the leading appointments in the public service, armed forces and police

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 3 -

with trusted nominees. In practice, having consistently failed to attract the electorate, it is pursuing political power through infiltrating the trade unions. Using union representation, the Communists hope to influence Labour Party policy to the point where an alliance, which they would try to dominate, became possible.

5. The Party's aims are coherent and positive; they are directed to a change in society rather than to its destruction and the Party has an interest in succeeding to a viable rather than a ruined economy. The Party does not advocate violence or lawlessness. Its attitude to promoting industrial unrest, as towards intervention in political, social and economic issues, is calculated in terms of the political advantage likely to accrue from its participation. Although, through its industrial influence, its size and its relatively strong organisation, the C.P.G.B. remains the major long term subversive threat in this country, it is weakened by internal dissension.

The Trotskyists

6. The Trotskyists groups taken together are about 4,000 strong, one seventh the size of the C.P.G.B., but their membership is increasing. Despite constant tactical and doctrinal disputes among themselves they share common basic aims and convictions. They believe that a decaying capitalist system is maintained artificially by an arms economy and that without this prop, which is already weakening, the country will decline into a pre-revolutionary situation. At this stage, because of economic hardship, the working class will be induced to accept Trotskyist leadership, which will steer the proletariat into direct confrontation with the forces of authority until the point of revolution is reached.

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 4 -

7. The Trotskyists see no need to build mass parties or secure Parliamentary power for this purpose. They aim to identify and make contacts in groups they consider to be currently alienated from society - militant students, Irish activists, Black Power groups and workers in industry are among their present targets. They hope to use these first to hasten the spread of disillusionment with the capitalist system and ultimately to further the cause of revolution. Much of the Trotskyist effort is occupied in manipulating front organisations which they use to maintain what is often a deliberately violent challenge to authority. A characteristic of this front activity is the Trotskyists' ability to attract the support not only of intellectuals and well known personalities such as Bernadette Devlin, John Lennon and Vanessa Redgrave but also of large numbers of students with militant inclinations who sometimes inflate Trotskyist confrontations to dimensions far beyond those of the hard core membership.

Maoists and Anarchists

8. Of the remaining subversive groups only the Maoists and the Anarchists are significant. (Though they have a total membership of about 4,500 the Fascist groups represent only an occasional problem for law and order rather than a threat to national security).

9. The Maoists, who number less than 500, are fragmented; their numerous splinter groups contain a few intellectuals, some businessmen and several trade unionists. Some young people including students have been attracted to Maoism by the revolutionary spirit exemplified in the former Red Guard

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 5 -

movement in China. This finds reflection in the violence sometimes shown by small groups of Maoists when participating in demonstrations organised by others. All Maoist groups in this country are hostile to the C.P.G.B. and Trotskyist groups. They derive some hospitality and moral encouragement from the Chinese Diplomatic Mission in London.

10. The number of traditional Anarchists in this country is hard to assess as they avoid organisation, but their press suggests that about one hundred small groups often not numbering as many as ten persons now exist - almost double the number five years ago. While all are theoretically dedicated to the overthrow of any system of government in this country, few are prepared to carry their beliefs beyond the bounds of lawful protest and much of their public activity comprises participation in demonstrations or forms of social protest such as squatting in empty accommodation and publicising the alleged injustices of the Social Services. A small number however are prepared to show solidarity with continental Anarchists, for example by creating propaganda explosions in Spanish and Italian government or business premises in this country.

Neo-Anarchism

11. A recent development has been the appearance of what may be called a 'neo-Anarchist' group - The Angry Brigade. Its planting of bombs resembles traditional Anarchist violence but the source of its political inspiration is to be found more in the modern revolutionary philosophies of GUEVARA, MARCUSE and MARIGHIELLA which have encouraged the development of urban guerilla movements in other parts of the world. It is dedicated to the complete overthrow of present society, though its proposals for replacing it are not defined. Apart from the I.R.A., the Angry Brigade's activities in 1971 represent the most

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 6 -

violent form of active political protest in present day society. Since the arrest of a number of members of the Angry Brigade, there have been three unclaimed and unexplained explosions. It must therefore be recognised that members of the group may still be at large or that other groups may engage in violence of this kind.

12. Neo-Anarchist movements find haven and support in the so-called Alternative Society, a form of personal and cultural protest which has developed on a small scale in this country. Some of its members have established and live in communes, one of which played a part in the Angry Brigade case, and its views and attitudes are represented in the Underground Press. The latter, far from being clandestine, is published openly and offered for sale commercially. It is characterised by its revolutionary and frequently obscene content and its general aim appears to be the undermining of present society by destroying public confidence in its institutions. The precursor was perhaps 'Private Eye' though this is less crude and professionally more competent, enjoying a commercial viability which has eluded 'IT', 'OZ', 'FRIENDZ', 'INK' and the more serious '7 DAYS'. While they exist these publications may achieve a circulation of up to 30,000 though it is usually considerably less. Only the weekly London entertainment guide 'Time Out' which also devotes space to revolutionary articles and to advertising protest meetings appears to be securely established at present.

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 7 -

SUBVERSION IN SOCIETY

Note: The three sections which follow represent conclusions drawn from a more detailed treatment of these matters in the Annex to this paper.

Education

13. Apart from some penetration of the leadership of the National Union of Teachers (N.U.T.), the extent of subversive activities at school level is negligible at present. There are no indications that serious attempts are being made on a wide scale to propagate subversive ideology through teachers or by any other means.

14. The emphasis of Communist Party activity at school level is on exerting influence on teachers' unions over working conditions and educational policy in general. There are currently 6 Communist Party members and sympathisers among the 55 national officials and Executive members of the N.U.T.

15. There is little known Trotskyist activity at school level but strong Trotskyist influence exists in one of the extreme wings of the N.U.T.

16. The situation in higher education is more complex and the efforts of subversive organisations more vigorous. It is doubtful whether more than 0.5%, i.e. about 2,500 of the total of nearly half a million students are seriously committed to subversive organisations, but the latter have the ability to attract and organise much heavier student support when promoting popular causes. The number of dons actively involved with subversive groups is small;

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 8 -

with a few exceptions they tend to exert their influence more by intellectual example than by participating in direct action.

17. In higher education the Communist Party's appeal to students lags behind that of the ultra left organisations and its organisation and control are uncharacteristically weak, to the extent that it has no accurate idea of the strength of its student following. Despite this, the Party has recently achieved a working majority on the executive of the National Union of Students. Both the Party and Communist dons tend to disapprove of the more extreme forms of student protest activity. The leadership of one of the academic staff unions is at present significantly penetrated by Communists.

18. There are about 600 student members of the various Trotskyist organisations. The latter, though at odds with each other and the Communist Party, all challenge the existing order and believe in confrontations with authority. This leads Trotskyist students frequently to mount demonstrations based on national as well as domestic student issues, during which they may deliberately commit acts of violence. Trotskyist students have recently practised the concept of universities as 'Red Bases' diverting university accommodation and duplicating facilities for the use of miners' strike pickets. On occasions they receive support from individual Trotskyist members of staff.

The Communications Media

19. The left wing subversive movements regard the Press, broadcasting and television as instruments controlled by capitalist society.

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 9 -

20. The Communist Party is wary of being presented in these media and does not co-ordinate the activity of Party members working in them. Any imbalance favouring the Communist viewpoint apparent in several current affairs television programmes over the past year has not been attributable to Communist production or direction. The Party has achieved some penetration of the various unions catering for employees in broadcasting, television and journalism but does not exercise a decisive influence in them.

21. The few Trotskyists employed by or contributing to television appear more alert to the possibility of exploiting it to their political advantage although their efforts are spontaneous rather than directed by the subversive groups with which they are associated. Trotskyists have occasionally been able to disturb the objectivity of programmes with which they have been concerned or have sought to discredit the authority; a small Trotskyist group of professional playwrights and producers has made and has screened several quasi documentary films containing a political or social message consistent with Trotskyist thought.

22. The Free Communications Group, a Trotskyist influenced association of authors, playwrights, journalists, producers and technicians has been in existence since 1969 but lacks cohesion and influence.

Industry

23. For complex reasons an atmosphere prevails in industry in which militancy and disruptive activities flourish, particularly at shop floor level. This provides continuing opportunities for exploitation by the different subversive groups, though there is no significant collaboration between them in this field;

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 10 -

on the contrary they regard themselves as rivals for the allegiance of left-wing workers.

24. Despite extensive penetration of the largest trade unions the Communist Party does not yet control any union or exercise a decisive influence on the T.U.C. Its attitude to industrial disputes is tactical and it exploits rather than creates them, preferring to work through union leadership where it has a vested interest, than through the shop floor level. It sees an opportunity in current disputes for forcing a General Election, its principal aim since June 1970. The Party's secret caucuses within the major unions and in some industries provide effective electoral machinery for Communist supported candidates for union office and thus bring influence to bear on union policies. The present Industrial Organiser of the C.P.G.B. is a competent, natural militant with wide contacts at the top levels of unions.

25. The Trotskyist groups are turning increasingly to industry where, unlike the Communists, they concentrate their activities on the shop floor rather than in the union hierarchy. Their attitude tends to be irresponsible and their doctrinaire promotion of militancy as a means of confronting authority often ignores the best interest of the workers and unions. There are probably less than 200 Trotskyist activists of the three main persuasions in industry at present. None of the groups employs full time itinerant agitators, there is no centralised control and usually Trotskyists on the spot are left to exploit suitable situations. Trotskyist influence on the outcome of national disputes is so far negligible, but it is having an increased effect on industrial relations due in part to an effective press. Trotskyists have also developed skill in identifying local disputes (for example Pilkingtons, Fine Tubes and Fisher Bendix) in which their influence can play a significant part and attract publicity.

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 11 -

COUNTER MEASURES

26. There is no panacea for subversive activities. Government is limited in what it can do and much must be left to natural restraints, such as the weight of public opinion, which operate in a free society.

27. Controversial policy decisions often offer opportunities for exploitation by subversive groups. It is important that the arguments for such decisions should be fully explained to the public.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

29. The threat of violence from subversive organisations can only be successfully countered by good intelligence, which it is the responsibility of Special Branches and the Security Service to provide. Good intelligence provides the basis for protective measures against acts of violence and for the prosecution and conviction of the perpetrators.

30. Rapid consideration and assessment of subversive developments by the appropriate departments are prerequisites for counter action. There should be an official counter subversion committee for this purpose, able to meet both regularly and ad hoc to survey developments, commission assessments and recommend counter action.

SECURITY SERVICE

16th March 1972

SECRET



ANNEX

EDUCATION

Schools

Through various national committees, the Communist Party is theoretically equipped to guide and co-ordinate its policies and activities throughout the educational field. In primary and secondary education there is no evidence to suggest that the Party attempts to direct individual Communist teachers or local groups; nor are there indications that it encourages them to propagate Communism at school. Its approach is largely aimed at exerting influence through its members in the teachers' unions, where they concern themselves with general educational matters and conditions of employment. At present there are 6 Communist Party members or sympathisers among the 55 National officials and Executive members of the National Union of Teachers. The Young Communist League (Y.C.L.) - a waning organisation - has from time to time attempted to extend its influence among school children but with little effect. It is currently pinning its hopes on a recent National Union of Students (N.U.S.) resolution offering union membership to all full-time scholars over 15. It is doubtful whether this will result in a substantial increase in Y.C.L. influence.

2. None of the major Trotskyist groups has attempted to establish any foothold in secondary schools. The International Socialism Group of Trotskyists has, however, a strong influence in the extremist wing of the National Union of Teachers and controls the Rank and File Teachers organisation. The principal concern of this organisation is agitation for better conditions of work, facilities and pay.

3. A small degree of subversive influence is exerted on pupils at school through the Schools Action Union (S.A.U.). This is subject to libertarian and Anarchist ideas and is concerned with leading school children to acquire more control over their own management and discipline, to question the established system and accepted values. The S.A.U. has no formal

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 2 -

membership tending rather to correspond with individual school children, sending them copies of their pamphlets. It has not so far made significant inroads amongst school children.

4. A similar, much publicised, but largely abortive attempt to lead school children to question the educational system as a whole and the authority of teachers and adults over children in particular, among other things, was made in 1971 by the publisher of the Little Red Schoolbook, who runs a bookshop in London dealing mainly in modern revolutionary works.

Higher Education

5. There are nearly half a million students in higher education; the figure for those known to be committed members of subversive organisations is difficult to assess because of the regular turnover of students. Many students join several political organisations experimentally during their first year and later abandon interest. It is doubtful whether those seriously committed to subversive groups is greater than 0.5% of the whole, i.e. some 2,500.

6. In higher education there is no evidence that the Communist Party has encouraged members among the academic staffs to propagate Communism, the Party's national committees being more concerned with evolving higher education policy than with co-ordinating the activities of its academics. Though some Communist dons have been implicated in militant activities and student unrest in recent years, both the Party leadership and Party members among academic staff have frowned on the more extreme protest activities of the students. As with lower education, the Party places importance on the trade union aspects of its work; although the Association of University teachers is

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 3 -

not known to be susceptible to Communist influence, both the President and General Secretary of the Association of Teachers in Technical Institutes are members of the Party, though none of the Association's 21 remaining national officials or Executive is known to have subversive affiliations.

7. The activities of Communist students in higher education are guided and co-ordinated by the Party's National Student Organiser, but this is an area in which Party organisation and control are weak and even the Party has little idea of the size of its student following. Frequently Communist students have participated in militant activities, sometimes in association with ultra-left students, without the knowledge or approval of Party Headquarters. The Party's appeal to students has generally failed to compete with that of the ultra-left groups and its recruitment has been almost static in a rapidly expanding field. One significant success in recent years has been its penetration of the Executive of the N.U.S. The Executive of this union contains three Communists and, by Party reckoning, sufficient supporters among the remaining 12 members to give them a clear majority. This hold on the N.U.S. is vulnerable to both moderate and ultra-left attack and the Communists who have a vested interest in maintaining the credibility of the N.U.S. as a responsible student organisation have not always been successful in defending its policies from militant attack. There may be at the Easter Conference of the N.U.S. an organised ultra-left challenge to the Communist position.

8. There are probably not more than 600 student members of Trotskyist organisations. They control no positions of influence in national student bodies such as the N.U.S. and the groups

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 4 -

are opposed both to each other and to the C.P.G.B. in theoretical terms. All Trotskyist groups are opposed to the existing order and see confrontation with authority as a necessary part of their philosophy. Their main strength lies in their ability to organise demonstrations and by selecting popular causes to secure at least temporarily, large numbers of student supporters for them.

9. The principal threat which student Trotskyists pose is in the recruitment of students to their organisations, the extension of their influence by example and propaganda and the attack on the university system generally with a view to discrediting and disrupting it. On occasions they receive support from individual members of the staff who share their political sympathies and who by their publications and articles also set an intellectual example. In this connection there is some indication that one of the Trotskyist groups has told those of its supporters who are able to do so to include appropriate Trotskyist material in the reading lists for their courses. Trotskyist students' principal activity in the foreseeable future will continue to be mounting demonstrations, which may be violent, based on national as well as domestic student issues. Trotskyist students were largely responsible for the violence introduced into the Anti-Internment League demonstration in Whitehall in February. They have also made some use of the concept of universities as 'Red Bases' whose facilities can be diverted to suitable revolutionary purposes. Their recent accommodation of miners' pickets in halls of residence and the use of university duplicating equipment for producing pamphlets for the pickets illustrate this practice.

THE COMMUNICATIONS MEDIA

10. Virtually all subversive groups in this country publish some kind of journal which can

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 5 -

7 // immediately be identified with them. These are not discussed here. In the Press generally and in the Cinema, the professional and in particular the economic controls over production and distribution are effective barriers against attempts to propagate subversive ideas, though there are individual members of subversive organisations working in these media who would otherwise be well placed to do so. Subversive influence in the publishing world is negligible.

11. Television, still a developing medium, commands a wider following and enjoys a greater capacity for intruding into the private life of the community than any of the others. It is therefore potentially an attractive target for subversive organisations. It has a duty to reflect all shades of opinion provided a proper balance is maintained.

12. It is significant, in considering subversion in this general field, that most left wing subversive groups are critical of the Press and television, which they regard as controlled by capitalist interests and manipulated to the advantage of capitalist society.

13. The C.P.G.B. has from time to time taken an interest in the communications media and formerly ran a number of cultural groups concerned with the Party's role in them. These have disappeared and the Party's formal interest is expressed through a press and publicity department at headquarters. This is largely concerned with handling requests to the Party for its members to appear on television and radio and with answering enquiries from the press. It does not try to obtain wider favourable publicity for the Party in the media - indeed the department worries about the possibility of adverse publicity and carefully considers offers of programmes featuring the C.P.G.B., sometimes rejecting them.

14. The Party pursues its normal industrial

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 6 -

policies within the various unions catering for employees in broadcasting, television, the theatre and cinema and journalism. The Assistant General Secretary of the Association of Broadcasting Staffs is a communist, there are Party members and sympathisers among the national officials and Executives of the Association of Cinema and Television Technicians and 3 of the 38 members of the corresponding leadership of the National Union of Journalists are communists. The Party's secret caucuses in these unions are at present ineffective.

Lower 15. A few B.B.C. T.V. current affairs programmes during the past year have appeared unbalanced with the views of Communists present eclipsing others. The views of Jimmy REID and James AIRLIE, two Communists who are leading members of the U.C.S. Shop Stewards Committee, have received attention on television and in the press during the U.C.S. dispute. These occurrences are not attributable to Communist influence in television. Indeed, the Communist Party has not always been enthusiastic over REID's appearances. There is no indication that the Party is making an effort to influence television or broadcasting for its own purposes or that it exercises any central direction over those of its members who work in or contribute to these media with a view to the covert introduction of Communist ideas.

16. There is similarly no indication that Trotskyist groups or any other ultra-left organisation are pursuing a calculated policy of influencing television for subversive purposes, though about a dozen persons with Trotskyist associations have come to notice as working in television. There have been a few occasions when employees with Trotskyist inclinations have apparently spontaneously used their positions in an effort to affect the objectivity of programmes or to discredit the authority for whom

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 7 -

they were working. A small cohesive group of writers and producers mostly with Trotskyist sympathies have achieved some success with quasi documentary T.V. plays on social issues of the day. Two of the plays (Rank and File and The Big Flame) contained a political message consistent with Trotskyism. The members of the group, however, are articulate and competent technicians whose employment by the B.B.C. and I.T.V. is due to their professional ability.

17. In the cinema and press the professional and particularly the economic controls in production and distribution prove effective barriers against covert attempts to propagate subversive ideas. One Trotskyist group, however, is known to keep records of likely sympathisers working in the press and is encouraged by the number of its contacts on the Sunday Times. Members of the Trotskyist television group referred to earlier have also produced films for the cinema. One, 'Kes', which contains an element of social criticism, enjoyed a mild success; a second produced recently, 'Family Life' politicises the social issue of the treatment of mental illness in keeping with its writer's and director's views that human relationships are political. Neither of these productions, however, is likely to reach substantial sections of the public; if they did it is doubtful whether they would exert any significant political influence.

18. Indications of the subversive penetration of the publishing world are slight; two members of the Penguin editorial staff concerned with political publications are known to hold left wing revolutionary views. Their presence in Penguin is not the result of calculated policy of any particularly revolutionary group. Though they are in a position to select certain revolutionary works for publication at the expense of more objective material, there is already a significant public demand for books about social

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 8 -

protest and contemporary revolutionary philosophy. The management of Pearsons, who control Penguins, is alert to the possibility that these employees may display bias.

19. The ultra left is showing increasing awareness of the importance of the communications media as a means of publicising its causes. The Free Communications Group, comprising authors, playwrights, journalists, producers and technicians was established in 1969. It has not so far proved to be an effective or cohesive body but it is subject to the influence of a number of Trotskyists in it, and advocates workers' control. The magazine 'Time Out' which allocates space to matters of revolutionary interest, has recently sponsored a relatively unsuccessful forum on the control of the communications media at the Round House.

INDUSTRY

20. There has been some increase in recent years in the number of officially recognised disputes conducted at national level, but there has been a much more marked increase in disruption and militancy, often unofficial at first, at shop floor level. The reasons for this are complex, but disillusionment with the quality of union leadership and a tendency to replace its authority with that of the shop steward or local union official on the spot, with a consequential erosion of union discipline, have played a part. Social security, tax procedures and employers' agreements made to encourage stability of the labour force (lay-off pay) can reduce the disincentive to strike action. Hostility to the Industrial Relations legislation and increased unemployment have sharpened industrial attitudes and have produced an atmosphere in which militancy and disruptive activities flourish. Subversive groups have taken advantage of this situation.

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 9 -

21. The C.P.G.B. is the most influential subversive group in industry. It aims to win political power through its influence in trade unions, notably through the collective voting strength of these unions at Labour Party conferences. The shift in trade union attitudes towards the industrial policy supported by the Party and the broad realisation of one of its long standing ambitions - to see the T.G.W.U. and A.U.E.W. leadership pass into left wing hands, have been two of the more significant developments to favour the Party's industrial aims during the past few years.

22. The Party recognises that power in the trade union movement lies with the National Executive Committees and with full time union officials, and therefore seeks to capture as many as possible of these posts. At present about one in eight of these posts in the forty major unions is held by Communists or Communist sympathisers, despite the ratio of only one Communist to every five hundred Trade Unionists. Although there are some Communists on the Executives of the major trade unions, Communists do not so far have a majority on any National Executive Committee and so do not control a single union. The Party is best placed in the two largest unions, the A.U.E.W. and T.G.W.U.;

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 10 -

Executive Committee of the T.G.W.U. has sixteen Communists or sympathisers and one Trotskyist among its thirty-six members.

23. Subversive influence in the T.U.C. is not significant at present.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

24. The Communist Party tends to regard as a bonus any industrial unrest which may result from its activity in the trade union movement. While adopting a militant stance, which is necessary to its image, its attitude to strikes is tactical and it tends to exploit rather than to create situations. Its activities in industry and the trade unions are co-ordinated by its Industrial Department, which operates mainly through secret Party caucuses set up for most of the larger unions and divisions of industry. These 'Advisories' try to provide effective electoral machinery for union candidates supported by the Party and to secure the reflection of Party aims in trade union policy. The Party's present Industrial Organiser, RAMELSON, is a natural militant with an excellent grasp of the industrial scene and a wide range of contacts at the highest level in many trade unions.

25. Unlike the Communists, the Trotskyists do not generally aim at penetrating the trade union bureaucracy, but concentrate their activities on the shop floor. The most industrially orientated Trotskyist group, the Socialist Labour League (S.L.L.)

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 11 -

has established small groups in a number of industries and unions, including the motor industry, the dockers, the power workers, the N.U.T., the Post Office Engineers Union and the A.U.E.W. There is a group of S.L.L. supporters among the Doncaster miners; these were responsible for some of the violent picketing during the coal strike. Trotskyist philosophy leads its supporters to exploit industrial disputes as a means of hastening political confrontation with the power of the State. They therefore encourage militancy, often to the detriment of the interests of the workers involved and of the trade union movement. Their main concern in stimulating industrial unrest is to enhance the influence of their own political group at the expense of others.

26. Trotskyist militancy in the trade unions is limited by their numerical weakness. Although the current total membership of Trotskyist organisations is about four thousand, it is doubtful whether there are more than two hundred Trotskyist activists throughout industry in this country, and there is no centralised controlling force reaching out to them on the C.P.G.B. pattern. The immediate exploitation of situations is left to the initiative of Trotskyists on the spot and none of the Trotskyist groups has the ability to employ full time itinerant agitators to exploit industrial disputes wherever they occur. Nevertheless there has been an increase in Trotskyist influence on industrial relations and the growing circulation of the Socialist Labour League's paper, the well-produced 'Workers' Press', now about 25,000 daily (c.f. the 'Morning Star' U.K. circulation of about 40,000), has had a noticeable influence on shop floor attitudes. Trotskyist influence on the outcome of national disputes has so far been negligible and the Trotskyists prefer to operate by selecting a particular area in which they consider there is a potential for developing their activities. They are becoming

/.....

SECRET

SECRET



- 12 -

skilled at identifying existing disputes, often at smaller plants where there may be little communist interest, and where they think that with their limited resources they may be able to exert significant influence. Such situations are exploited to gain maximum publicity. Examples of Trotskyist intervention are the Pilkington dispute 1969/70, the Pine Tubes dispute 1970/72 and the recent Fisher-Bendix occupation.

27. The small Maoist group, the Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist), about 250 strong, is active in the technical and supervising section of the A.U.E.W. It has some influence, through its leader, Reg BIRCH, in the Executive Committee of that section, though the left wing of the Executive cannot rely on BIRCH's consistent support. Maoist influence elsewhere in industry is of little significance.

28. All the subversive organisations mentioned above regard each other as rivals for the allegiance of left wing workers in industry. There is no evidence of contact between the leaders of the different subversive organisations, though at local level in a few areas broad left movements sometimes develop, embracing members of all the extreme left organisations. Where these exist members of the different subversive groups within these bodies occasionally co-operate over particular issues - the Broad Left movement, which includes local shop stewards in the motor industry in Birmingham, has exerted some influence on shop stewards organisations throughout that industry.

16th March 1972

M. Taper
per Reg.

M
21/3

Mr Barker. I would be grateful if this could be filed (only copy) in International Section (K.D.) on agreed. 20/3/72 copy No. 2 of 2 FILE
OH 1/3/72

TOP SECRET

Mr Reddaway
Sir Stewart Crawford

(1)

COUNTER SUBVERSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. Sir Burke Trend asked me to jot down any ideas on Counter Subversion in the UK which might occur to me in the course of preparing my memorandum on Counter Subversion overseas. (The draft on overseas counter subversion has been ready for some time but I am still engaged on discussion of one part of it [REDACTED])
2. I do not know much about home affairs and submit the notes below with much diffidence. Apart from the original herewith, one copy only has been retained and this is filed with IRD International Section. The ideas in them are mine, but the original draft was discussed at some length both with IRD and with the Security Service. I did not discuss it with the Home Office.
3. In the end I have not come up with anything very new - my main suggestion is that the existing machinery should be used more regularly.
4. For what they are worth, my notes are below and if you have no objection, perhaps they could be passed on to Sir Burke Trend.

20 March 1972

L C Glass
Counter Subversion Committee

THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER
SECTION 3 (4) OF THE
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

COUNTER SUBVERSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

1. A democratic society permits and should thrive on criticism and challenge. Parliamentary democracy accepts the necessity for change of governments and of policies and institutions, and for pressures for change, but only by peaceful means within the rules of the Constitution. When words and actions go beyond the limits permitted by the law of the land, the transgressors should be brought before the ordinary courts of law for open trial. Democratic societies are reluctant to maintain large domestic intelligence agencies in time of peace as counter to the concept of freedom of the individual. British democracy is unwilling to pillory individuals and sacrifice them on the altar of State security. Parliament would react violently against any evidence that the State Security machine was being used in any way not compatible with the principles of an "open society". This is the essential background against which the problem of subversion and counter subversion in the UK must be viewed.

2. Responsibility for finding out about espionage, sabotage and subversive activities of persons and organisations, whether directed from within or without the country, is the responsibility of the Security Service. Effective action can be mounted against espionage and sabotage, but action against subversion, which is a vaguer concept, presents particular problems.

3. The questions arise whether in the conditions in the UK in the 1970's:

- a. the Security Service and Special Branches have adequate resources for collecting intelligence about subversive persons and organisations;
- b. whether there is adequate machinery for collating, assessing and analysing this information and seeing that it reaches, in this form, people legitimately entitled to receive the information and in a position to do something about it;
- c. what action is needed and practicable, within the limits of Parliamentary democracy, to counter subversive activities and whether the machinery for achieving this is adequate.

4. It is necessary first to venture some assessment of certain disturbing trends in the UK in the 1970's and in particular to consider whether these are spontaneous developments arising from the conditions of an affluent

technologically /

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-2-

technologically advanced industrial society (in which case they are primarily a matter for political, economic and social action) or whether they have been to any significant extent engineered and or exploited by organisations concerned to overthrow Parliamentary democracy and authority generally (in which case more specific counter action would seem to be called for). There is in the UK today, not only a considerable degree of industrial and student unrest, and a noticeable change in standards of morals and manners (which might be a good thing as well as a bad) and a fading of old fashioned "patriotism", but a challenge to the basic principles and institutions of our society and a threat to elected authority. This challenge is largely from militant minorities who aim to exploit existing grievances by the use of violence, e.g., by pushing peaceful demonstrations into riots and who would like "to substitute the politics of catastrophe for the politics of consensus", to polarise society, and to provoke governmental repression which would ultimately play into the hands of the extremists. Their long term objective is in fact revolution, sparked by industrial violence, but directed by leaders trained in universities and technological colleges to think popular grievances are not matters to be put right by peaceful reform, but launching pads for revolution. These groups may at present be small and weak, but the example of the IRA in Northern Ireland (which could conceivably infect other Celtic nationalists) and of certain aspects of the miners' strike, suggests that we should not underestimate their potential. It is conceivable that we could see something in the style of "urban guerrillas" in the cities of the UK in the 1970's.

5. The extent to which disruptive and subversive forces in our society are engineered and exploited by Communists getting external direction in some way from Moscow or elsewhere, is for the Security Service to assess. The Communist Party of Great Britain remains the largest, most experienced and most potentially dangerous of organisations in this country which are of subversive interest. But their declared aim is still to achieve power by legitimate political means rather than by unconstitutional methods. On the whole it would seem that though this threat has to be carefully watched and countered, it is perhaps less, rather than more, significant than it was some years ago. The new threats seem to come largely from splinter groups of the New Left - Maoists, Trotskyists, anarchists, etc., growing in influence amongst students and intellectuals. While these have no central direction, they all in their different ways wish to inflame a class struggle and aim at the same objective - destroying "capitalism" and setting up a "Socialist" i.e., Communist State (even if the Communism aimed at is not of Moscow variety) - and there is little doubt that in these days of very rapid communications, they have international

connections /

TOP SECRET

THIS IS A COPY
THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER
SECTION 3 (4) OF THE
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

TOP SECRET

-3-

connections with similar groups in many other parts of the world (e.g., outsiders trying to climb on to the bandwagon of the 1968 student troubles in France). While the danger from such groups and from low level political violence generally should not be exaggerated, it is nevertheless growing.

Collection of Intelligence

6. The best single answer to subversion is good and prompt intelligence, both to inform all responsible (and where possible the public) on the true state of affairs, and to ensure that the lawbreakers are rapidly apprehended and punished before their challenge to law can have escalating political repercussions.

Recommendation

7. Whether the Security Service and Special Branches feel they have adequate resources for this task is for them to say.

Collation, Analysis, Assessment and Research

Recommendations

a. Again it is for the Security Service, whose main responsibility it is to prepare analyses and assessments in this field, to say whether they have enough resources for this task;

b. but whereas we have all been studying orthodox Communism for years, the New Left's developments and general trends of thought amongst youth today are something comparatively new and it would perhaps be worth commissioning some in-depth research papers from carefully selected professors or authors or institutes;

c. IRD's "International Section" is partly engaged on this task with the important angle of considering international ramifications and repercussions [REDACTED]
Since this problem is likely to become of increasing importance, there would seem advantage in strengthening IRD's International Section, which is extremely small, by an additional high-level Research Officer;

d. since the industrial field is much the most important one, there might be a case for setting up (if there is not one already) an Industrial Relations Research Unit in the Department of Employment);

c. /

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-4-

e. conceivably too a small Research Unit on Student Politics and Protest could be considered for the Department of Education;

f. alternatively there might perhaps be a general Research Unit of Assessments Staff attached to the Cabinet Office, or even opportunity for reference of special topics in this field to Lord Rothschild's Think Tank;

g. another look should be given by the Cabinet Office and the Security Service to ensure that SS intelligence is adequately distributed in good time throughout Whitehall at a level where the information might affect policy; and to see whether a procedure by which policy makers can put special requirements on the Security Service for special assessments, could be brought into common practice.

*Should have
offic. been
P. U. S. D. ?
JY*

Counter Action

8. A lot of necessary counter action falls in the realm of normal politics and opinion-making in a democracy. The challenge which might seem at the moment a cloud on the horizon no bigger than a man's hand, is sufficiently menacing to make it necessary for those who believe in Parliamentary democracy, in non-violent change and the rule of law, to stand up and argue their case with the young people of today. Societies and associations devoted to these ends need to be revitalised and within the Government, when an appropriate time comes, briefs need to be provided for Ministers to speak on these subjects in Parliament, on public platforms or on television and radio. Articles and books need to be written challenging the moral and intellectual validity of the arguments in the New Left as well as of orthodox Communism. In spite of drastic pruning of IRD and the new tasks allotted to it, its original role of research for the purpose of combatting "Communism" in all its forms and subversion overseas hostile to British interests, should be reaffirmed. It is possible that HMG's Information arrangements on the Home Front in general might be due for a fresh look. Perhaps a Minister with overall supervision of Home Information could have a small Research staff considering the problems of Government relations with the mass media, especially TV.

What more can be done within the Governmental Machine other than seeing that good intelligence, expertly analysed, is made available to Ministers, and bringing to justice in the normal way anyone who actually breaks the law?

9. For the reasons given in paragraph 1, this is an extremely

delicate /

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

-5-

delicate, political issue to be handled with the greatest discretion and circumspection. Possibly all that can be done is to see that good information about methods and tactics of subversive organisations are supplied to those who have to deal with them in the fields, e.g., of industry and education and that reliable correspondents and communicators, with access to the mass media, can within discreet limits, be given material for their articles, talks and debates.

Machinery

10. While the Security Service is responsible for the gathering of intelligence and the making of assessments, several Whitehall Departments are concerned with studying the assessments and seeing whether anything can be done about threats, e.g., the Cabinet Office, the Home Office, the Department of Employment. (Although student protest generally merits central study and analysis with a view to counter action, the Department of Education is apparently not organised to consider this as a special subject and it is merely considered sporadically in the Committee of Vice Chancellors). In the past the threats have mainly come from the Communist Party of Great Britain and since this is a legal Party in this country, there has been understandably reluctance amongst Departments to take responsibility for any counter action other than the normal Home Office responsibility for bringing before the courts of law persons who actively break the law.

11. The original machinery grew up on the following lines:-

- a. a high level Top Secret Interdepartmental Committee chaired by the Secretary of the Cabinet and called the Anti-Communism (Home) Committee (set up in 1956) to provide advice where necessary to Ministers;
- b. a lower level informal Working Group called the "Treasury Group";
- c. a Home Regional "Meeting" chaired by the Head of IRD, which brought to bear IRD's experience of world Communism on problems of Communism in this country and in a modest way attempted, unattributably and discreetly, to provide material so that the overall problems were better understood in this country and that Communist methods in this country were better understood by the public;
- d. a special unit in IRD (under its International Section) which in close liaison with the Security Service, helped

service /

TOP SECRET

service the Home Regional Meeting, and carried out both the preparation and, when authorised, the unattributable distribution of suitable material.

12. The Treasury Group set up in 1952 disappeared later in the 50's, since it was neither low enough in representation to deal with detailed operations, nor high enough to have a rapid influence on Cabinet policies. The Anti-Communism Home Committee Official is defunct and its responsibilities have been taken over by a high level Working Group now and more appropriately called the Subversion at Home Committee, chaired by the Secretary of the Cabinet and attended as necessary by the high officials of the Home Office, the Department of Employment and the Department of Education, etc. To the extent that this Committee now deals with all forms of subversion (right and left) which are increasingly involving illegal and violent behaviour, its constitutional position is easier than if it dealt merely with the activities of C.P.G.B. Although this Group had two quick ad hoc meetings without minutes about a year ago, it has not had a regular meeting since November 1970. The Home Regional Meeting has continued to meet monthly under the umbrella of the higher committee, but it has not recently referred anything upwards and has a limited role in the unattributable Information field, and as at present operating can hardly be said to service the Higher Committee.

13. Various possible new arrangements have been considered. One has been the possible setting up of a Home Subversion Committee at a higher level than the Home Regional Meeting and a lower level than the Subversion at Home Committee. The past history of the "Treasury Group" is not a good omen for this. The matter is of such political importance and delicacy that it requires a high level Committee to deal with it and Sir Burke Trend's personal experience and understanding of the problems has been a most important element in the handling of them.

14. Another suggestion has been that the Home Regional Meeting should be increased in importance and given a wider scope and that it should have as Chairman an Under Secretary from the Home Office, which seems logically the right Department of State to take responsibility for this subject. This Meeting is already attended by representatives of the Home Office, from the division within the Office dealing with law and order; but the Home Office approach is basically the traditional one of watching for breaches of the law, with arrest and arraignment before the courts (and possible expulsion of foreigners) as the legitimate counter measures; and their approach is necessarily cautious.

I /

P.S. 07
 I do not know whether in the Home Office, which has so many and varied responsibilities, there is any division particularly dealing with threats of internal subversion. But on the assumption that there is not (perhaps there should be one?) IRD's International Section provides the only machinery by which any action (modest enough) can be taken, apart from legal processes and the conducting of the Government's economic, political and social policies in a way to remove exploitable grievances. So an IRD Chairman of this operational working meeting has a certain practical value.

15. Failing any fundamental reappraisal of the organisation and responsibilities of the Home Office in this matter, it would seem that the best method of dealing with the problem remains some strengthening of the existing machinery.

Recommendations

16. a. The high level Subversion at Home Committee should meet regularly at least once every six months (as well as ad hoc if required in an emergency) to look at considered assessment papers on topical subjects. The membership should be as now, with the possible occasional coopting of one of the Crown's Law Officers;
- b. since the Secretary of the Cabinet is perforce exceptionally busy, more regularity of meeting of the existing Committee could perhaps be achieved if he could appoint a Deputy from within the Cabinet Office who could chair the regular meetings, if the Secretary of the Cabinet is busy on more important matters;
- c. the Security Service, the Department of Employment and the Department of Education should be encouraged to put on the agenda of the regular meetings, special matters which worry them in the context of subversion and to prepare papers for the consideration of the Committee, and IRD International Section should also be encouraged to put forward assessments on special threats for discussion at the Committee;
- d. as for the Home Regional Meeting (which is an operational working group), unless and until the Home Office is willing to take a more direct responsibility in this matter, it could continue to be chaired by the Head of IRD. In order to strengthen consideration of the international implications and

connections /

THIS IS A COPY

THE ORIGINAL HAS BEEN RETAINED
IN THE DEPARTMENT UNDER
SECTION 3 (4) OF THE
PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958

TOP SECRET

-8-

connections of subversion in the UK, the Group could also coopt, if and when necessary [REDACTED]

as the Head of IRD's International Section (the Security Service already have close cooperation with their counterparts in the REC) and as a member, the Secretary of the Overseas Counter Subversion Committee;

- e. the Meeting should consider not only subversion instigated by the KGB and other foreign Intelligence Services, but (like the Higher Committee) should consider every sort of subversive and revolutionary organisation and their activities in e.g., fields of industry, education and the mass media, and the Meeting should consider the whole range of minority extremist groups such as student militants, Black Power, Scottish and Welsh extreme nationalists, the Angry Brigade and potential urban guerrillas of all types (perhaps including the IRA in the UK). The Meeting should keep under review all manifestations of low level political violence, including bombing, assassination, kidnapping and hi-jacking, etc.; since the Meeting has no specific terms of reference other than subsumed from its parent committee's terms, these subjects could from time to time be put on the agenda as and when members of the Committee would like to discuss them. The Security Service could field different representatives according to the agenda. It should, however, be accepted that the more serious continuing problem is in the industrial field;
- f. the Meeting should be encouraged to refer important problems to the Higher Committee, with appropriate documentation;
- g. if serious threats exist to peace and order which cannot adequately be dealt with by existing law, the Higher Committee should consider recommending new legislation, e.g., stiffer penalties for illegal possession of explosives, etc.

TOP SECRET

Ref. A01663
19 APR 1972
PRIME MINISTER

Subversion

At the Ministerial meeting on industrial policy on 12th April (GEN 92(72) 1st Meeting) you said that you would arrange for separate consideration to be given to the question of subversive activity in society, particularly in the industrial context. We have accordingly arranged a meeting at 11.30 am tomorrow. The Ministers who have been invited to attend are the "nucleus" of GEN 92, i.e. the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary (who has, in addition to his general interest in the subject, Departmental responsibility for IRD), the Secretary of State for Defence, the Lord President and the Secretary of State for Employment. I hope that Mr. Maitland will also find it possible to be present.

The only item before the meeting will be the memorandum by the Security Service which I sent you with my minute of 17th March. In circulating it I have asked Ministers to regard it as for their personal information; and in opening the discussion you may like to emphasise the sensitive nature of the subject in general and of this memorandum in particular.

I hope that the meeting will then follow the precedent of the earlier discussion on industrial policy by providing Ministers with an opportunity to speak their minds freely about the doubts and misgivings as regards subversive activity at which they hint from time to time in wider discussions. But when they have had a chance to say what they really feel on this subject they should perhaps be invited to concentrate on the basic question, which might be formulated as follows. Are we facing a genuinely subversive threat to society in the sense in which the Security Service understand that phrase, namely a deliberate, conscious and organised attempt by a number of identifiable individuals to overthrow Parliamentary democracy in this country? Or have we to try to deal with something much more indefinable and elusive in the form of a pervasive climate of opinion which is opposed in principle to most of the forms of established authority in this country but, although it may be exploited from time to time by individuals concerned to foment particular instances of industrial unrest, is not necessarily in itself a conscious and organised threat to society? I think that most people, having considered the evidence in the memorandum by the Security Service and studied the terms of MI5's "Charter" (which I attach), are driven, however reluctantly, to the latter conclusion. If so, however, certain consequences follow. In particular:-

(a) The "Charter" implies certain limits to the assistance which the Security Service can provide in dealing with the problem with which we are concerned. The Home Secretary will probably seek an opportunity to make these limits clear to his colleagues. Even so, it is for consideration whether, without infringing them, MI5 could perhaps adopt a rather more "aggressive" attitude in this field; and it is possible to detect between the lines of their memorandum that they would not be wholly averse from an invitation to do so.

(b) The Government's main response to the threat, however, must be tailored to the nature of the threat itself, i.e. it must take the form of activity which is as pervasive, oblique and "unattributable" as the influences which it is seeking to combat. Essentially this is a question of trying to change the climate of society by encouraging higher standards of behaviour, by establishing new (or old!) values and by ensuring that what we loosely call "the Government's case" does not go by default. There is a great deal which the Government can do - and are doing - to achieve these aims by perfectly overt means, in particular by their emphasis on policies designed to promote self-reliance and self-respect and by their attitude on issues involving the enforcement of the law. But these efforts could sometimes be supplemented by more covert forms of activity; and after discussion with Mr. Donald Maitland I suggest that Ministers should adopt the proposal at the end of the memorandum by the Security Service and should constitute a small interdepartmental team whose purpose would be to keep subversive developments under review, to improve our information about them and to promote a greater flow of information and guidance to the many bodies - in industry, in the world of the Press and TV and in society at large - who are concerned to expose and to withstand "subversion" but are uncertain about the means of doing so and would welcome discreet guidance in this respect. The group might be chaired by Sir Leslie Glass, who ran IRD some time ago with conspicuous success and would be willing and available to launch this new venture. It should consist of representatives of the Home Office (including the Security Service), the FCO (in the shape of IRD) and the Department of Employment, with the right to call in other Departments as necessary. Mr. Maitland should, of course, be present or be represented at all meetings.

I doubt whether the group would need, or should be given, any terms of reference other than the broad definition of its purpose which I have outlined in the previous paragraph. But it would certainly need Ministerial direction; and it might be most appropriate that it should look for guidance

and instruction to the Lord President, as the Minister to whom you have assigned responsibility for the Government's information services. If this proposal is accepted in principle the Lord President should perhaps arrange an early discussion with Sir Leslie Glass in order to plan a programme of work for the new group; and he might be invited to make a progress report to a resumption of tomorrow's meeting in, say, three months' time.

BURKE TREND

18th April, 1972

General Directive of 27/1/52

DIRECTIVE TO THE DIRECTOR-GENERAL
SECURITY SERVICE

1. In your appointment as Director-General of the Security Service you will be responsible to the Home Secretary personally. The Security Service is not, however, a part of the Home Office. On appropriate occasions you will have right of direct access to the Prime Minister.
2. The Security Service is part of the Defence Forces of the country. Its task is the Defence of the Realm as a whole, from external and internal dangers arising from attempts at espionage and sabotage, or from actions of persons and organisations, whether directed from within or without the country, which may be judged to be subversive of the security of the State. In consultation with the Colonial Office, you will assist and advise Colonial administrations in carrying out their parts of the above task. You should arrange to meet appropriate requests for advice and assistance in their own security programmes made to you by Commonwealth or Allied foreign Governments.
3. You will take special care to ensure that the work of the Security Service is strictly limited to what is necessary for the purposes of this task, and that you are at all times fully aware of the extent of its activities.
4. It is essential that the Security Service should be kept absolutely free from any political bias or influence and nothing should be done that might lend colour to any suggestion that it is concerned with the interests of any particular section of the community, or with any other matter than the Defence of the Realm as a whole. You will impress on your staff that the work of the Security Service has no connection whatever with matters of a Party political character and that they must be scrupulous to avoid any action which could be so misconstrued.
5. No enquiry is to be carried out on behalf of any Government Department unless you are satisfied that an important public interest bearing on the Defence of the Realm, as defined in paragraph 2, is at stake.
6. You and your staff will maintain the well-established convention whereby Ministers do not concern themselves with the detailed information which may be obtained by the Security Service in particular cases, but are furnished with such information only as may be necessary for the determination of any issues on which their guidance is sought.
7. You will, of course, consult with other Departments when questions are raised affecting their responsibilities.

TOP SECRET
AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

S+P 1769?
Tale

BR 3/8

CABINET OFFICE
A Ref. A02294
Copy No. 2 of 2 Copies
- 1 AUG 1972
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO.

31st July, 1972
2 AUG 1972
FILE

At the meeting here which Sir Philip Allen attended this afternoon, Sir Philip Allen undertook to let Sir Burke Trend have by the end of the week his thoughts on the best means of devising a proper co-ordination of intelligence (both covert and overt) about subversion in industry, with particular emphasis on the provision of this intelligence in times of industrial crises. It would be for consideration how and in what form (if appropriate) this intelligence should be provided for Ministers, and what Departmental officials should receive it. It was thought that any machinery to be created for this purpose should be under Home Office chairmanship, but probably physically situated in the Cabinet Office, that it should be formed on lines analogous to the existing JIC structure (although it would not be part of the existing structure) and that representation on it would need to come, in addition to that from the Home Office and the Cabinet Office, from the FCO (IRD), the Department of Employment and the Security Service. The aim behind this machinery would be to enable appropriate advice to be given to the Security Service about the formulation of the material they provided in this connection and to apply to the material any further analysis which might be judged necessary.

B. M. NORBURY

(B. M. Norbury)

Miss E. J. Serron

TOP SECRET



HOME OFFICE
WHITEHALL, SW1A 2AP

CABINET
A 9442
-4 AUG 1972
PLACING THIS FILE IN :
FILE NO.

3rd August 1972

Dear Burke

I have had a good deal of discussion with Michael Hanley on the possibilities of improving our present arrangements for co-ordinating and assessing intelligence about subversion in industrial disputes. We hope that the SUBIND series provides information of value to Ministers; but we feel that there is a risk that the provision of intelligence in this form may serve to exaggerate its significance in the over-all picture, and that there is perhaps room for some new piece of organisation which would bring together the intelligence which is obtainable from overt sources as well as covert, and should make available a balanced evaluation to Ministers. If one had some such machinery, it would also be possible to give greater guidance to those concerned with acquiring intelligence as to the particular aspects on which information would be especially valuable.

We have felt some hesitation in making proposals for new machinery, since clearly one does not want to add to the number of committees and supporting structures unless there is a clear need; and certainly I for one have always found that the Security Service has itself had a lively appreciation of the particular points on which intelligence would be especially welcome. Nor do we want to pitch expectations too high. The Security Service has functioned, under administrations of both Parties, under a clearly defined, and publicly announced, charter. There are distinct limits to the scope of their activities under the charter; and serious issues would be involved in any extension of the charter.

Be that as it may, Hanley and I have come round to the conclusion that, provided the limits are clearly understood from the start, there would be some advantage in setting up new machinery to guide those concerned with the provision of intelligence, both covert and overt, about the formulation of the material, and applying to that material an analytical approach which would enable it to be assessed and evaluated for submission to Ministers.

/The existing

The Rt Hon Sir Burke Trend GCB CVO

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

The existing JIC structure would not be appropriate and, if anything on these lines is to be done, it will be necessary to set up some new machinery.

It seems that the Home Office ought to be in the chair; and the Cabinet Office, the Department of Employment, the Security Service, and the FCO(IRD) must be represented. The Scottish Office also. Defence and in some circumstances DES are on the margins. We might include Defence but I doubt if DES should be a foundation member. Then there are the police. We should look to the Security Service to co-ordinate their activities with the police, as they have done hitherto, but I am inclined to think that the head of the Metropolitan Special Branch might also be a member.

The question of who should receive the reports of this new machinery is one which would have to be thought about. There would have to be some link up with the new Dean Committee, since that committee would appropriately consider the use which might be made of some of the information which would be forthcoming.

I see this machinery as operating during times of industrial crises, although we would not change the present arrangements for the preparation of SUBINDS, and also in the periods in between when assessments are being made of possible future troubles.

I have not yet discussed this with Denis Barnes, but will do so if you are in general agreement with this approach.

I have mentioned the project in general terms to the Home Secretary but have not had an opportunity of discussing it in any detail with him. I hope to be able to do so soon.

Yours sincerely

Reg Allen

PS On reading this letter, I realise that I have written it solely in terms of intelligence about industrial disputes; but if new machinery is set up, it will be for consideration whether the remit should not go rather wider than this and cover other subversion problems on the home front.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

File
1714

11th August, 1972

CABINET OFFICE
Ref. A02378
Copy No. 2 of 3 Copies

RE: INSTRUCTIONS

FILE NO.

We had a word yesterday about the unit which the Prime Minister has directed should be constituted to improve the co-ordination of intelligence on subversion in public life and to provide regular and comprehensive reviews on this subject for Ministers. You wrote to me about this on 3rd August.

We were inclined to think that the terms of reference for the unit should be -

"To supervise and direct the collection of intelligence about threats to the internal security of Great Britain arising from subversive activities, particularly in industry; and to make regular reports to the Ministers concerned".

The unit would be under Home Office chairmanship and would include representatives of the Department of Employment, the Security Service, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (IRD), the Scottish Office, the Cabinet Office and the Metropolitan Special Branch; and it might be necessary on occasion to invite representation from the Department of Education and Science. You said that Jimmy Waddell could undertake the task of being Chairman; and you kindly agreed to consult Denis Barnes about Department of Employment representation and to ask the Head of Special Branch to be a member. The Ministers to whom the unit would report and their regular assessments would be circulated would be the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence (not in his Departmental capacity), the Home Secretary, the Secretary of State for Employment and - presumably? - the Secretary of State for Scotland.

We also had a preliminary discussion about the best way to organise the unit's work. I think you agreed with my suggestion that, while it would not form part of the existing JIC structure, it might best work on the lines of JIC(A) and JIC(B) to the extent that the Security Service and the Department of Employment would make available officials to draft preliminary assessments, which could then be considered at meetings of the unit preliminary to the production of an approved document for circulation to the Ministers indicated above. You thought it might be possible to provide a Home Office Secretary

/for

Sir Philip Allen, GCB

for the unit; and he could be the man who would provide the necessary link between those producing the preliminary assessment and the unit proper, arranging meetings and circulating papers and so on. I think that he might find it useful to work in conjunction with the JIC Secretariat for this limited purpose, since they are accustomed to dealing with the controlled distribution of sensitive paper of this kind; and, if this would be acceptable, we will arrange accordingly.

If you could begin to make dispositions on this basis and consult Denis Barnes and the Head of Special Branch - and if Symonds, to whom I am sending a copy of this letter, could also say who will be the Security Service member or members of the unit and who will be MIS's "desk" man - I will let you know the name of the Cabinet Office representative; and we could perhaps think in terms of the unit holding a fairly early meeting to look at a first Department of Employment/Security Service assessment. As you know I hope to go on leave for a fortnight from tomorrow night; but I hope that Jimmy Waddell may be able to set about commissioning a first "product" in advance of the necessary machinery being formally constituted. Any immediate enquiries in my absence could be referred to Brian Norbury.

Watt. M.
Rus agreed
that to start
in Cabinet Office
rep.

BURKE TREND

Mr Reddaway
Sir Stewart Crawford

SECRET

HOME COUNTER SUBVERSION: UNATTRIBUTABLE EXPOSURE

1. Sir Burke Trend sent for me last night to say that Ministers were very disturbed at the effectiveness of extremist Left Wing organisations in important aspects of the national life, particularly in the industrial and student fields and that special attention needed to be paid to mass media.
2. Ministers had come to the conclusion that an important counter weapon was exposure of the details of these organisations, their personnel, tactics and objectives. In the industrial field in particular, in spite of Security Service reports, Ministers were much influenced by reports from top employers claiming that strikes were often inflamed by travelling agitators. Ministers had agreed to strengthen the Information machinery to deal with these problems. In particular it had been decided to set up a Standing Group responsible for unattributable exposure of subversive activities and I was asked if I would take on the job of being Head of this Group.
3. I said I was not keen to do this, but agreed to find out more about it before making my decision.
4. I saw Donald Maitland this morning who said, incidentally, that his own staff was to be strengthened by another man who would have particular responsibility for keeping in touch with television and seeing that good spokesmen were lined up in time for programmes. He said that discreet material about special trouble-making groups joining legal picketers had been given by him to the Sun newspaper and printed. The controllers of the Sun Group had been shocked by the violent letters and threats they had received for publishing this and had their eyes opened as to the sort of people they were exposing. There was now in fact a considerable amount of requests from the Press for more material about the extremist organisations and subversion at home generally.
5. Ministers had decided, therefore, to have a Ministerial forum which would discuss the broad policy of exposure and a Minister specifically designated to give authority for individual exposure operations of any scale or special delicacy.
6. Working below this would be a Group composed of representatives of IRD, FCO, Security Service, either Mr Maitland himself or perhaps his new colleague and representatives of such Departments who might be concerned with the agenda, e.g., Ministry of Employment, Ministry of Education and Home Office.

Minister to
operate, but
not operation
Grady.

But?

SECRET

-2-

7. This Group would:

- a. set in motion studies of the broad problems by getting surveys and assessments written by IRD, the Security Service, outside experts, etc.;
- b. work out specific exposure projects for dealing with the threats revealed by the assessments;
- c. submit for Ministerial approval, projects which needed authority;
- d. put the projects into effect by contacts with mass media representatives and others who could help.

8. The Group would be a secret one. It would meet as often as necessary to discuss the assessments produced on the various threats. But clearly it was envisaged that it would meet fairly often. Sir Burke Trend had said that he regarded the job of Head of the Group as a part-time one which could be combined with Secretary of the overseas Counter Subversion Committee and I assume that the other representatives of the Group would also be part-time, though perhaps specially designated by their Departments to become experts in this field.

9. It would in fact not be a Research Group - this work would be farmed out to others. It would be an operational group whose job was to think up the projects for dealing with internal subversion, make the contacts and arrange the exposure. It would be responsible also for informing those who should know in other Departments in Whitehall, so that plans could be coordinated.

10. I said that the Home Regional Meeting chaired by the Head of IRD already carried out very much this sort of function. What seemed to be new was having a special Minister responsible and the political decision to take a bolder initiative in exposure. Mr Maitland said he was aware of this, but the object was to bring IRD with its expertise into wider operations across the board on the Home front without upsetting Home Departments.

11. Since much of the machinery exists already, it is clear that the real thrust of the new approach will be the development of new and bigger operations. This, I suppose, means somebody (perhaps the Head of the Group - i.e., me?) helped by IRD and the Prime Minister's Press Office generally, really getting out into a more dynamic contact with selective mass media contacts, Members of Parliament and such Groups as the Working Together Campaign and the Economic League in industry.

This /

SECRET

-3-

This tricky and important job requires the imagination, energy and wide range of contact possessed by Mr Reddaway in the 1950's.

12. I got the feeling that this has not all been thought through and that the immediate need is for the setting up of a bit of machinery, and that the appointment of a specific body to take responsibility is being undertaken at this speed to allay Ministers' growing disquiet by demonstrating that "something is being done". At the same time, it is clear that a genuine problem exists on which more action is necessary and that it is better to take positive action of a start somewhere than to go on discussing the subject interminably as has happened for many years. One of the aspects that I am not sure has been thought out are the implications of the FCO getting directly involved on a greater scale. I assume that the idea is that the Head of the Group should in fact be appointed to the Cabinet Secretariat and that IRD, which will do a lot of the work, is being more and more regarded as an interdepartmental agency. I elsewhere got a sniff of the feeling that the JIC and Assessments Staff (who work under the Cabinet Secretariat umbrella) may themselves spread increasingly into the Home field or that a parallel organisation may be contemplated for the Home side.

13. I am not at all keen to take on this job for a number of reasons:

a. the most important is that I am 61 and for health and other personal reasons had, before this matter arose, already decided to give the short notice required in my contract and inform the Chairman of the Counter Subversion Committee that I would like to terminate my contract at the end of July and then either be considered for a part-time advisory job on modest pay for the rest of the year or stop working forthwith. I had taken on the present job mainly because my son was still at Oxford and he finishes this summer;

b. the new job is a very interesting and important one and being an operational job, requires a degree of energy and enthusiasm and robust health which I have not at present got. The job should also be held by somebody for at least a couple of years so that the experience gained from doing the job could be used more and more in the future;

c. as I said to Sir Burke Trend, I hardly think that a job dealing so much with

(I am shaky:
the power of getting
a collapse - the
country.)

SECRET

-4-

the gut issues of domestic politics should be given to someone who, like me, has spent 33 of the last 38 years abroad (Mr Maitland would not have this and said that his own experience showed that FCO officers often had a fresh view of home problems);


d. the plain fact is also that because of the rule that my pay and pension together must not on re-employment exceed my pay when I retired, and because my pay when I retired, technically about 5 years ago, was round about £6,000 (less than half my final pay when I finally, formally retired in October 1972) after drawing the pension which I have earned, I can only be paid about £2,600 a year. This pay has been very welcome to me while my son was at university and I was happy to accept it in an interesting and not too onerous back-room job. But the new job is a difficult and exciting one which needs to be done by somebody really whole heartedly. And quite frankly I don't feel disposed to take on an active job with inevitable pressures in any case. So that to do it in addition to my present task for less than a Third Secretary's salary is not particularly alluring.

14. I made these points broadly to Mr Maitland who nevertheless is obviously keen to have something to say to Ministers next week and somebody to serve up on a plate and he said that he accepted my general statement, but suggested that I might set the new machinery up for a few months while they found someone to take it over.

15. I have to reply by Monday morning to Sir Burke Trend. Certainly if I stayed on for the next few months, I would be willing to give every possible advice and help to the new Group, but I do not want to get personally involved in active domestic operations and I think that it would be better if I made this clear from the start.

16. In canvassing other possible candidates, Sir Burke Trend mentioned Mr Thistlethwaite of the Security Service, and Mr Maitland, who said that this job would be of great and direct interest to the Prime Minister, mentioned Mr Tom Barker or the new colleague who is due to join Mr Maitland's Press Office.

14 April 1972


L C Glass
Joint Secretary
Counter Subversion Committee
Riverwalk House

[See draft
to Sir B. Trend
attached]

What about
Jack
Morton?

He is going for
except for
his job. or
the return of G. himself?

F. through F/1. and F/4.

M.P.S.B. and Subversion in Industry.

You may like to see the attached eleven page report from the Metropolitan Special Branch dealing with industrial unrest in the Port industry during 1972, (Annex A). You may also like to compare it with the attached press cutting from the Daily Telegraph which appeared at the end of July, (Annex B). Whole sentences and paragraphs are identical.

2. The report is not an analysis of the degree of subversive involvement either nationally or in the Metropolitan area. Neither is it a comprehensive account of industrial unrest in the docks on a national basis this year, though it purports to be so. It is grossly inaccurate on matters of fact, incomplete, emotive, and contains unsubstantiated comments and assumptions. Detailed comments are at Annex C.

3. [redacted] in the Police Department of the Home Office has told me that Fergusson Smith sent him a copy of this report.

4. During the docks dispute we have had little security intelligence from Special Branch on the situation in the London docks. Despite repeated requests M.P.S.B. have failed to produce information about the membership of [redacted] a [redacted] Committee and the proceedings of its meetings. This should be the first priority target of M.P.S.B. One can only conclude that they have no agent coverage. On the other hand, it must be said, the M.P.S.B. have produced useful reports on mass meetings, picketing, and demonstrations obtained, apparently, from direct observation or attendance at mass meetings. Some other information has been produced which has derived largely from contact with employers, or, as in the case of the present report, from the press.

5. The effort devoted to this attached report, which is of no value either to us or to any other Department, would have been much better spent on developing sources to provide intelligence about subversive activities in the Port of London [redacted]

6. It is for consideration whether, because Special Branch do not see Subinds, they may feel that this report supplies a need which is not otherwise being met.

/7. A report

7. A report from Special Branch on the Powerworkers dispute is at Annex D. It states that rank and file members of the unions involved are likely to call for a ban on overtime from early October. At the time this report was received this information was not corroborated [REDACTED]. George WAKE had said that industrial action would be taken in January 1973 if the claim had not then been settled. If Special Branch's information had been accurate it would have been most important. When asked to give an assessment of the reliability of this information they were unable to do so and said that the information had subsequently been proved wrong. (Since the announcement of the Government's Incomes Policy WAKE has become more militant, but the policy had not been announced at the time of this report.)

8. At Annex E and F are two reports said to be from a reliable but delicate source on the activities of Hugh SCANLON and the A.U.E.W. If M.P.S.B. have [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

9. In submitting [REDACTED] to F.4. earlier this year we drew attention to the unsatisfactory supply of security intelligence on industrial and trade union matters from M.P.S.B. and the [REDACTED] in this essential area. These reports highlight the present unsatisfactory state of affairs,

10. We shall continue to try and establish closer contact with the officers working for Chief Inspector [REDACTED] in the industrial field, but are unlikely radically to alter their method of approach.

11. I shall be grateful for advice as to whether we should write to the Home Office and/or to M.P.S.B. about the content of the report on the docks dispute and its similarity to the Daily Telegraph.

[REDACTED]

F.1.A [REDACTED]

2 October 1972.

[REDACTED]

Special Branch report on industrial matters signed by a former SDS officer

Special Branch report on industrial matters signed by a former SDS officer

UCPI0000031254/2

Special Branch report on industrial matters signed by a former SDS officer

Reference BM to

Policy File

1

2.10.72

Minute to F. re MPSB and Subversion in
Industry



2

9.10.72

Minute to F. re MPSB and Subversion in
Industry



3

9.10.72

Minute to F. re MPSB and Subversion in
Industry



13.10.72 F1 note.

P.
- This BM discloses an extension of MPSB activity which, unless retracted, is likely to confuse Government and to hamper the machinery established to provide both instant and reviewed intelligence to consumer departments. The salient points are these:-

(a) without, so far as we know, any requirement having been laid on them by Government, MPSB have decided to issue detailed retrospective surveys of industrial disputes. One 11 page survey on the Docks dispute has already issued; a second 15 page report on the Building Workers dispute is about to appear. MPSB propose from now on to prepare them for all major industrial disputes;

(b) these reports are not confined to events which have taken place within MPSB's area of jurisdiction, but cover countrywide aspects of the disputes in question. MPSB have told us that they have used material obtained from provincial Special Branches in their report on the Building dispute;

(c) we have discovered, although MPSB have not told us, that they have sent the first report to the Home Office (Police Department). There may be other recipients;

(d) the first report (Annex A to serial [REDACTED]) may fairly be described as seriously inaccurate in many places. Worse, it contains whole paragraphs plagiarised from the 'Daily Telegraph', without acknowledgment. No attempt has been made in it to inform the consumer of the reliability of the sources or the accuracy of the information. Its contents, including assessments, are in the main stated as facts;

(e) MPSB recently admitted to us that they have no industrial agents. We know that their attempts to obtain sources in London to cover the last rail dispute, when at its height were made in a most clumsy manner and were rebuffed. We considered it fortunate at the time that they

4 (continued)

received no publicity as the already taut situation between unions and Government might thereby have been further exacerbated.

2. The dangers arising from this situation are:-

(a) that there are now two sources of national coverage of and reporting on the subversive aspects of industrial disputes, ourselves and MPSB. We are moreover, speaking with different voices;

(b) that reports sent to a consumer department such as the Home Office risk acceptance at their face value, particularly when there is nothing to enable the reader to assess their reliability. There is no reason to think they might not be shown to Ministers. Had this happened with the Docks dispute report then Ministers could be forgiven for seeing in it corroboration for a number of completely inaccurate statements in the 'Daily Telegraph'. The result could have been faulty ministerial decisions or action;

(c) that Security Service (and no doubt Department of Employment) officers already engaged in the production of reports in London on industrial disputes have no time to spare to analyse and produce detailed comments on lengthy reports of such dubious provenance, and to date, blatant inaccuracy. If the Home Office produce these reports for the attention of the Waddell Unit, the amount of time wasting could be substantial.

3. It comes as a shock to see MPSB indulging in such an unprofessional approach to the production of intelligence reports. It is appropriate to ask why they consider it necessary to extend their function in a manner which both duplicates parallel work undertaken very much more effectively by Department of Employment and at the same time usurps Security Service responsibilities as the Government's national security

/.....

4 (continued)

agency. No doubt MPSB have come under pressure, possibly from the Commissioner or the Home Office, to provide intelligence about the law and order of industrial disputes in the London area, which is indisputably a legitimate charge on them. Indeed, we ourselves have told MPSB that we require much more current intelligence about the subversive aspects of these disputes in the London area - but so far their response has been very limited and compares unfavourably with that of most provincial police forces. We urgently need their cooperation in developing a joint agent system in the industrial and other fields parallel with that which we have with provincial police forces. For MPSB to divert effort from much needed London intelligence coverage to the production of broad surveys of national matters without having any assessment capability is all the more deplorable.

4. In my view this situation needs to be rectified before it gets out of hand. There is no room for two national security agencies covering the same ground and MPSB should be told to stick to their last concentrating on intelligence production, currently inadequate, in their own area, supplying the product to us for inclusion in collated reports and assessments.

5. How this is to be done will need further consideration, but to have the required result, it will probably call for action at a high level. One solution may be to persuade the Home Office (particularly in view of their Chairmanship of the Waddell unit) to point out to MPSB that their reports are duplicating work which is already the job of the Department of Employment and the Security Service and that they are therefore not required. If our need for information about the subversive aspect of disputes in the London area could be stressed at the same time this would be an advantage. This might relieve us of the embarrassment of a direct confrontation with MPSB. There is however some risk that it would lead to a call for extending to them the circulation of Subinds the control of which now seems to lie with the Home Office. There are some dangers here which I can explain if required.

6. You may wish to consider taking the views of P.I.B. and P.4. in this matter.

P.1 

16th October 1972

UCPI0000031254/7

5.

~~F.2.~~ 1674. Reuben tone.
~~F.2.~~ [redacted] 7/11.

Reference minute 4 I agree that this recently started series of industrial reports by MPSEB is not a very useful development. I think it probably arises from MPSEB's recent recruitment to the Waddell Group.

2. The meetings of the Waddell Group have so far demonstrated (and, so far as I can see, the new arrangements for industrial reporting under the aegis of the Waddell Group will continue to show) that MPSEB are not a serious contender with us in the field of reporting on industrial subversion and providing security information to the D. of E.

3. I have already spoken to Vic Gilbert and Colin Woods about a meeting on industrial coverage and I hope to arrange this shortly.

J.L. Jones

F
76.11.72

6

~~F.2.~~ Noted [redacted] 14/12

I dare say you are familiar with the relationship between F.I. and MPSEB on the industrial front.

2. You may nevertheless like to note the contents of this file now that you have responsibility for the industrial desk. There have been some developments in that F. has, I gather, spoken to Colin Woods about the subject and he has doubtless done a note on this discussion.

3. Since these papers were put away in this B.M. we have had at least one further report from MPSEB [redacted]

[redacted] we felt we could not

/assess

Min. 6 cont'd

assess the intelligence it contained. I made this point to F. as I felt that this was a situation which we could not very well continue to support. The industrial desk will be able to give you details if you require them.



F.I. 

11th December, 1972.

7

14.5.73

S.B; Report



8

8.6.73

Loose Minute with S.B. Report attached



9

15.11.73

MPSB report re railways



10

16.11.73

MPSB report re railways



11

23.11.73

MPBS report re railways

12

23.11.73

MPBS report re [REDACTED]

13

23.11.73

MPBS report re building industry

14

27.11.73

MPBS report re engineering industry

15

29.11.73

MPBS report re industrial militancy against Phase Three

16

30.11.73

MPBS report re mineworkers

17

3.12.73

MPBS report re mineworkers


18

~~P2~~

1. We discussed with Director F the series of reports from MPSE which we have recently received and about which you wished to speak to Commander Rodgers. Copies of all these reports are on this BM, serials 9a to 18a. A number of them are of the type which one would expect MPSE to produce for the benefit of the Metropolitan Police, since they refer to matters which affect law and order or the policing of the Metropolitan area. Examples of this kind are at serials [REDACTED]. The remainder deal with topics of national interest, i.e. the situation in the building industry, the situation in the engineering industry, the situation in the mining industry, the current state of the [REDACTED] and industrial action against Phase Three generally.

2. The following points would seem to be worth discussing with MPSE:-

- i. We understood from MPSE that they would no longer undertake enquiries about industrial or trade union matters unless they had a specific law and order or subversive connotation. The reports at serials 12a to 16a on the national scene would seem to derive largely from press coverage and are not specifically concerned with law and order matters, indeed that on the mining industry specifically states, at paragraph 9, that there is no immediate threat to public order.
- ii. In view of the pressure under which MPSE are working the production of the latter type of report, which is contrary to their own policy, seems to be a waste of valuable resources. While we shall continue to look to the MPSE for information about subversion in industry in the Metropolitan area, and no doubt the Home Office will continue to look to them for information about law and order, there is no requirement for general background reports of this type.
- iii. I have spoken to F4, [REDACTED] about two of these reports in which there is information which allegedly derives from informants. F4 are taking up separately with MPSE the question of sources. Some of this information might possibly be of value to us if the sources were disclosed and the information could be assessed. But at present none of it can be incorporated in our own reports.



11 December 1973



01-930 5422

J.1044/
Je.0396.

S E C R E T

L. Burke Trend
CABINET OFFICE
LONDON SW1A 2AS

S+P

19 October, 1972.

Dear Angel,

On instructions of Sir Burke Trend I am enclosing for information of your Secretary of State a copy of the first report (SPL(72)1) by the Interdepartmental Group of Officials set up to study Subversion in Public Life. The Group was formed in September 1972 to supervise and direct the collection of intelligence about threats to the internal security of Great Britain arising from subversive activities, particularly in industry; and to make regular reports to the Ministers concerned. The Group is chaired by Mr. J. H. Waddell (Home Office) and consists of representatives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Scottish Office, the Department of Employment, the Security Service, the Special Branch, Metropolitan Police, and the Cabinet Office.

2. The report has been seen by the Prime Minister who will, I understand, wish to discuss it at an early date with the Ministers now receiving it.

3. I have also been instructed by Sir Burke Trend to send copies of this letter and the report to Acland, Russell

/and

G. L. Angel, Esq.,
Home Office.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

and Holland for their Secretaries of State; and also to Andrew for the personal information of the Secretary of State for Defence. Attached to the cover note of the report is a list of officials who have received a copy.

4. A copy of this letter without the report also goes to Norbury and Kay Dover.

J. M. Peter.
for M. E. HERMAN

Enclosure: SPL(72)1

S E C R E T

SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

SPL(72) 1 (Final)

COPY NO 29

11 October 1972

CABINET

INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP UNDER CHAIRMANSHIP
OF MR J H WADDELL

—
IMPACT OF SUBVERSIVE GROUPS ON TRADE UNION ACTIVITY

Note by the Secretaries
—

The attached report has been approved by the Group and is issued in final form.

Recipients are requested to treat the contents of this report, and the existence of the Working Group, on the strictest need-to-know basis.

Signed M E HERMAN
D H J HILARY

Cabinet Office

11 October 1972

SECRET

SECRET

DISTRIBUTION

Ministers (as decided by the Secretary of the Cabinet)

Sir Philip Allen, Home Office
Mr J H Waddell, Home Office
Mr D H J Hilary, Home Office
Sir Denis Greenhill, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Sir Stewart Crawford, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Mr G F N Reddaway, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (IRD)
Mr T C Barker, Foreign and Commonwealth Office (IRD)
Sir Denis Barnes, Department of Employment
Mr D B Smith, Department of Employment
Mr K N Atkinson, Department of Employment
Sir Douglas Haddow, Scottish Office
Mr W K Fraser, Scottish Office
Mr M B Hanely, Security Service
Mr J L Jones, Security Service

Deputy Assistant Commissioner V S Gilbert, Special Branch, Scotland Yard
Sir Burke Trend, Cabinet Office
Mr J M Moss, Cabinet Office
Mr Herman, Cabinet Office

THIS IS A COPY THE ORIGINAL
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT.

SECRET

SECRET

THE IMPACT OF SUBVERSIVE GROUPS ON TRADE UNION ACTIVITY

OBJECT

1. So far 1972 has been a year of exceptional industrial militancy, with major unions in major industries engaged in prolonged and bitter disputes. Subversive organisations and groups such as the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) and the Trotskyists have been closely involved in fomenting and supporting militant industrial action, both official and unofficial. The aim of this paper is to analyse and assess the significance of the part played by subversive groups and individuals in trade union activity and to forecast the part they may seek to play in future disputes.

INTRODUCTION

The Role of Trade Unions

2. Trade unions legitimately seek to achieve a real improvement in the earnings of their members, the right to work and security of employment, improvement in working conditions and a larger say in the decisions which govern these matters. Through Parliament, by the exercise of their political influence, they have also sought a redistribution of wealth, full employment policies, improved social measures and minimum health, safety and security provisions for the employee and his family. These aims inevitably give rise to conflict with Government if only on timing and means. Trade unions in the United Kingdom can never be wholly co-operative allies of governments, which are of necessity constrained by economic and social realities and external and political considerations not necessarily either understood or accepted by trade unions or their members. Nevertheless the trade union movement as such has always been prepared to pursue its aims within the existing social framework as determined by the parliamentary system of democracy and has sought to change the former only through the latter.

Trade Union Leadership

3. Trade union leaders, whatever their political sympathies, are essentially concerned with the maintenance of control over their union's affairs and they prefer order and certainty in these affairs. They would welcome the restoration of discipline in the trade unions with effective sanctions against militant and unofficial leaders, but they exist to serve the needs of their members and must respond to vocal rank and file pressure. Even right-wing leaders such as Chapple of the Electrical, Electronic, Telecommunications

SECRET

and Plumbing Union (BETPU) occasionally adopt attitudes of militancy eg in February 1972 he said "We have drawn our lessons from the miners' strike. Next year we will take the same action as the miners". George Smith of the Union of Construction and Allied Trades Technicians (UCATT) was forced by militant pressure to persist in an official strike in the building industry in the face of an offer he was prepared to accept.

4. The influence and standing of many right-wing leaders has been reduced through their involvement in the Incomes Policy of the previous Government. In the same period major unions such as the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU) (with Jack Jones as General Secretary) and the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW) (under Scanlon as President) have followed more left-wing policies. There has thus been a general swing in major unions away from moderate or right-wing policies.

Subversion and Militancy

5. For the purposes of this paper militancy is defined as readiness to use or threaten the use of strikes, sit-ins and other forms of aggressive industrial action in the furtherance of industrial disputes and an unwillingness to seek or accept compromise solutions through negotiation, conciliation or arbitration. Subversion is defined as activities threatening the safety or well being of the state and intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means. Hence militancy in the pursuit of trade union disputes with employers is not subversive, unless the motivation and purpose of the militants is primarily political and threatens the parliamentary democratic system. Opposition to the industrial policies of the government of the day is not in itself subversive.

BACKGROUND TO INDUSTRIAL MILITANCY IN 1972

6. Several factors have led to the erosion within the last few years of previously accepted standards and procedures in the conduct of industrial disputes. Attempts to reform the trade union movement following the Donovan Report, the abandonment of the legislative proposals contained in "In Place of Strife" and the subsequent passage of the Industrial Relations Act resulted in a posture of confrontation with the government on this and other issues. Trade union leaders have had to become more responsive to rank and file aspirations in attempting to exercise more effective control over their

SECRET

SECRET

members. Such increased control as they have been able to achieve has been attained by out-flanking the more militant unofficial leaders by being more ready to give official recognition to strikes and less ready to accept compromise solutions. Withholding of recognition and funds for strike pay has largely ceased to be an effective sanction in the hands of union leaders because tax refunds and social security payments make union strike pay of less significance to the striker.

7. Perhaps the most significant factors in inducing a mood of frustration and militancy, sometimes irrational, in the trade unions at all levels have been the unprecedented rate of inflation and an equally unprecedented post war level of unemployment, the effects of which are not neutralised by higher rates of redundancy payment and unemployment benefit. The rate of inflation and fears for its continuance have tended to produce intolerance of the slowness of normal procedures for the examination of wage claims and have increased rank and file pressures on union leaders for militant action to produce speedy and considerable wage increases. Government measures in other fields, particularly over housing, welfare payments and entry into Europe have been misrepresented and have come to be seen as divisive, thus contributing to further militancy.

8. The militant mood of ordinary members of unions has tended to increase yet further the influence of shop stewards, to lessen the standing and influence of union full time officials at regional level, and to increase the difficulties of national officials and elected union leaders in seeking to control the influence of shop stewards in local and national negotiations.

9. Militancy in recent disputes has occasionally led to violence, which has attracted considerable publicity. The more militant and frustrated the mood of rank and file union members the greater is the likelihood of irrational and violent acts. Violence in industry is seldom planned in advance, except by Trotskyists, but where passions are aroused and contending forces meet eg at picket lines, violence may erupt. Notwithstanding the violence which has occurred in recent picketing incidents the use of violence is not generally advocated by militants or subversive groups such as the Communist Party. Only some Trotskyist and Maoist elements would openly encourage violence.

SECRET

10. Nationwide circulation of major newspapers, radio and television sustain an intense public interest in the progress of industrial disputes. Although most trade union militants regard the media as being biased against them, there can be little doubt that television in particular has made a contribution to the spread of militancy both by example and by enabling telegenic unofficial leaders (such as Jimmy Reid of Upper Clyde Shipbuilders (UCS) and the docker Steer) to acquire a national or regional following at least as great as that of official union leaders. On the other hand, the media can and do expose the more flagrant abuses of the militants and this may result, as in the recent dock strike, in more reasonable rank and file attitudes to negotiated settlements.

11. In these circumstances the CPGB and other subversive groups have found less effective opposition to their advocacy of militant industrial action. The climate of industrial militancy and the decrease in the power and influence of right-wing union leaders have benefited the CPGB, which exerts an influence in the national leadership of major unions disproportionate to its numerical strength.

THE ROLE OF THE CPGB

12. Appendix I indicates the extent of the influence of the CPGB in the national leadership of major unions. Over one in ten of the leading full time officials and executive committee members of the larger trade unions are Communists or their sympathisers. The Communist Party has not achieved sufficient penetration to give it control of a single union and has no representative on the General Council of the Trades Union Congress (TUC). In the Mid-1950s Communist penetration was of the same order as it is today. The Party received a severe setback in several major unions following the exposure of Communist malpractices in the Electrical Trades Union (ETU) in 1961, but within the last 10 years it has been able to restore its position and influence. The political and industrial attitudes of the TUC and the union leadership generally are subject to pressure by Communists, but are not determined by them. A numerical approach, however, under-estimates the extent of Communist influence. A small disciplined group pursuing a well-rehearsed policy can influence a much larger body such as a union executive whose other members do not act as a single-minded group.

SECRET

13. The aims of the CPGB in seeking to increase its influence in industrial affairs are essentially political. The Party's ultimate objective is to redress its political and numerical weakness by obtaining dominant influence in the Labour Party or by attracting a significant proportion of the Labour Party into a Communist-led major parliamentary grouping. The CPGB therefore strives to secure the removal of Labour Party bans on Communists attending its Conferences by increasing its influence in the major trade unions and thereby on the policies of the Labour Party itself. (At the recent TUC Conference the CPGB counted as a success for its policies the lifting of the ban on Communist participation in the Annual Conference of Trades Councils). With these objectives in view, the CPGB leadership likes to avoid unthinking militancy and does not seek to create a revolutionary situation by smashing the economy through industrial action. Politically the Party wants to inherit control of a viable economy. That is not to say, however, that on occasions individual Party members do not get carried away by their militancy. During the recent docks dispute Communist advocacy of unofficial strike action continued after it had become clear that the majority of dockers wished to return to work.

14. The CPGB makes no secret of its political objectives and its advocacy of industrial militancy, which are regularly and proudly proclaimed in its publications, notably the "Morning Star" (see Appendix II). In this sense there is no clandestine Communist conspiracy to subvert industry. The Party does, however, plan its interventions in the internal affairs of trade unions in clandestine fashion. Under the guidance of Ramelson, the CPGB's Industrial Organiser, caucuses of leading Party members in the major unions and industries (known as "Advisories") meet secretly to agree the Party line in a particular dispute or in trade union elections. The Party also seeks to conceal its manipulation of unofficial bodies such as the National Ports Shop Stewards Committee (NPSSC) and the Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions (LCDTU) (active in opposing trade union reform and the Industrial Relations Act). In short, the CPGB is proud to claim to be in the vanguard of industrial militancy and hopes thereby to attract new members and strengthen its influence in the unions at a time when there is a general mood of militancy. It seeks, however, to conceal the methods by which Party members interfere in internal union matters and is ever mindful of the damaging effect on its public image and influence of such scandals as the ETU conspiracy case of 1961.

SECRET

15. During the passage of the Industrial Relations legislation, the CPGB's main efforts were devoted to campaigning against it and to supporting those union leaders (such as Jones and Scanlon) who actively opposed the Government's proposals. In the major industrial disputes of 1972 the Party has adopted a vigorous militant posture and has sought to exploit the prevailing militancy among rank and file unionists to its own advantage. The extent of Communist involvement in major disputes during 1972 is summarised in Appendix III. It is doubtful whether the Party's activity has had a decisive effect on the outcome of any of these disputes outside the building industry. Party policy and propaganda in the docks dispute materially increased the difficulties of the union leadership. In the building industry Communist activity prolonged the dispute thus leading to a higher settlement.

16. It is too early to say whether the prominent part played by the CPGB in advocating militancy in industrial disputes in 1972 will result in an increase in Party membership and sympathy for its political policies. It is known that the total of CPGB membership in June 1972 (27,823) was 980 less than in June 1971, thus continuing a declining trend. On the other hand, the Party's Scottish District increased its membership over the same period by 200. This increase no doubt reflects what was regarded as the success of Communist militant leadership in two major disputes affecting Scotland (the work-in at Upper Clyde Shipbuilders and the mining strike) in which well known Communists played a prominent part.

TROTSKYIST ACTIVITIES IN INDUSTRY

17. Trotskyist groups consist of dedicated militant revolutionaries. Unlike the CPGB, they do not normally seek to penetrate trade union bureaucracy; their aim is to use industrial disputes to bring about confrontation with employers, and the forces of law and order. There are only some 200 Trotskyist activists in industry, most of them militant agitators. One group, International Socialism (IS) now has full time industrial organisers; but generally the Trotskyist groups, who are bitterly competitive with each other and with the CPGB, have no organisation for the central control of their efforts in industry. The groups cannot afford to support paid itinerant agitators. Leading members have however been persuaded to live in areas where industrial conflict is likely. Trotskyist leaders - unlike Communist leaders - are ready to visit the sites of disputes. The main objective of the Trotskyist groups seems to be to attract new recruits by the virulence of their propaganda and the violence of their actions.

18. There are 3 major Trotskyist groups. The International Marxist Group (IMG) has played little part in industrial disputes except for mobilising student support at Essex University during the miners' strike. Together with some anarchists, they have helped to develop the Claimants and Unemployed Workers Union (CUWU) as a channel for the dissemination of information to strikers about methods of exploiting the social security system. The Socialist Labour League (SLI), led by Gerry Healy, has some influence on Merseyside and in the motor industry. International Socialism (IS) has in recent years placed greater emphasis on activity in industry and has organised "fractions" in particular industries. Through the SW Litho Press it has produced a number of effective broadsheets and propaganda pamphlets covering particular industrial situations, notably in engineering in the Midlands.

19. Trotskyists have had no significant impact on major industrial disputes in recent years. They have favoured intervention in small disputes at local level in small firms such as Fine Tubes, Millingford Engineering and Fisher Bendix. The influence of their press has contributed to the propagation of militant attitudes in industry generally and has increased pressure on the CPGB and militant trade unionists to adopt extreme policies. The Socialist Labour League daily "Workers' Press" with a circulation of 25,000 and the International Socialist weekly "Socialist Worker" with a circulation of 20,000 give considerable coverage to industrial affairs. Trotskyist propaganda and militant activity can be assumed to have made a contribution to the spread of violence in recent disputes. Individual Trotskyists were behind some violent picketing eg at Doncaster during the mining strike.

THE PROBABLE IMPACT OF SUBVERSIVE GROUPS IN FUTURE DISPUTES

20. At Appendix IV are outlined the areas in which major disputes are likely to arise during the Autumn round of wage negotiations later this year. The Appendix also draws attention to 2 disputes which are expected to give rise to major difficulties early in 1973. It is too early to assess the effect on union attitudes of the Government's proposals put to the TUC and the Confederation of British Industry (CBI) on 26 September.

21. The most serious and potentially damaging disputes in the rest of this year are likely to involve manual workers employed in local government and in the electricity power industry. The incidence of disputes arising from the operation of the Industrial Relations Act is impossible to predict, as is the timing of future industrial trouble in the docks.

22. Subversive organisations are not well placed to affect the outcome of any local government workers dispute. The CPGB will press for militant action in support of the power workers claim, but its influence is unlikely to be decisive. The CPGB and the NPSSC will be seeking opportunities to exploit any discontent with the Jones/Aldington settlement in the docks. The Party will press strongly for national industrial action should any further individuals be imprisoned as a consequence of the operation of the Industrial Relations Act.

23. Impending claims in the coal mining industry and at Fords are likely to cause serious disputes which will come to a head in February 1973. The CPGB will press for militant action in both. The extent of its influence will depend on the generosity of the opening offers, the negotiating skill of the parties and the feeling of the rank and file. The CPGB is not in a position to determine the outcome of negotiations in either case, but is sufficiently well placed in the negotiating machinery to exercise some influence towards militancy.

CONCLUSIONS


24. The present degree of union militancy results from a combination of political and economic circumstances, in particular the rate of inflation and its expected continuance, and from the fact that militant action has appeared to succeed in producing more generous settlements than could have been achieved by normal negotiating procedures.

25. Subversive groups, and in particular the Communist Party, have made a contribution to the militancy of trade unions in recent disputes but have had no significant impact on the outcome of disputes outside the building industry.

26. They have, however, taken full advantage of the general militant mood to pose as the vanguard of the workers' cause, thereby hoping to increase their influence in the major unions and to attract increased support for their political policies and objectives.

27. These organisations will certainly continue to exploit to the full any major disputes developing in future, and the CPGB will continue to exercise the considerable but not decisive influence it has in major unions and unofficial groups on the side of militant industrial action.

A The National Archives

DEPARTMENT/SERIES <i>CAB 301</i>	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: <i>Appendix 1 Page 9</i>	
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>B. Walsh</i> <i>13/12/17</i>
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

SECRET

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

SPL(72) 2nd Meeting

COPY NO 13

CABINET

INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP UNDER CHAIRMANSHIP OF
MR J H WADDELL

MINUTES of a Meeting held in
Room 208, Home Office on
MONDAY 23 OCTOBER 1972 at 3.15 pm

PRESENT

Mr J H Waddell
Home Office (In the Chair)

Mr G F N Reddaway
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr W K Fraser
Scottish Office

Mr T C Barker
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr D B Smith
Department of Employment

Mr M B Hanley
Security Service

Mr J L Jones
Security Service

Deputy Assistant Commissioner
V S Gilbert
Special Branch, Scotland Yard

Mr J M Moss
Cabinet Office

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT

Mr K N Atkinson
Department of Employment

Security Service

SECRETARIAT

Mr M E Herman
Mr D H J Hilary

CONTENTS

Item No	Subject	Page
1.	CLAIMANTS AND UNEMPLOYED WORKERS UNIONS	1
2.	CURRENT REPORTING AND LONGER TERM STUDIES	3
3.	TRIPARTITE TALKS ON THE ECONOMY: TRADE UNIONS REACTIONS TO GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS	6
4.	FUTURE REQUIREMENTS OF MINISTERS: POTENTIAL DISPUTES IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR.	7

SECRET

SECRET

1. CLAIMANTS AND UNEMPLOYED WORKERS UNIONS

The Group had before it SPL(72) 3 (Draft), an assessment of the importance of the Claimants and Unemployed Workers Unions and the extent of subversive involvement in them.

The following main points were made in discussion -

- a. The role of Strike Claimants Unions, in some ways a new expression of industrial militancy, should be more clearly differentiated from those Claimants Unions whose existence was not linked to particular strikes.
- b. The hostility of the Claimants Unions was directed specifically against the Department of Health and Social Security but was essentially a manifestation of a more general anti-establishment attitude; there was also some evidence of Claimants Unions members being involved in incitement to strike.
- c. The paper could be re-ordered to cover the history of the movement and the circumstances bringing it into being; its aims, organisation and methods; and the extent to which subversive elements influenced its activities.
- d. It would be helpful to have an indication of the scale and success of the movement's activities, and of the amount of support its demonstrations had attracted.

THE CHAIRMAN, summing up, said that the paper was a useful contribution on a topic that was likely to be of considerable Ministerial interest, particularly in the event of major industrial disputes. Its form should be revised in accordance with the discussion, especially to indicate the extent of the influence of subversive elements, and to bring out some conclusions, however tentative. He would himself discuss the re-draft with the Department of Health and Social Security.

SECRET

SECRET

The Group --

1. Took note, with approval, of the Chairman's summing up.
2. Invited the Security Service to revise the paper in accordance with the Chairman's summing up.
3. Instructed the Secretaries to circulate the revised version for clearance out of Committee.

SECRET

SECRET

2. CURRENT REPORTING AND LONGER TERM STUDIES

The Group considered SPL(72)(SEC) 2, a note on proposed longer term studies, and SPL(72)(SEC) 3, a note on methods of handling current intelligence.

In discussion of the Group's role in current and longer term assessments, the following main points were made -

a. During industrial disputes, and related periods of intensive negotiation, the Security Service provided a rapid service of information on subversive influences and their relation to other aspects of a dispute. The Department of Employment drew upon these reports, together with other information available to it, in its dealings with Ministerial and Official Committees and others concerned. Daily or even weekly assessments by the Group would duplicate work being done elsewhere and would not add significantly to the knowledge available from other sources.

b. The Group's role in relation to individual disputes might best be seen as the production of medium term "framework" papers, setting down likely subversive influences and other factors relevant to those disputes which could be predicted in advance. It might also be useful on occasions to produce brief ad hoc reports of subversive influences in disputes after they had been concluded.

c. The most useful preparation which the Group might undertake was, however, the thorough study of key Unions to establish how decisions were taken at various levels, where power lay, and the extent to which subversive forces had influence or control.

d. The Department of Employment was establishing a new unit to collect and assemble overt information about Trades Unions, and this information might profitably be collated with that available to the Security Service.

SECRET

SECRET

In the subsequent discussion of topics for assessment the following points were made -

e. In addition to the longer studies already proposed there was a requirement for a paper on the New Left, studying its subversive elements as a whole rather than in connection with particular disputes or causes. The paper should examine, at least in part, the Movement's international connections.

f. A study of subversion in the media would be valuable but posed considerable problems. IRD had produced some studies on this subject, and the Security Service had previously reported such information as was available; but a thorough assessment would involve a substantial investment of collection and analytic effort.

THE CHAIRMAN, summing up the discussion, said that it appeared that the Group's most useful contribution would be in medium and long-term assessments on the lines indicated in paragraph 10 of the paper under consideration, rather than current intelligence. The Group's Assessors should begin work on a detailed study of the National Union of Mine-workers, to be completed by the end of the year; work should also be put in hand on a similar study in depth of the Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers. The Assessors should be prepared to produce, when necessary, short "framework" papers on subversive influences which might be involved in major disputes later this year or early next year in Fords and the Railways. In addition, the Security Service should begin work on a study of the New Left, including its international links, as a long-term project. The Security Service should not at this stage devote special effort to the production of assessments for the Group on the Schools' Action Union and National Union of School Students, but should be prepared to produce papers should the activities of these bodies become more prominent. It

SECRET

SECRET

would be premature to commission a study of subversion in the media, but it would be helpful if the Director General of the Security Service could give preliminary thought to the problems involved.

The Group -

1. Noted with approval the Chairman's summing up.
2. Instructed the Group's Assessors to proceed as in the Chairman's summing up.
3. Invited the Security Service to proceed as in the Chairman's summing up.
4. Invited the Director General of the Security Service to consider the problems involved in the production by the Group of an assessment on subversion in the mass media.

SECRET

SECRET

3. TRIPARTITE TALKS ON THE ECONOMY: TRADE UNIONS REACTIONS
TO GOVERNMENT PROPOSALS

The Group had before it SPL(72) 2, a paper by the Department of
Employment on this subject.

THE CHAIRMAN, summing up a short discussion, said that the contents of
the paper were of interest in showing how information was currently
presented; and in demonstrating the need for speedy compilation and
presentation. It would not now be appropriate to up-date the paper
and issue it as an assessment from the Group.

The Group -

Took note, with approval, of the Chairman's summing up.

SECRET

SECRET

4. FUTURE REQUIREMENTS OF MINISTERS: POTENTIAL DISPUTES
IN THE PUBLIC SECTOR

THE CHAIRMAN informed the Group that its initial report (Impact of Subversive Groups on Trade Union Activities SPL(72) 1 (Final)) had been submitted to the Prime Minister who had now authorised its distribution to appropriate Ministers. It was likely that the report (and the scope of the Group's future work) would be discussed by Ministers in the fairly near future. The Group's programme of work would need to be reviewed in due course in the light of this Ministerial discussion.

The Group -

Took note of the Chairman's statement.

Continuing, the Chairman said that it was possible that for this discussion Ministers would wish to be brought up to date on the potential disputes in the public sector referred to in the Group's first report. A paper (SPL(72)(SEC) 4) had therefore been prepared by the Group's assessment officers covering the potential disputes with the Local Authority Manual Workers and the Electricity Supply Manuals (Power Workers).

In Discussion of this paper the following main points were made -

- a. The cut off date for information and assessment should be clearly indicated.
- b. The possible unwillingness of supervisory grades to assist in maintaining services in the event of a dispute, was a development of some significance.

The Chairman, summing up, said that the report illustrated the difficulties of producing a short-term assessment which was not liable to be overtaken by events. Nevertheless, the report, amended in

SECRET

SECRET

accordance with points made in discussion, should be produced for Ministerial distribution if required. In sending it to the Secretary of the Cabinet he would draw attention to these limitations.

The Group -

1. Took note, with approval, of the Chairman's summing up.
2. Instructed the Group's Assessors to amend the report in accordance with the Chairman's summing up and to provide a revised draft for the Chairman to send to the Secretary of the Cabinet.
3. Instructed the Secretaries to circulate the revised draft in due course.

Cabinet Office

25 October 1972

SECRET

NoteRelations with M.P.S.B. about Industrial Subversion

On 6 December 1972 I discussed with Colin Woods (AC Crime) and Vic Gilbert the possibility of our obtaining increased assistance from M.P.S.B. in our coverage of subversion in industry. F.4. [REDACTED] was present.

2. I explained to Woods that we were under increasing pressure from Whitehall (as Vic Gilbert knew from his membership of the Waddell Group) for more and more detailed information about subversive activities in industrial disputes and the degree of subversive influence in trades unions. We needed to increase our agent coverage of industrial affairs, particularly in the Metropolitan Area, [REDACTED]

3. I said that although our industrial desk had a useful liaison with M.P.S.B. C Squad about industrial activity it was mainly productive of overt information about demonstrations and public meetings. What we needed was long term agent penetration of subversive groups active in the unions rather than casual informant sources. We had some success with Provincial forces in this field.

4. Colin Woods said that, having consulted the Commissioner (Bob Mark) he did not want to get M.P.S.B. involved in running agents in trades unions. M.P.S.B.'s role should be to collect information (e.g. about likely law and order trouble spots) on which police executive action could be taken. It [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] would be politically embarrassing for the police to be involved in this field.

5. At this point I explained that the Security Service [REDACTED], within its Charter, investigated the activities of subversive groups and individuals in industry. Since "subversion in industry" was listed in the responsibilities of C Squad of M.P.S.B. I had assumed that M.P.S.B. could be similarly targeted.

6. Woods appreciated these points but said that he remained opposed to M.P.S.B. becoming involved in agent running [REDACTED] in this field, not least because he had serious staff shortages within CID and was contemplating raiding SB (who had a high proportion of experienced manpower) for CID purposes. He had no objection to M.P.S.B. assisting us in talent spotting but the job [REDACTED]

/7. In...

- 2 -

7. In subsequent discussion with Vic Gilbert, Rollo Watts and [REDACTED] of C Squad we agreed that F.4 should have an early meeting with Commander C Squad with the object of defining targets and assets. It was clear from this discussion that AC Crime's ruling about agent running in trades unions was an embarrassment to M.P.S.B. because

Special Branch was already
collecting intelligence in this area.

J.L. Jones

F.

7.12.72

covering TOP SECRET

CABINET OFFICE
A 2107
14 DEC 1972
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO. 2107

To: Prime Minister

From: Lord Rothschild

14th December, 1972.

Following a recent conversation with you I attach Part I of a note which you may find of interest and which, perhaps during January, by when Part II will be ready, I believe might be worthy of an informal discussion.

Copies have been sent to Lord Carrington,
Mr. Robert Carr, Sir Burke Trend and Sir William Armstrong.

NA

TOP SECRET

SUBVERSION

Subversion is defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as

"To bring about the overthrow or ruin of a person, people, a country, a dynasty, etc."

It is often thought to refer to espionage, sabotage and disruptive activities, organised and/or carried out on behalf of a Foreign Power.

In the modern world, however, subversion may be of a different form. It may not be organised or controlled by a Foreign Power and may take the form of disruptive activities carried out by an individual who wishes to undermine or overthrow constitutional democracy.

A number of people may well engage in similar activities without any connection between each other, but with the same objective of undermining or overthrowing constitutional democracy.

It is this new activity about which the modern state must obtain as much information as possible with or without the intention of taking any particular course of action; and, of course, about the people engaging in it.

The attached memorandum on subversion, though rather long, is, we believe, well worth study. As will be seen, it is based on Lord Denning's report on the Profumo case.

14th December, 1972

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

Copy No. 4
of 5 copies

SUBVERSION

1. In para. 238 of Cmnd. 2152 (Report on the Profumo case), Lord Denning gives the text of the Directive issued in 1952 by the Home Secretary to the Director-General of the Security Service. This Directive, which Lord Denning in 1963 described as 'the governing instrument today', runs in part as follows:
 - "2. The Security Service is part of the Defence Forces of the country. Its task is the Defence of the Realm as a whole, from external and internal dangers arising from attempts at espionage and sabotage, or from actions of persons and organisations whether directed from within or without the country, which may be judged to be subversive of the State.
 3. You will take special care to see that the work of the Security Service is strictly limited to what is necessary for the purposes of this task.
 4. It is essential that the Security Service should be kept absolutely free from any political bias or influence and nothing should be done that might lend colour to any suggestion that it is concerned with the interests of any particular section of the community, or with any other matter than the Defence of the Realm as a whole."
2. The word subversive is not defined in the Directive. In the context of Security Service operations it is most naturally understood in its normal dictionary meaning, - metaphorically, "that which undermines authority or allegiance". So much at least it must mean, and no preciser definition will be offered at present, in order that the following argument may be immune from the charge of using the term in some special sense not envisaged by the drafter of the Directive.
3. Lord Denning's interpretation of the Directive is given in para. 230 of his Report as follows:

"(The operations of the Security Services) are not to be used so as to pry into any man's conduct, or business affairs; or even into his political opinions, except in so far as they are subversive, that is, they contemplate the overthrow of the Government by unlawful means."

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

This interpretation introduces two new points:

- (a) That 'political opinions', as well as 'actions' (to which alone the Directive refers) are, if they are 'subversive', subject to Security Service operations. This, if accepted, has an important consequence; and plainly it should be accepted. Political opinion may be evidence of intent to act in a political way, whether openly or not. If, for example, a man in control of a powerful internal organisation, expresses the opinion that a Communist system would be preferable to Parliamentary government in this country, it is in the interests of the State to watch for evidence of behaviour designed to translate opinion into action.
 - (b) The second new point is the definition of 'subversion'. To say that subversion means 'contemplating the overthrow of the Government' does not go far enough; it is not so much 'the Government' (i.e. a particular administration) as 'the system of Government' which is or may be at stake. And to add 'by unlawful means' over-simplifies the issue, as subversion may take forms in which the means employed are, in themselves, not unlawful.
4. The Directive instructs the Security Service to defend the realm against subversive organisations directed from within the country as well as from without. Now, to take an example, a Trade Union is an organisation directed from within the country: suppose that X is in control of a Trade Union, employs lawful means, ostensibly for a lawful purpose, but in fact for the purpose of subversion as defined ("contemplating the overthrow of the system of Government"), are his actions, and (accepting Lord Denning's interpretation of the Directive) his political opinions, subject to the operations of the Security Service?
5. The answer to this question is manifestly affirmative. Although it is not unlawful for X to induce men to strike, however damaging this may be to the realm, nor is it unlawful to persuade men to claim high wage increases, however injurious these may be to the national economy; yet, if these measures are taken by X with the intention (whether primary or secondary intention) of undermining the system of Government, then, although his means are lawful, his end is subversive and therefore not lawful. His organisation is, within the terms of para. 2 of the Directive quoted above, being directed to an end which "may be judged to be subversive of the State", i.e. designed to undermine lawful authority and to destroy allegiance. It follows that his actions (according to the Directive)

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

and also his political opinions (according to Lord Denning) are subject to the operations of the Security Service.

6. This conclusion is not in conflict with para. 4 of the Directive quoted above. There is no question here of political bias. The duty of the Security Service to investigate suspected subversion is absolute, and is not affected by the colour of the suspect's political opinions, whether these are extreme right-wing or extreme left-wing or anything else.
7. It is much easier to show that the Security Service has a duty, under its Directive, to concern itself with subversive activity of the type described above, than to define what action it can profitably take; for the circumstances in the example of X are of a peculiar type. Both the end and the means of X are to a very great extent both openly avowed and lawful. It is publicly stated, and not denied by X, that he would prefer an alien type of regime in this country, with the necessary implication that he would assist, given the opportunity, in the elimination of Parliamentary government as established under the Constitution. There is no secret to be unearthed in this respect, and it is not unlawful to state a preference for an alien type of regime and to work openly to that end; for example, it is not unlawful to be a member of the Communist Party, and there have been Communist members of the House of Commons. Nor are the principal means employed by X (strikes, incitement to discontent, excessive wage claims) either concealed or unlawful.
8. It seems plain that where the true purpose is subversive but the actions and the ostensible end are lawful, proof of subversiveness, in any sense in which a charge could be laid and maintained, will be difficult if not impossible to supply. But in a case where there is reason to believe that an organisation is in fact being directed towards the overthrow of lawful authority and the destruction of allegiance, there are certain questions which a Security Service should seek to answer.
 - (a) Is the organisation, or any person or group within it in receipt of financial assistance, directly or indirectly, from a foreign source?
 - (b) Is the organisation, or any person or group within it, supplied, whether regularly or occasionally, with instructions of any kind from a foreign source?
 - (c) Are there contacts, whether overt or clandestine, between the organisation, or any members of it, and a foreign power, of such a kind that it is reasonable to suspect that information contrary to the interests of the State is being passed?

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

9. It is necessary to envisage the possibility that the result of such inquiries may prove to be largely negative; and this may be because the subversive element is of a relatively novel and not easily definable type, fluid and flexible within its own organisation, loosely or not at all coordinated with like elements in other organisations, and indebted to foreign sources for nothing but its ideology. The Security Service will therefore adopt flexible and experimental tactics, adapting its methods to the varieties which actually present themselves on closer inquiry, recognising that the pattern of subversion may be an incoherent patchwork of irregular shapes and sizes and a variety of colours.
10. As the technique of subversion may be much less tangible than (for example) that of a well-organised agency of a Communist group, the results of inquiry may well reflect the subject-matter's lack of concreteness; and even if the results are both positive and concrete, it may be impracticable or impolitic to take proceedings in respect of them. There is nevertheless plainly one advantage to be derived from Security Service operations in such a field - the provision of an 'Early Warning System' for the Government. Methods could be employed to supply the Government continuously with advance information of plans, the fore-knowledge of which could be of great importance. It seems likely that the true value of Security Service operations would be rather in this region than in the areas outlined in para. 8 above.
11. It has been the object of the present note (a) to show that the direction of an organisation towards an end which is known or believed to be subversive, in the sense defined above, exposes that organisation, and in particular the actions and political opinions of individuals or groups within it, to Security Service concern within the terms of their Directive; (b) that, despite certain inherent difficulties, there is at least one product of Security Service operations in such a case which could be of high value to the Government.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

APPENDIX

- (i) The above analysis implies that, in the example taken, the Security Service has the duty to 'pry into the private conduct and business affairs' (Lord Denning's phrase) of individuals; and it is plain that, if the Profumo case is an example of normal interpretation by the Security Service of their Directive, the analysis will be unacceptable.
- (ii) In the Profumo case, the Security Service held it to be 'not the function of the Security Service to find out whether she (Keeler) was his (Profumo's) mistress or not. It was a purely personal side of his life which the Security Service were not concerned to look into,' (para. 260(1)). That is to say, the Security Service was not concerned to look into the question whether a Minister was intimate with a prostitute known to be in close contact with a foreign intelligence-agent. The obvious possibility that a Minister in such circumstances might be exposed to blackmail, for example through compromising photographs taken without his knowledge, appears to have been overlooked or regarded as unimportant. It is asserted in defence that when the Security Service first became aware of the Minister's acquaintance with the prostitute, the foreign agent had just left the country, and therefore 'the present risk had gone' (para. 260 (2)). A layman in these matters might conclude that methods have undergone a surprising change: there was a time when the natural and expected sequel would have been the immediate supply of a successor to Colonel Ivanov in the affections of Keeler, in order to maintain this possibility of pressure on the Minister. The fact that the Russians did not supply a successor (presumably because they guessed that the lid was about to be blown off the kettle) does not justify the Security Service in refusing to inquire whether the Minister's intimacy had gone so far as to expose him to the risk of blackmail in the future.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET
AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

Copy No. 2
of 3 copies

StP

SLP

18th December, 1972

CABINET OFFICE
Ref: A03096
18 DEC 1972
RLIN. INSTRUCTIONS
FILE NO.

hild

Sir Burke Trend has revised the draft of his minute to Robert Armstrong on Industrial Intelligence which he sent to Sir William Armstrong under cover of his letter of 11th December, to take account of the points made by Sir Philip Allen in his letter of 13th December (and also to include a reference to Lord Rothschild's memorandum to the Prime Minister of 14th December).

Sir Burke Trend is now most anxious to minute Robert Armstrong and he would be glad to know whether Sir William Armstrong is content. Perhaps this might be discussed at the meeting arranged for Wednesday, 20th December at 9.45 am. If it is not possible to clear the matter earlier.

I am sending a copy of this letter, for information, to Liz Sermon.

E. M. NORBURY

(B.M. Norbury)

J.A. Chilcot, Esq.

TOP SECRET
AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

Copy No. 2
of 4 copies



Industrial Intelligence

Sir William Armstrong, Sir Philip Allen and I have discussed your minute of 17th November.

It was very timely to be reminded of the Prime Minister's concern about this matter, since I had it in mind to submit to him in the near future - for possible discussion by Ministers during the Recess - a further progress report on the operation of the arrangements which I proposed in my minute of 7th August. You will remember that in that minute I suggested that we should create, in relation to internal security, an organisation having much the same functions as those discharged by the JIC in relation to intelligence about external developments; that you conveyed the Prime Minister's approval to this proposal on 9th August; that I submitted the first report from this new interdepartmental group (on "The Impact of Subversive Groups on Trade Union Activity") to the Prime Minister on 13th October; and that in your minute of 18th October you said that the Prime Minister wished this report to be circulated to the other Ministers concerned, who should thereafter meet to discuss it. We have tried several times to organise this discussion; but the pressure of other business has so far defeated us. Meanwhile, however, we have reviewed the activities of the group (which is chaired by Mr. Waddell of the Home Office) in the light of the meetings which they have held so far and with particular reference to the need to organise a more regular and systematic service of the "SUBIND" reports about industrial unrest, which at present appear in a rather haphazard way as regards both timing and distribution. The group have found that they are well organised and equipped to produce medium and long term studies of subversive tendencies in industry; and they have already commissioned a provisional programme of work of this kind. It comprises detailed studies of the structure of the NUM and the AUEW; a series of inquiries into the subversive influences which might be involved in major disputes in Fords and the railways in the near future; and, in the rather longer perspective, some research into the "New Left", including its international links. (I hope that the group may

TOP SECRET
AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

subsequently extend their activities to include subversion both in the educational world and among the information media. But this raises some rather delicate issues, which Ministers will need to consider carefully.)

It is at the short-term end of the scale that the difficulties arise, since the group is not appropriate for the production of the kind of "instant" situation reports which the JIC produce in moments of international crisis. In particular, it is too large for a purpose which essentially requires a small, compact body, capable of very rapid action. We have considered this problem further; and we now propose that the "SUBINDS", which provide Ministers with the only source of information of this kind (although the Secretary of State for Employment receives his own Departmental briefing), should be replaced by a new series of documents, which would not merely provide "raw" covert intelligence about current industrial disputes but would also attempt to produce a considered assessment of all the information, both overt and covert, available to the Department of Employment, the Security Service, the police and the Department concerned with the industry in question. This will involve creating a small interdepartmental sub-group, able to react very quickly in moments of crisis. Its basic membership should be drawn from the Home Office (who would provide the Chairman), the Department of Employment and the Security Service; and in order to ensure speed of operation it should be geared into the machinery of the JIC and so be free to draw on its resources of servicing, circulation, etc. The circulation list for the product should be, at the minimum, the Prime Minister, the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Employment. But it might be extended, if the Prime Minister wishes, to the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretaries of State for Defence and for Scotland and the Lord Privy Seal; and reports on individual industries should be supplied, in addition, to the responsible Ministers. They should also be made available, as a matter of routine and subject to the necessary safeguards, to those senior officials who are directly concerned either with particular disputes or with industrial relations policy in general. Both the Home Secretary and the Secretary of State for Employment, who have been consulted informally about this proposal, have approved it (albeit with some reluctance on the part of Mr. Macmillan); and, if it is acceptable to the Prime Minister, I will arrange for it to be put in hand forthwith.

TOP SECRET
AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

There remains the question of the scope of the Security Service's activity, which is discussed in paragraph 4 of your minute of 17th November. Sir William Armstrong, Sir Philip Allen and I have discussed this question carefully, with full regard to the Prime Minister's concern about it. The charter of the Security Service (of which I attach a copy) is so drafted as not merely to enable but also to require them to concern themselves strictly with "the security of the State". Moreover, for many of their operations they are dependent on warrants signed by the Secretary of State, who must therefore satisfy himself in each case that the purpose of the warrant falls within the ambit of the charter. In practice "the security of the State" is interpreted as meaning the maintenance of the system of Parliamentary democracy in this country; and the effect of the charter is therefore to restrict the Security Service to the detection of activities which are directed to the overthrow of that system, whether by subversive political action or by force, and to preclude them from interesting themselves in mere "militancy" in industrial disputes unless it has a specifically political implication in the sense defined above. But there is, of course, a "grey" area between these two concepts; and the extent to which the Security Service can properly operate in this indefinable area must inevitably be to some extent a matter of judgment. Fortunately, the newly-appointed Head of the Service is both more aware of, and more sympathetic to, the Government's anxieties in this context than his recent predecessors; and we are pretty confident that, in so far as the balance of judgment needs to be tipped in favour of the Government's interests in any particular case, he will not hesitate so to tip it. He is also devoting considerably increased resources to this aspect of his responsibilities. We doubt, therefore, whether any amendment of the charter is required in order to ensure that we shall secure the information which we need.

More important is the fact that the essential terms of the charter are public knowledge (having been disclosed practically in full in the Denning Report on the Profumo case); and that they have been formally approved, without alteration, by successive Prime Ministers at the outset of each Government's term of office for a good many years. To amend them, therefore, would be a matter of considerable political significance; indeed, we doubt whether it would be either proper or possible to do so without consultation with the Opposition and, probably, some kind of public

TOP SECRET
AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

statement. One hesitates before the prospect of the probable consequences. On balance, therefore, we suggest that they should remain as they are but that the Director General of the Security Service should be advised that they are to be so interpreted as to do full justice to the real objects of the Government's concern.

Since our discussions on which this memorandum is based we have seen the Note on Subversion which Lord Rothschild sent the Prime Minister on 14th December. It is described as Part I of a submission, to be followed by Part II in January; and until we have seen the latter we would prefer to suspend judgment, apart from observing that Part I:-

- (a) reflects from time to time a point of view which the Home Secretary might find it difficult to endorse without reservation;
- (b) essentially confirms our own view about the "grey" area mentioned above and does not cause us to modify our views about the way in which we have suggested that that area should be dealt with.

If the Prime Minister would like to discuss these questions before any wider Ministerial meeting about the work of the interdepartmental group, we are, of course, at his disposal.

MURKE TREND

20th December, 1972



CABINET OFFICE	
A	2297
22 DEC 1972	
FILING INSTRUCTIONS	
FILE NO. 2297/1/1	

copy no. .1. of 3 copies

10 Downing Street
Whitehall

TOP SECRET AND STRICTLY PERSONAL

SIR BURKE TREND
CABINET OFFICE

Industrial Intelligence

Thank you for your minute of 20 December, reference AO3116, which I have now discussed with the Prime Minister.

He would be grateful if you would proceed directly with the proposal on page 2 of your minute, and if you would arrange for the Director General of the Security Service to be advised as you suggest at the top of page 4 of your minute.

He will want to have a further opportunity of discussing these matters with you and Sir William Armstrong early in the New Year.

REA

c.c. Sir William Armstrong

22 December 1972

Top Secret

of 3 copies

1714(72) 1st Meeting

RECORD of a Meeting held in
Conference Room E, Cabinet Office, on
MONDAY 3 JULY 1972 at 3.00 pm

PRESENT

Sir Patrick Dean (In the Chair)

Mr D J D Maitland
Prime Minister's Office

Mr J H Waddell
Home Office

Mr C F N Reddaway
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Mr K Barnes
Department of Employment

Mr J L Jones
Security Service

SECRETARY

Mr J. M. Moss

CONTENTS

Item No.	Subject	Page
1.	THE WORK OF THE GROUP	1
2.	NON-OFFICIAL ORGANISATIONS	3
3.	POSSIBLE PROJECTS	3
4.	FUTURE BUSINESS	4

DISTRIBUTION

Copy No. 1 - Lord President of the Council
" " 2 - Mr D J D Maitland
" " 3 - Sir Burke Trend

Top Secret

1. THE WORK OF THE GROUP

THE CHAIRMAN explained that the Prime Minister had established a small Committee of Ministers to keep under review the problem of subversion in modern society. This Committee consisted, under the Prime Minister's chairmanship, of the Home Secretary, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Lord President of the Council and the Secretary of State for Employment. It had been agreed that this Ministerial body should be supported by a small interdepartmental official group over which the Chairman would preside and of which this was the first meeting. Its terms of reference were as follows:-

"Under the direction of the Lord President of the Council, to develop methods, including appropriate publicity and exposure, by which certain types of subversive activity can be countered; to implement, subject to Ministerial approval, specific projects for this purpose; and to make periodical reports to the Ministerial group."

Continuing, the Chairman stressed the following points which the Group would wish to bear in mind:-

- a. The existence of these groups, both Ministerial and official, should in no circumstances be allowed to become known. His own connection with their work should also remain secret.
- b. The members of the Ministerial and official groups were the only persons with whom this work should be discussed.
- c. The terms of reference made it clear that the link between the official and the Ministerial groups would be provided by the Lord President, with whom the Chairman would normally find it convenient to communicate through Mr Maitland.
- d. The words "... certain types of subversive activity ..." in the terms of reference had been deliberately chosen in order to make it clear that, although the Group would, of course, rely on the Security Service for much of its material, its functions did not in any sense coincide with those of MI5 in so far as the latter were concerned with the whole area of the security of the State.
- e. The words "... subject to Ministerial approval ..." in the terms of reference were also important in as much as they both afforded members of the Group the protection to which they were constitutionally entitled and safeguarded the position of the Security Service, the Directive of which confined its functions to the security of the State and specifically debarred it from any kind of partisan political activity.

Top Secret

f. The same principle was involved in so far as the Information Research Department (IRD) of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office would be one of the channels through which the Group would naturally work; it was essential that expenditure on IRD was directed solely to ensuring the security of the State and not to securing any kind of partisan political advantage.

The Group -

1. Task note.

In discussion it was suggested that it might be useful for the Group to be served by an official responsible for co-ordinating, perhaps on a weekly basis, the relevant information available to, and activities of, the Security Service, IRD and the Department of Employment; he could also liaise with the Press Secretary (Co-ordination) soon to be appointed to Mr Maitland's staff. There was reason to believe that Mr C H Heron, whose experience fitted him particularly well to advise on the wisdom of intervention in particular industrial situations (although not necessarily on the best means of doing so), might be willing to undertake such a function, which might supersede some of the work of the Home Regional Meetings.

The Group -

2. Invited Mr Maitland to consider further with Mr Barnes, bearing in mind the points made in discussion, the desirability of the appointment of a co-ordinator to serve the Group, and to make recommendations.

In further discussion, the following points were made:-

g. The information available to Departments on subversion tended to be rather fragmented, and the Group might usefully commission, as a background both for its own activities and for Ministers, a survey of the broad extent of subversive activity in the country and its development over recent years.

h. It would be beyond the resources of the Security Service to prepare such a survey on an industry-by-industry basis.

j. The Group's own terms of reference were primarily concerned with action, and the commissioning of a survey on the lines suggested might more appropriately be considered by the Official Committee on Subversion at Home.

Top Secret

The Group -

3. Invited Mr Maitland to consult the Chairman of the Official Committee on Subversion at Home as to whether, taking account of the relevant information which the Department of Employment, IRD and the Security Service might be able to provide, it would be appropriate for that Committee to commission a survey of subversive activity in the United Kingdom.

2. NON-OFFICIAL ORGANISATIONS

The Group had before them the note at Annex in which IRD had provided brief details of certain non-official organisations.

The Group -

Invited Mr Reddaway, in consultation with Mr Jones, to make recommendations as to which organisation of this type were likely to be able to assist the Group in their work.

3. POSSIBLE PROJECTS

The Group considered the four projects listed in Mr Maitland's letter of 28 June to Mr Waddell.

Project (a)

The Group -

1. Invited Mr Maitland to convey to the Editor concerned the advice that -

i. it would be undesirable for his newspaper to undertake any general investigation of subversive elements in this country; but

ii. despite this, there might well be some specific instance in the future in which those concerned would be very grateful to take advantage of the Editor's readiness to assist.

2. Invited Mr Reddaway to consider whether he could suggest a project on which this Editor's assistance might usefully be enlisted.

Top secret

Projects (b) and (c)

The Group, taking account in particular of the main sources of the unpublished information in the notes which Mr Maitland had circulated about these projects with his letter -

3. Agreed that there was no action which could be taken to pursue Project (b) or Project (c).

Project (d)

The Group -

4. Invited Mr Maitland to arrange for the Prime Minister's Office to convey to the two industrialists concerned -

- i. the suggestion that, after considering precisely which elements in industry they wished to exert influence, they should seek the help of the Economic League or Industrial Research and Information Services, Limited (IRIS);
- ii. the Prime Minister's gratitude to them for raising the matter and his readiness to consider it further, if necessary, in the light of their discussion with one of these non-official organisations.

4. FUTURE BUSINESS

The Group -

Invited Mr Maitland to determine a suitable date, at least a fortnight later, for their next meeting.

Cabinet Office

7 July 1972

Top Secret

1. SUB-GROUP ON INDUSTRY

Previous References: 1714(72) 2nd Meeting, Minute 2 and
Minute 4, Conclusions 2

MR. BARNES said that the Sub-Group on Industry had held eight meetings and was proving a very useful piece of machinery which was now able to propose the exploitation of suitable information whenever it became available. In particular, in response to Ministers' interests in SUBIND Nos. 20/72 and 27/72, it had arranged for the preparation of material on the building industry which had been used in an article in The Times on which the Guardian had subsequently drawn.

The Group -

Took note.

2. INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP UNDER THE CHAIRMANSHIP
OF MR. WADDELL

MR WADDELL said that an interdepartmental group had been set up under his chairmanship with the following terms of reference:

"To supervise and direct the collection of intelligence about threats to the internal security of Great Britain arising from subversive activities, particularly in industry; and to make regular reports to the Ministers concerned."

Although his group was concentrating initially on long-term assessments, there would no doubt come a time when its work would be of direct use to the Sub-Group on Industry or to the Group itself.

In discussion it was pointed out that recent conversations between Lord Collison and certain trade union leaders on the activities of the Claimants' Unions could be relevant to current work by Mr Waddell's group and to the Sub-Group on Industry.

The Group -

1. Invited Mr Waddell to report orally at future meetings on the activities of his interdepartmental group.
2. Invited Mr Maitland to arrange for Mr Waddell and Mr Barnes to receive any available information on Lord Collison's discussions about Claimants' Unions.

Top Secret

3. HOME REGIONAL COMMITTEE

MR REDDAWAY said that he had agreed with Mr Maitland to report regularly to the Group on the work of the Home Regional Committee. The Sub-Group on Industry was now handling the industrial matters that had hitherto been covered by the Committee and, although the Committee's interests extended to considerably wider aspects of subversion, the advent of the Sub-Group meant that the frequency of the Committee's meetings could be reduced from approximately once a month to perhaps once a quarter. Meanwhile the full support of IRD's resources was available to the Sub-Group; in particular it was informed of all IRD's potential outlets for industrial information.

The Group -

Took note.

4. ADVANCE INFORMATION FOR INDUSTRY

MR MAITLAND said that he had been asked by the Dunlop Group (among others) whether there was any way in which a firm could be warned when it was in danger of employing an individual who was known to have been a subversive influence in some other part of industry; he had advised Dunlops to seek help from non-official organisations such as the Economic League.

The following points were made in discussion -

- a. It was a cardinal principle of the operation of the Security Service that official information could not be made available merely to protect private industrial interests. This principle was not unique to the United Kingdom; in the Federal Republic of Germany, for example, the release of official information for unofficial purposes was forbidden by law.
- b. Against the background of assurances given to Parliament, for example in the context of the Younger Committee Report, it was similarly impossible to countenance unofficial access to criminal records.
- c. Where there was overt evidence that a subversive employee was likely to change the scene of his operations, it was possible to ensure that this was given enough unofficial publicity to serve as an adequate warning to firms who might be at risk.

Top Secret

The Group -

Invited Mr Maitland, in any further discussions with industrialists about the provision of advance information of the kind envisaged by Dunlops, to draw on the points made in the Group's discussion.

5. POSSIBLE PROJECTS

Previous Reference: 171s(72) 2nd Meeting, Minute *

Project (a)

MR REDDAWAY referred to a survey which the newspaper concerned had just begun to publish on its own initiative under the title "The Strifemakers"; the Editor had been supplied with certain photographs which might well be deployed to good effect in an early instalment of the survey.

The Group -

1. Took note

Project (e) - Divergencies between West European Communist Parties over the EEC

The Group -

2. Invited Mr Reddaway to continue to seek a suitable opportunity to give effect to the Prime Minister's wish that reflective Press comment should be promoted to bring out the divergence between the Communist Party of Great Britain and other West European Communist Parties on the subject of Britain's joining the European Communities.

6. FUTURE BUSINESS

The Group -

Invited Mr Maitland to determine a suitable date for their next meeting.

Cabinet Office

3 November 1972

SECRET

in Burke Trend
~~MR MORBURY~~

MR WADDELL'S GROUP

Sir Burke Trend will by now have received Mr Waddell's letter of 15 January about the circulation to Ministers of papers dealing with the NUM and Claimants' Unions.

Mr Herman has suggested in the attached minute that, for the NUM paper, the circulation should be the same as for SPL(72)1 (The Impact of Subversive Groups on Trade Union Activity), which is the only paper so far sent to Ministers. The recipients were:

Prime Minister
Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs
" " " " Defence (personal capacity)
" " " " the Home Department
" " " " Scotland
" " " " Employment

I agree that it would be appropriate to use the same list on this occasion. There is however the question whether a copy should also go to the Lord Privy Seal. There is in principle much to be said for this, because the information is highly relevant to him in his capacity as Chairman of CCU; but I think that this is something on which Sir Burke may first wish to consult the Prime Minister.

The paper on Claimants' Unions might have the same circulation, but with the addition of a copy to the Secretary of State for Social Services (though if Sir Burke Trend is discussing circulation with the Prime Minister, he might wish to mention this point also). If a copy is sent to Sir Keith Joseph, it would not be necessary to send him the covering note suggested in Mr Waddell's letter; but he would have to be given some brief information about the Group, of whose existence he is not formally aware. A note on the following lines might serve:-

A Group of Officials was set up in September 1972 to supervise and direct the collection of intelligence about threats to the internal security of Great Britain arising from subversive activities, particularly in industry; and to make regular reports to the Ministers

SECRET

Qf086

SECRET

concerned. The Group is chaired by Mr J H Waddell (Home Office) and consists of representatives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Scottish Office, the Department of Employment, the Security Service, the Special Branch, Metropolitan Police, and the Cabinet Office. Their work has included the preparation of a paper about Claimants' Unions, and a copy of this is attached.

Paragraph 4 of Mr Herman's minute describes the present position on current assessments. I shall be keeping in touch with developments.

16.1.1973

cc Mr Herman
Mr Moss


P Benner

Enc

S E C R E T

C.329/5.

MR. BENNER

MR. WADDELL'S GROUP

I met Mr. Waddell this morning and collected the agreed text of the NUM report. We decided that this should be issued in final form to officials. At Mr. Waddell's request, this is being done as quickly as possible; we should have it typed for issue late to-day or early tomorrow (Tuesday).

2. You may like to see a copy of Mr. Waddell's covering note to Sir Burke Trend. It does not in fact make a recommendation for distribution of the two reports to Ministers, as Mr. Waddell prefers to leave this to Sir Burke. My recommendations for distribution (which you asked should be put via you) are:-

- (a) The NUM Report: The Prime Minister
 Secretary of State for Foreign and
 Commonwealth Affairs
 Secretary of State for Defence
 (in his personal capacity)
 Secretary of State for the Home
 Department
 Secretary of State for Scotland
 Secretary of State for Employment

This was the distribution given to SPL(72)1, The Impact of Subversive Groups on Trade Union Activity, which was the only report previously sent to Ministers. (I am sorry that I omitted the Foreign Secretary when we spoke about this earlier. He was on Sir Burke's original list of Ministers to receive the

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

Group product, presumably on account, inter alia, of IRD's responsibilities.)

(b) The Claimants' Union
Report:

As above, plus

Secretary of State,
Department of Health and
Social Security.

(In addition, distribution to the Lord Privy Seal might be considered, in view of possible effects of Claimants Unions' activities on the Civil Service.)

3. The Ministers at (a) above had all had the following explanation from me of the Group's composition and rôle in October:

The Group of Officials set up to study Subversion in Public Life was formed in September 1972 to supervise and direct the collection of intelligence about threats to the internal security of Great Britain arising from subversive activities, particularly in industry; and to make regular reports to the Ministers concerned. The Group is chaired by Mr. J. H. Waddell (Home Office) and consists of representatives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, the Scottish Office, the Department of Employment, the Security Service, the Special Branch, Metropolitan Police, and the Cabinet Office.

This explanation has not gone to the Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Security. If Sir Burke Trend approves distribution to the Secretary of State, arrangements will need to be made to provide something on these lines in a covering letter.

/4.

S E C R E T

S E C R E T

4. You may wish to know of plans for the "sub-group" dealing with current assessments. I have been asked to arrange for a meeting at 3.00 p.m. in Room 215 on Thursday, 18th. The object is to produce the first of the weekly Assessments, or at least to conduct a dry run. Mr. Waddell is going to attend, with Mr. Wright of the Home Office. Others will be Mr. Smith (Department of Employment), Mr. Jones (Security Service) (Security Service, but their nominee to join the Assessments Staff to produce these industrial assessments). I have been invited to provide "such JIC attendance as may be necessary", and will be going myself; I shall be asking the Chief of the Assessments Staff whether he will wish to attend. I assume that you will not wish to attend or send a representative to the sub-group, but would want to be a customer for its material.

J. E. Herman.

[M. E. HERMAN]

15 January, 1973.

Enclosure: Copy of Mr. Waddell's covering note to Sir Burke Trend.

Copies to: Mr. Cradock)
Mr. Moss) without enclosure

S E C R E T

10. SECRET
PERSONAL

30th January, 1973

Copy No. *S* 21 Copies

Ref. A03389

As your Secretary of State may be aware, we have recently been overhauling the arrangements for the provision to Ministers of intelligence (including intelligence from covert sources) about industrial relations. As a result the Prime Minister has approved a new interdepartmental structure, comprising two groups, each under Home Office chairmanship. The first will be concerned with the problem in its long-term and medium-term aspects; and the type of report which they will produce is illustrated by the three studies on the impact of subversive groups on trade union activity, the NUM, and Claimants' Unions which are enclosed with this letter (SPL(72) 1 Final, SPL(72) 5 Final and SPL(72) 3 Final respectively). Further reports of this kind will be produced from time to time as the situation requires. The second, and smaller, group will be concerned with short-term intelligence, particularly during emergencies; it will normally meet once a week in order to produce assessments of the kind illustrated by its first two reports, of which I enclose copies. In times of crisis, however, it will need to meet more frequently, perhaps daily.

Both groups will be serviced by the JIC machinery; and in view of the sensitive material involved, the circulation of their reports will not be strictly controlled. The Prime Minister would like your Secretary of State to be a regular recipient of the reports of both groups and to attend the meetings under his chairmanship at which they are discussed. It is directed that the regular circulation should include also the Chancellor of the Exchequer, the Secretary of State for Defence, the Home Secretary and the Secretaries of State for Scotland, for Trade and Industry and for Employment, to whose Private Secretaries I am sending copies of this letter and its enclosures.

All Ministerial recipients of these reports, and their Private Offices, are asked to treat them as for their personal information and to deal with them on a strictly "need to know" basis. I am also sending copies of this letter and its enclosures, with a suitable covering letter, to the corresponding Permanent Secretaries, with a request that they will let me know the names of the other officials to whom they will regard it as necessary to show this material. The JIC will then construct a regular distribution list for future reports; and this, which will be circulated, will indicate those individuals with whom alone this information may be discussed. In so far as it may be necessary to include other Ministers and Departmental officials in the list from time to time, special arrangements will be made for this purpose.

Gist of evidence concerning MPS attendance at, and access to records of, meetings of the Subversion in Public Life ('SPL') committee

1. From the records available, it appears that Victor Gilbert consistently attended SPL meetings as the MPS representative from the committee's revival in March 1974 to June 1977, when he left the MPS. James Waddell of the Home Office was often the Chairman of these meetings.
2. The following police recipients are recorded as having authorisation to receive the SPL committee reports and minutes:
 - 2.1. March 1974 - New Scotland Yard – Victor Gilbert, Matt Rodger, R Wilson
 - 2.2. March 1976 - New Scotland Yard – Victor Gilbert, Matt Rodger, R Wilson
 - 2.3. June 1977 - New Scotland Yard – Robert Bryan, Rollo Watts, R Wilson
 - 2.4. April 1978 - New Scotland Yard – Robert Bryan, Rollo Watts, Low, Alan Dickinson, HN294

Gist of evidence concerning MPS attendance at, and access to records of, meetings of the Subversion in Public Life ('SPL') committee

1. From the records available, it appears that Victor Gilbert consistently attended SPL meetings as the MPS representative from the committee's revival in March 1974 to June 1977, when he left the MPS. James Waddell of the Home Office was often the Chairman of these meetings.
2. The following police recipients are recorded as having authorisation to receive the SPL committee reports and minutes:
 - 2.1. March 1974 - New Scotland Yard – Victor Gilbert, Matt Rodger, R Wilson
 - 2.2. March 1976 - New Scotland Yard – Victor Gilbert, Matt Rodger, R Wilson
 - 2.3. June 1977 - New Scotland Yard – Robert Bryan, Rollo Watts, R Wilson
 - 2.4. April 1978 - New Scotland Yard – Robert Bryan, Rollo Watts, Low, Alan Dickinson, HN294

25th March, 1974

Ref: A06636

RPA

28. 11

In my letter A06349 of 4th March, I implied that I should be consulting the Prime Minister about the handling of industrial intelligence. I have now had an opportunity to do this and have established that it would be in accordance with his wishes for the two groups of officials, which dealt under the last Administration with Industrial Assessments (IAC) and Subversion in Public Life (SPL), to resume their activities on a secure and discreet basis.

An important change, however, is that their reports are to be prepared for the benefit of the Permanent Secretaries concerned and not for Ministers and the terms of reference of SPL are amended accordingly.

The Permanent Secretaries who, together with Michael Hanley and me, will receive and be concerned with all these reports are yourself and Conrad Heron. Copies will also go to Robert Armstrong at No. 10. Because their Ministers will no longer be receiving this material, William Armstrong, Tom Brimelow, Douglas Allen, Jack Rampton, Antony Part, Ned Dunnatt and Nick Morrison will no longer have a need to see the entire output of the IAC and SPL groups; in future they will receive only those papers which are of departmental interest to them (although Reddaway (FCO) and [redacted] (Scottish Office) will continue to receive SPL papers as members of that group). Despite any intervals of apparent silence they will be able to rest assured that the Security Service will continue to keep itself informed about subversive activity in industry.

Leaving aside the position of the Home Secretary, which will of course be different because of his responsibility for the Security Service, Permanent Secretaries are authorised to reveal to the Ministers in charge of their Departments such of the contents of these reports as they have a genuine need to know, but the aim should be to avoid revealing the nature of the sources; an element of discretion about this will inevitably have to be left with Permanent Secretaries in view of the paramount importance of protecting those sources.

-/The existence

Sir Arthur Paterson, KCB, MVO

The existence of the IAG and SPL groups will of course remain secret, and knowledge of their existence must continue to be confined to those who are positively vetted and have a need to know under the new arrangements which I have described. The provisions made under the last Administration for the safeguarding of this special intelligence material will be maintained, and I have asked Mike Herman (Secretary of the Joint Intelligence Committee) to issue to Control Officers an up-dated version of his guidance on the arrangements in general and Control Officers' duties in particular; as a first step, however, he will be asking your Control Officer and those in the Departments to which I am copying this letter, to let him have, with the personal approval of their Permanent Secretaries, a revised list of the officials who need to continue to receive personal copies of SPL or IAG reports or to see them under departmental arrangements.

I am sending copies of this letter to those shown on the attached list.

JOHN HUNT

(John Hunt)

**DISTRIBUTION LIST FOR COPIES OF SIR JOHN HUNT'S LETTER
TO SIR ARTHUR PETERSON DATED 25th MARCH 1974**

Mr. R. T. Armstrong	10 Downing Street
Sir William Armstrong	CSD
Sir Thomas Brinslow	FCO
Sir Douglas Allen	Treasury
Mr. C. F. Heron	Department of Employment
Sir Jack Rampton	Department of Energy
Sir Antony Part	Department of Industry
Sir James Dunnitt	Ministry of Defence
Sir Nicholas Morrison	Scottish Office
Sir Michael Hanley	Security Service

For Information:

Mr. P. D. Nairne	Cabinet Office
Sir Leonard Hooper	Cabinet Office
Mr. P. Craddock	Cabinet Office
Mr. M. E. Herman	Cabinet Office
Mr. J. S. Elliott	Cabinet Office
Mr. J. M. Mossal	Cabinet Office

TOP SECRET AND PERSONAL

Copy No. 16
of 18 copies

hm *hoss*

4th March, 1974

Ref: A06349

In view of the change of Administration, I think it would be wise to put the present machinery for handling industrial intelligence into abeyance until I have had an opportunity of ascertaining the wishes of the new Prime Minister. This means that the weekly meetings of the "short-term" Group concerned with Industrial Assessments (IAG), and periodic meetings of the Group which deals with Subversion in Public Life (SPL) in the medium and long-term, both under Home Office Chairmanship, should be suspended. I would be grateful if you would ensure that all papers of the two Groups issued to your Department are returned by the Control Officer to the JIC Secretariat in accordance with the normal arrangements for disposing of these papers.

I am copying this to those shown in the attached distribution list with the request that they will make similar arrangements for the return of all IAG and SPL papers.

(John Hunt)

Sir Arthur Peterson, KCB, MVO

SECRET

Mr Roscoe
Sand P
1367

Ref. A08642

MR. MOSS *2/1*

Thank you for your manuscript note of
20th January.

Sir Thomas Brimelow had already spoken to me about Lord Chalfont's efforts to get a House of Lords debate on subversion. The line which Lord Chalfont was peddling did not seem a very fruitful one and I agreed with Sir Thomas Brimelow that he would take a fairly detached attitude - neither offering to help Lord Chalfont nor positively discouraging him.

John
JOHN HUNT

21st January, 1975

SECRET

CASIN

A 6681

20 JAN 75

FILE NO.

FILE NO.

Sir John Hunt

Thank you for letting me see the outcome of your submission to the PM on IRD.

In this context, I might mention that I met Lord Trend on 10th January and he told me that Lord Chalfont was trying to get a Lords debate on Subversion. Lord Trend had had this news from Lord Greenhill who was evidently giving Lord Chalfont encouragement and had, I think, been lobbying Lord Trend to take part in the debate. This last idea did not seem to strike Lord Trend as so unthinkable as one would have expected. I passed no comment.

Presumably Lord Chalfont & Lord Greenhill are assuming that IRD will help. It would probably be a tactical error (now that you no longer have any responsibility) for ~~you~~^{us} to mention this to the FCO, but is it worth your tipping off Sir Michael Hanley?

M. Moss

20 Jan 75

SECRET



SIR ARTHUR PETERSON KCB MVO
PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY OF STATE

HOME OFFICE
WHITEHALL SW1A 2AP

23rd December 1975



*Pl attach App. about
its English Section of IRD
(Haggins has minutes to
the PM.)
Jag X New 12/11*

Dear John

I enclose a minute which I have had from Robert Armstrong about possible counter subversive action. This is, of course, a very delicate area and I think it would be helpful if I could have a talk about it with you together with Michael Palliser and Conrad Heron. If I may I will ask my Private Secretary to arrange a meeting early in the New Year.

I am sending copies of this letter and the enclosure to Michael Palliser and Conrad Heron.

Yours sincerely

Arthur Peterson

(ARTHUR PETERSON)

Sir John Hunt K.C.B.

SECRET

144
SIR ARTHUR PETERSON

Subversion in Public Life

I have (as you know) succeeded Sir James Waddell as Chairman of a small official committee on subversion in public life, the present membership of which consists of representatives of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (I.R.D.), the Department of Employment, the Scottish Office and the Security Service. The Committee has not met for nearly two years. I understand, however, that the Security Service is on the point of completing an up-to-date assessment of the subversive threat, which will deal with the present threat not just in industry but in education, the media and other sections of public life. The Security Service considers that this new assessment could well be discussed more widely in Whitehall. The most suitable way to do this would seem to me to be to circulate it for discussion at a meeting of the official committee, to which other departments (e.g. Education, Health, perhaps Industry) might be invited to send representatives as appropriate. The committee could both comment on the assessment and consider what action (if any) needed to be taken on it.

2. As you know, there is no regular machinery for organising or disseminating counter subversion - material designed to counter or discredit the subversive elements in society - though techniques for doing so exist and have been put to use on two occasions on the initiative of the Prime Minister, when he has seen particular opportunities for counter-subversive action. I should like to suggest the institution of arrangements whereby officials could put forward particular proposals for counter-subversive action when suitable opportunities seem to present themselves. One such opportunity has now arisen: the Security Service has come into possession of a copy of a document prepared by a member of the Communist Party of Great Britain on the organisation of subversion in trade unions, and of evidence that the publication of this document would cause grave embarrassment to the leadership of the Party. The publication of this document could be arranged without prejudice to sources, and would clearly be timely in relation to the C.P.G.B.'s recent reverses in the A.U.E.W. and the E.E.P.T.U. The sort of arrangement I have in mind is that, where the Security Service considers that such an opportunity may present itself, it should put a

SECRET

proposal to me; the proposal should then be discussed with the F.C.O. (IRD) and the Department of Employment; if there is agreement that the action proposed is timely and appropriate, and that it can be taken without prejudice to sources, the proposal should then be put to the Home Secretary for endorsement. I think that the Prime Minister's approval in principle should be sought for the institution of such arrangements; it is for question whether his approval, as well as that of the Home Secretary, should be required for each individual proposal.

3. If you agree with the proposals in this minute, the next stage would be to discuss them with Sir Michael Palliser, Sir Conrad Heron and Sir John Hunt. You may like to invite them for a meeting for this purpose: the discussion could perhaps be based on this minute, which could be copied to those concerned.

RA

22 December 1975

SECRET



SIR ARTHUR PETERSON KCB MVO
PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE

SECRET COVERING: **TOP SECRET**

HOME OFFICE *Send P*
WHITEHALL SW1A 2AP 1367

24th May 1976



Other paper attached

Dear John,

When we met, with Michael Palliser and Conrad Heron, on 9th January, we discussed briefly how to handle the Security Service's latest assessment of the subversive threat; and we agreed that, before deciding how it should be handled in Whitehall, we should ourselves see the assessment, so that we could take our decisions on handling when we had done so.

... I now enclose a copy of the document, together with a copy of a document agreed among West European Security Services last December on Soviet Bloc Subversion.

I am sending copies of this letter with the documents to Michael Palliser and Ken Barnes, and without the documents to Michael Hanley; and my office will be getting in touch with your offices about arrangements for a meeting.

Yours sincerely

Arthur Peterson

(ARTHUR PETERSON)

Sir John Hunt KCB

SECRET COVERING: **TOP SECRET**

TOP SECRET

JULY NO 2

A

THE THREAT OF SUBVERSION TO THE UK

APRIL 1976

CONTENTS

SUBJECT

PARAGRAPHS

INTRODUCTION

Aim

Summary

1 - 5

1

2 - 5

MAIN PAPER

SUBVERSION IN THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

The Trade Union Movement

The Communist Party of Great Britain
Trotskyist Groups
Soviet bloc subversion

The Labour Party

The Communist Party of Great Britain
Trotskyist Groups
Soviet bloc subversion

Forecast

1 - 23

1 - 8

1 - 5

6

7 - 8

9 - 23

9 - 12

13 - 15

16

17 - 23

THE PUBLIC SERVICE

EDUCATION

THE MEDIA

RACIAL ISSUES

THE EXTREME RIGHT

POLITICAL TERRORISM

24 - 28

29 - 33

34 - 36

37

38 - 40

41 - 48

APPENDIX A

SUBVERSION IN SOME MAJOR UNIONS, THE TUC AND THE SCOTTISH TUC

ANNEX TO APPENDIX A

SUBVERSIVE PENETRATION OF MAJOR TRADE UNIONS: 1 APRIL 1976

APPENDIX B

SOVIET BLOC SUBVERSION

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

1

THE THREAT OF SUBVERSION TO THE UK

APRIL 1976

INTRODUCTION

Aim

1. The purpose of this paper is to examine and assess the threat presented to the UK by subversion. It does not deal with the threat arising from Irish extremism.

Summary

2. Subversion is defined as activities which threaten the safety or well-being of the State and are intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means. It presents the most immediate threat where it impinges directly on central democratic institutions, in particular upon the process of Government and its ability to maintain the country's defences and secure its economic stability.

3. The main subversive threat to the authority of Government is directed through the trade union movement. By exploiting the efforts of successive Governments in recent years to restrain domestic inflation and improve the framework of industrial relations, subversive groups have exacerbated the Government's problems in these vital areas and have increased their own influence in the trade unions. This increase in subversive influence in the trade unions has made an important contribution to the leftward shift in certain sections of the Labour Party. The most important of these, the National Executive Committee (NEC), which in 1973 removed some obstacles to the extension of Communist influence within the Labour Party, is now hesitating to take action against Trotskyist activity at constituency level. Because of this leftward shift, and because the trade union movement has increasingly been prepared to accept the need for wage restraint, subversive organisations are now devoting

TOP SECRET

more attention to the Labour Party itself. These developments have assisted, and have themselves benefited from, the subversive effort of the Soviet bloc which is exploiting détente to make increased use of subversion as a disguised instrument of foreign policy.

4. Less immediate and better contained, but still important in the context of the subversive attack on the process of Government, is the threat presented by subversion in the public service. Its most worrying aspect is the success which subversive organisations have had in penetrating certain Civil Service unions. Subversion in education and in the media, both of which are fundamental to the democratic process, appears to pose a threat in the longer term, as does subversive exploitation of racial issues.

5. Political terrorism is a violent manifestation of subversion. A number of foreign based groups, some of which have supporting contacts in the UK, including the intelligence services of Cuba, Iraq, Libya and the PDRY, present a constant threat. Adherents of the domestic ultra Left may give support to these groups, or to 'Irish' terrorism, or indulge in violence on their own account. Although limited in number, extreme nationalists in Scotland and Wales who are prepared to use violence may pose a more serious problem, depending on political developments, than they do today.

(UP - E)

TOP SECRET

SUBVERSION IN THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

The Trade Union Movement

The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB)

1. The CPGB poses the major subversive threat in the trade union movement. The extent of its influence in the national leadership of the 34 major unions is indicated in Appendix A. Approximately 1 in 500 trade unionists is a member of the CPGB. Approximately 1 in 5 of the leading full time officials and Executive Committee members in these unions is a Communist or Communist sympathiser. This numerical approach, however, underestimates the extent of Communist influence. A small disciplined group pursuing a well-rehearsed policy can influence a much larger body such as a union Executive whose other members do not act in concert. Communist influence at Executive level is backed up by the CPGB's apparatus up and down the country, through which it can marshal rank and file support for its policies.
2. The aim of the CPGB in seeking to increase its influence in the trade union movement is essentially political. The Party's ultimate objective is to offset its numerical and electoral weakness by obtaining a dominant influence in the Labour Party. Partly because of the ban on Communists becoming members of the Labour Party, the CPGB exploits the trade unions as a back door into the Labour movement. Since 1966 several factors have combined to increase the CPGB's influence in some major unions. During this period the political influence of the trade union movement as a whole, and of these major unions in particular, has increased.
3. Between 1966 and 1974 the most important factors were the efforts of successive Governments to control domestic inflation through an incomes policy and to improve the framework of industrial relations. The CPGB, which differs from the mass of the Labour Movement in regarding political conflict as a means of advancing the class struggle, was able to exploit traditional trade union opposition to imposed reforms and interference in free collective bargaining to stimulate industrial conflict and turn it into political confrontation. As a result, the influence of the CPGB in the trade union movement has increased. At the same time, the ability of Government to exert effective control in the two vital areas of the economy and industrial relations has been limited.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

4. Two major unions have been particularly important in these developments. The National Union of Mineworkers (NUM), in which Communist influence has grown significantly in recent years, has played a leading role in opposing wage restraint, including the defeat of the statutory policy in 1974. The Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW), regarded by the Party in recent years as second only to the NUM as a vehicle for Communist influence, has also been in the forefront of opposition to wage restraint and industrial relations legislation.

5. Since 1974 the TUC has participated closely in the formulation and implementation of the Government's counter-inflation policy. As the concept of voluntary restraint has gained acceptance in the Labour movement, the CPGB's efforts have turned towards an attempt to drive a wedge between the Government and the Left wing of the Labour movement in order to create pressures to force the TUC into opposition. The NUM and the AUEW have again been the major vehicles for Communist influence. The Party's efforts to challenge voluntary wage restraint by persuading the NUM to adopt a massive wage claim have to date been unsuccessful. In the course of its manoeuvrings over the formulation of such a claim, a rift has developed between leading Communists in the NUM and SCARGILL, a Communist sympathiser. For the moment, this has weakened the CPGB's position in the union. In the AUEW, the main vehicle for Communist opposition to voluntary wage restraint at the TUC Conferences in 1974 and 1975, the CPGB suffered setbacks in elections during 1975 (see Appendix A). As a result the union has reversed its policy of opposition to voluntary wage restraint. Because of the difficulties which it has encountered in its attempts to extend its political influence through mass trade union action the CPGB is now placing greater emphasis on extending its influence in the Labour Party itself (see paragraphs 9 - 12 below).

Trotskyist groups

6. The Trotskyists, unlike the CPGB, do not generally seek to further their own political ends through alliances within the trade union movement. Their aim is to overthrow it, either by attacking and discrediting it from the outside, or by penetrating it in order to transform its character. One of the main threats posed by Trotskyist activity in industry (as elsewhere) has been its tendency to raise the level of agitation. In the short term this can create problems for the Communists, who sometimes feel obliged to outdo the Trotskyists. But in the longer term, the Communist Party, with its more respectable image and better organisation and discipline, benefits from the rise in

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

5

the temperature of industrial relations caused by this competition in militancy. In the present industrial relations climate Trotskyist agitation may benefit the Communists more directly by enhancing the apparent respectability of the 'Broad Left' alliances through which the CPGB attempts to influence important unions.

Soviet bloc subversion

7. The trade union movement in Western Europe is a major target for Soviet subversion. Through organisations under its control, the most important of which are the Soviet All Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU) and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) is making some progress towards its ultimate aim of creating a single Communist-dominated European trade union organisation. WFTU's contacts with some major British trade unions, such as the AUEW (in which the CPGB has considerable influence), are providing valuable assistance. Communist influence in the existing European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) is increasing and the attitude of the British TUC, which itself appears to have no intention of re-affiliating to WFTU, could be a decisive factor in its further extension. Since 1974 there has been a considerable increase in the extent of British trade union contacts with WFTU, the AUCCTU and its counterparts in other Soviet bloc countries. The CPGB has used its influence in the trade unions to support these developments.

8. One of the CPSU's highest priorities in Western Europe at present is its campaign for disarmament. Since 1973 the World Peace Council (WPC), which it controls, has displayed a particular interest in expanding its connections in this country and involving them in international activities. In particular, it is seeking to link the current 'crisis of capitalism' with defence expenditure and to secure the support of leading figures within the British trade unions and Labour movement for the campaign. The International Forum on Disarmament, held at York at the end of March, was conceived by the WPC and is an example of the CPSU's attempts to influence public opinion on this issue. The WPC's activities and its policy towards the UK constitute a particular security threat. The non-Communists involved may believe that the 'peace' campaign is unrelated to the requirements of Soviet foreign policy or fail to appreciate its significance for the policies and interests of their own Governments.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

6

The Labour Party

The Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB)

9. In recent years Communist influence in the trade unions has made a major contribution to the leftward shift in influential sections of the Labour Party, particularly its National Executive Committee (NEC). The trade unions have opposed Government economic policies by industrial action and by their votes in the Labour Party Conference (where the trade unions control over 80% of the total votes cast), in the Labour Party NEC and in Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs). By exploiting this situation, the CPGB has made some progress towards establishing a broad front of 'Left unity' with the left wing of the Labour Party. Through its influence in the Labour Party, particularly on the NEC, the CPGB played an important part in the withdrawal in 1973 of the Labour Party's list of proscribed organisations, a major step in the blurring of fundamental differences between Communist and social democratic politics. The list included all the Communist-controlled Friendship Societies and Peace organisations and the international Communist 'fronts', eg the World Peace Council (WPC) and the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU). The CPGB is now working towards a change in the rule whereby only Labour Party members may attend Labour Party Conferences. If Communists were permitted to represent their unions at the Conference the door would be open to direct Communist influence in the formulation of Labour Party policy.

10. In support of this long-term strategy the CPGB's present tactic is to create a rift between leaders of the Parliamentary Labour Party and the Party's Left wing. The CPGB believes that the development of Communist influence in the Labour Party NEC is of fundamental importance since, through its sympathisers and collaborators there, it is able to exploit disagreements on policy within the Labour Party and stimulate opposition to Government policy on key issues such as unemployment and wage restraint. Particularly relevant in this context is Communist influence on the Home Policy Committee and some of its sub-committees. The CPGB also has influence on the International Committee, which is encouraging the development of official links between the Labour Party and the Soviet bloc Communist Parties, thus benefiting both the CPSU and the CPGB. The presence of Communist sympathisers and collaborators on the NEC is contributing to its present reluctance to take action against Trotskyist activities within the Labour Party (see paragraphs 13 - 15 below).

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

7

11. Within the Parliamentary Labour Party the CPGB is making a sustained effort to develop contacts with Left wing MPs and in particular with a small group within the Tribune Group. By coaching these and other sympathetic MPs on particular issues, and manipulating them into leading posts in Communist-influenced pressure groups such as Liberation, the Chile Solidarity Campaign and the Anti-Apartheid Movement, the Party seeks to extend its links with the Parliamentary Labour Party. Applying pressure through such contacts the CPGB is able, on some chosen issues, to bring a decisive influence to bear on the attitude of the Labour Party. The CPGB also recognises that its influence in the Labour movement, particularly in the trade unions, provides it with the means to intervene in the selection of sponsored MPs. It plans to make more use of this tactic than it has in the past.

12. Communists cannot become directly involved in the management of CLPs, and the CPGB discourages clandestine penetration. The Party is, therefore, seeking to extend its influence on organisations affiliated to the Labour Party, such as trades councils, trade unions at local level and co-operative societies. It has declared its intention of working through constituencies to remove 'Right wing' Labour MPs. Through its influence upon delegates from CLPs as well as trade unions the CPGB has the means to intervene indirectly on selected issues at the Labour Party Conference.

Trotskyist Groups

13. Trotskyist groups are unlikely to reduce the scale of their attack upon the Labour Party while their activities at constituency level continue to meet with success and the Labour Party NEC takes no official action on the Underhill report. Trotskyist 'entrism' (the practice of working under cover in other organisations so as to influence and ultimately control their policies) in CLPs presents a direct threat to some MPs and thus to the Parliamentary Labour Party's ability to resist subversive pressures upon and within the Party as a whole. Because of its covert nature, the effect of 'entrism' is difficult to assess. In nine CLPs where there is Trotskyist influence, the sitting Labour MP is at risk. There are varying degrees of Trotskyist influence in a further 43 CLPs in constituencies with Labour MPs. In constituencies not represented by Labour MPs, Trotskyists have some influence in 24 CLPs.

14. The major Trotskyist 'entrism' group is the Revolutionary Socialist League (RSL) which, despite having held a successful National Conference in August 1975, refuses to admit its own existence. By Trotskyist standards it is

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

growing rapidly, and now has some 900 members. The main vehicle for its activities in the constituencies is the Labour Party Young Socialists (LPYS), whose National Executive Committee is under RSL control. The LPYS has 589 branches throughout the country. The RSL claimed to have had 45 delegates at the last Labour Party Conference. One of its members is a co-opted representative of the LPYS on the Labour Party NEC. Other Trotskyist groups practise 'entrism': for example, the recently formed International Communist League (ICL), which is a successor to Workers' Fight, an organisation which sought to promote revolutionary activity within the Labour movement. Two long-standing Trotskyist groups, the International Marxist Group (IMG) and the Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP), both of which had abandoned 'entrism', have resumed it within the last nine months (in the latter case on a limited and selective basis).

15. Some Trotskyists now recognise that overt involvement in protest action in constituencies could harm their interests by alerting the main stream of the Labour Party to the threat of subversion. Nevertheless, in addition to their 'entrism' activities, they are continuing their efforts to achieve influence in CLPs by penetrating affiliated organisations such as trades councils. Trotskyist groups have little influence amongst MPs or the national officials of the Labour Party. Their contacts tend to be opportunist. Nevertheless, through campaigns on particular issues, such as the Shrewsbury pickets, they are able to add to the subversive pressures upon and tensions within the Labour Party at all levels.

Soviet Bloc Subversion

16. The CPSU has declared its intention of 'strengthening Left wing currents' in the British Labour Party. Its increasing contacts with British trade unions together with less formal cultivation of British trade unionists are making an important contribution towards this objective. At the same time the CPSU is orchestrating all the instruments under its control to establish and extend relations with other influential members of the non-Communist Left. Representatives of the Soviet bloc intelligence services based in London under diplomatic cover continue to place a heavy emphasis on the cultivation of political and Parliamentary contacts. The CPSU is making a considerable effort to develop official links with the Labour Party. In this connection it has made increasing use of the East German Communist Party since the advent of 'Ostpolitik' and the recognition of the GDR by the West.

TOP SECRET

Forecast

17. The CPGB's policy of challenging voluntary wage restraint will be maintained, though no major union shows an inclination to stage a confrontation with Government during the present round of wage negotiations. Despite its own predictions to the contrary, the CPGB's influence on the TUC General Council has not been significantly increased by the changes which took place at the 1975 TUC Conference. The support of Jack JONES, General Secretary of the Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU), for the Government's wage restraint policy will remain an obstacle both in the trade unions and in the Labour Party to subversive efforts to undermine wage restraint.

18. The CPGB judges that the issue most likely to divide the Labour Party is unemployment. It has been conducting a broad-front 'Left unity' campaign, encouraging mass action in the form of demonstrations, lobbies and rallies, as well as protest action in the Parliamentary Labour Party, particularly the 'Tribune Group'. Its campaign has benefited from the parallel Trotskyist campaign, in particular the 'Right to Work' march organised by the International Socialists (IS). MPs and trade union officials have tended to support the Communist-inspired 'Assembly on Unemployment', held in London on 27 March, as a relatively respectable alternative to the Trotskyist campaign. The Assembly, which was a high point of the Party's campaign, called for militant action in the form of a 'day of action' on 26 May backed by stoppages, a march in London and a lobby of Parliament.

19. The CPGB hoped that its campaign would generate sufficient pressure to secure a recall of the TUC Conference, at which it might be possible to reverse or substantially qualify the support of the Labour movement for Government policies; it had intended that the Assembly on Unemployment would give a positive lead in this direction. This intention was, however, pre-empted by the TUC General Council, which, in mid-March, indicated that it would be calling some form of consultative conference to discuss a successor pay policy.

20. During the spring and summer, while discussions on wages policy continue, subversive groups will maintain their demands for a return to unfettered free collective bargaining. The NUM and the AUEW will retain their central importance to the CPGB. Despite setbacks in the AUEW (see paragraph 5 above) the CPGB has recently increased its representation amongst the union's Conference delegates. Nearly half will support the Communist line and the outcome may be finely balanced. The CPGB is currently attempting to formulate a

TOP SECRET

claim for consideration by the NUM Conference in July which will provide a challenge to any wage restraint policy while being sufficiently realistic to secure strong rank-and-file support. These Communist efforts to bring about a breakdown in the understanding between the Government and the TUC over wages policy will be repeated at many other union Conferences prior to the TUC Conference in September. If such a breakdown should occur, subversive groups, principally the CPGB, may be expected to move quickly to exploit the situation, and at that difficult stage their activities could have serious consequences.

21. While concentrating on the central issue of domestic economic policy as a means of increasing its political influence, the CPGB will continue to exploit other opportunities to extend its influence at all levels in the Labour Party. It will maintain its contact and collaboration with members of the Labour Party NEC and continue its search for other short-term issues over which to develop links with MPs in order to subject the unity of the Parliamentary Labour Party to further strain.

22. The World Peace Council (WPC), the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU), the World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) and the International Union of Students (IUS), all of which are international Communist front organisations under the control of the CPSU, are paying increasing attention to the UK. The WFSW which, like the WFTU, is taking up the Soviet theme of Western disarmament as a solution to economic problems, plans to hold a General Assembly in London in September.

23. The Trotskyist attack on the Labour Party at constituency level is likely to be maintained as long as the groups involved believe that they can make progress. The Labour Party NEC appears reluctant at present to take official action on the Underhill report (see paragraph 13 above). If subversive groups, particularly the CPGB, succeed in increasing their influence upon it, it may be even less inclined to counter Trotskyist activity in the future.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE

24. Although the security procedures introduced to give effect to the Attlee declaration in 1948, and their subsequent extension and refinements, were designed primarily to protect secrets, they have had the effect of excluding individuals with subversive views or associations from the Diplomatic

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

11

Service, from Under Secretary and more senior grades in the Civil Service, from commissioned ranks in the Armed Forces, from most of the Royal Navy, the Royal Air Force and large sections of the Army, as well as from posts which afford access to information classified CONFIDENTIAL or above (51 Communists or Communist sympathisers, 7 Trotskyists and 2 Fascists still had some access at the end of 1975. Of these, only 18 had access to information above CONFIDENTIAL).

25. The holding of subversive views is, however, no bar to employment in the Civil Service outside these senior grades or the departments and posts which afford access to classified information, and some 1,450 Civil Servants have significant security records. These tend to be concentrated in departments which have least involvement with classified information. Thus large departments in the social sphere, such as Employment (DE) and Health and Social Security (DHSS), tend to have rather more employees with subversive records than other departments. The numbers involved are a very small proportion of the total, but they constitute a potential threat to the efficient functioning of these departments.

26. The activities of subversive organisations in relation to the Civil Service tend to be concentrated on achieving influence in the two largest Civil Service unions, the Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA) and the Society of Civil Servants (SCS). Competition between subversive groups has raised the level of militancy, and the growth of subversive influence in these unions is the principal danger in the public service. An amalgamation between the two is under discussion. A serious threat to the Government's ability to administer its policies could arise if the present subversive influence in the leadership of the CPSSA were matched in the leadership of an amalgamated union. The introduction of a post-entry closed shop would create further problems.

27. A popular tactic of the ultra Left is to seek out and publish information which will embarrass the Government. In this connection, although members of the ultra Left in the Post Office do not appear at present to be actively enquiring into postal and telephone interception, their presence constitutes a threat to the security of such operations. There is a danger that the replacement of Section II of the Official Secrets Acts by a more selective application of criminal sanctions will diminish a deterrent provided by those sanctions against disruptively motivated publication of official information.

28. Subversive influence in the Armed Forces is negligible; less than 50 members have significant subversive records and none has access to information classified CONFIDENTIAL or above. The CPGB carefully avoids recruiting serving members

TOP SECRET

of the Armed Forces and in circumspet in its propaganda. Ultra Left organisations, although not engaged in any deliberate policy of inciting disaffection, are less cautious.

EDUCATION

29. At this stage of investigation an authoritative assessment of the threat presented by subversion in education can not be made. Nevertheless, some provisional conclusions have been reached.

30. There is a threat of subversion to and through education. Subversive forces are attempting to revolutionise the educational system and to use it as a weapon in their attack on Parliamentary democracy. They operate in educational institutions and in unions and professional associations representing students and teachers. They include not only members of subversive organisations but substantial numbers of the non-aligned ultra Left.

31. All extreme Left groups recognise the importance of youth as a target and some (such as the IMG) are almost entirely student based. Rivalry between them for influence among students, reflected in competitive militancy, will continue to pose a threat to authority in universities and technical and training colleges. The ultra Left is also active in schools. For example, the aim of the IS-controlled unofficial Rank and File group in the National Union of Teachers (NUT) is 'to force change and progress ... in the general sociological and educational field'. IS and other ultra-Left groups advocate a change in the traditional relationship between teachers and school children, and support radical school childrens' movements such as the National Union of School Students (NUSS), which is being revived under an Anarchist President. The WRP, through its youth wing, the Young Socialists (YS), aims to recruit children in schools. It is clear that as well as seeking to revolutionise the educational system some Trotskyist teachers exploit opportunities to proselytize their pupils. They are certain to be supported, and may be pre-empted, by 'unaffiliated militants' and 'independent activists'.

32. The most important single instrument of subversion in education is the National Union of Students (NUS), whose leadership is at present dominated by the CPGB and its collaborators in the 'Broad Left'. It is used as a vehicle not only for Communist policy on higher education but in

support of the Party's more directly political objectives. To further both, the CPGB is currently encouraging the NUS to develop closer links with the trade unions.

33. The threat from subversion in education is likely to increase, particularly if subversive influence in the teaching unions grows, and if teachers, converted as students to revolutionary beliefs, begin to indoctrinate their own pupils on a wider scale.

THE MEDIA

34. There is no evidence that any subversive group at headquarters level is pursuing a deliberate policy of infiltrating members and sympathisers into the Media in order to carry out a co-ordinated programme of subversion. The threat is rather one of a constant erosion of the authority of established democratic institutions, through the work of individuals and small circles of collaborators with varying degrees of subversive affiliations. These subversive individuals may not only produce slanted work on their own account; they may also exploit and encourage the anti-establishment and highly articulate (but not necessarily subversive) people whom the Media - particularly television, radio and the press - tend to attract.

35. Subversive groups are aware of the value of the Media. The Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP) in particular has attracted to it a small number of talented writers, directors and producers whose abilities are exploited in its interests. Gerry HEALY, the General Secretary of the WRP, appears more interested in employing their technical skills and the charisma of their contacts in the entertainment world directly for the Party than in penetration and manipulation of the Media. Nevertheless, in television drama members and associates of the WRP produce work containing elements of Trotskyist propaganda. At the same time, the WRP has a wide range of contacts in the Media through whom Trotskyist influence may be brought to bear in the reporting of news and current affairs.

36. A number of other individuals with records of membership of, or sympathy with, subversive organisations or of contact with officers of hostile intelligence services, occupy positions of influence in the Media. It is generally difficult to establish whether such bias as may be detectable in their work or that of their protégés (who may themselves have no subversive intention) is subversively inspired. Amongst those organisations in the Media which appear to have

TOP SECRET

acquired a disproportionate extreme Left element on their staff are Granada TV (particularly the 'World in Action' documentary programme), the Sunday Times, and the Guardian. In the case of the first at least, there is some evidence that individuals with subversive affiliations have deliberately recruited others with similar views.

RACIAL ISSUES

37. Despite the inferior social and economic status of the coloured community, the exploitation of racial issues by extreme Left (including Black Power) organisations does not in the short term pose a substantial subversive threat. The coloured community is particularly vulnerable to a decline in economic standards, and a continuing rise in unemployment could render it more susceptible to subversive influences. In the longer term the prospect is more threatening. In some urban areas with high coloured populations the involvement of 'second generation' black youths in crime and violence now poses a significant law and order problem. This could lead to a severe deterioration in race relations. Should this happen, such factors as the growing alienation of black youths from the older generation, their deliberate cultivation of separate social customs, unemployment, housing difficulties, or even the emergence of an influential extremist to provide leadership, could well produce a situation which Black Power and other subversive organisations could exploit with serious effects. The threat would come not only from Black Power and other extreme Left groups but also from the extreme Right.

THE EXTREME RIGHT

38. On the extreme Right there is a number of neo-Nazi organisations. None is of any real significance, as their limited membership renders them largely ineffective. The largest is the British Movement, with a little over 400 members. Its members occasionally pursue its racist policies with violence. The Union Movement, still led by Sir Oswald MOSELEY, retains some (around 400) of his former supporters. Recruitment is negligible and the membership is ageing. Before it split into two in December 1975 the National Front (NF) was neither Fascist nor subversive. The 'Nationalist' faction led by the former neo-Nazis John TYNDALL

TOP SECRET

and Martin WEBSTER, which has retained the name National Front, may now adopt more seriously National Socialist policies. The 'Populist' faction, known as the National Party (NP), will probably continue the policies embraced by the NF before the split. Apart from their virulent racism, these owe little to Fascism. Nevertheless, the NP also numbers former neo-Nazis amongst its leaders.

39. Because of the readiness of the ultra Left to exploit the antagonism which 'Fascist' policies arouse, the extreme Right presents more of a law and order than a security threat. Should there be a severe deterioration in race relations, a small number of genuine Fascists (including those in the NF and the NP), would attempt to take advantage of the situation to encourage violence in order to further their own political ends.

40. The extreme Right has in recent years threatened to react violently during periods of severe industrial unrest. Though this does not pose a problem at present, the threat could arise again should widespread national industrial action re-occur. In such circumstances the strength of an extreme Right 'backlash' would be specifically related to the extent to which industrial action appeared to have been instigated by subversive elements on the extreme Left.

POLITICAL TERRORISM

41. The passing of the Prevention of Terrorism Act in 1974 caused domestic ultra Left organisations to modify their attitudes to the Irish Republican Army (IRA). None now publicly expresses unqualified support: most believe that violence in Great Britain may damage their own interests. As organisations they do not appear to be involved in IRA activity. Individuals with ultra Left sympathies have, however, been involved in bomb incidents. Others may follow their example, but their motivation is likely to be Irish rather than ultra Left. Similarly, individual adherents of the ultra Left could offer support in this country to other external terrorist groups.

42. Some of the genuine revolutionaries within the broad spectrum of the 'Alternative Society' may be prepared to use violence in the furtherance of their aims. There is still evidence of the existence of that blend of traditional Anarchist, Situationist and Alternative ideologies which led to the formation of the Angry Brigade. Some Maoist and Anarchist groups, apparently following a pattern established

TOP SECRET

by the New Left in Germany, are deliberately attempting to recruit prisoners. Their intention appears to be to acquire criminal expertise, and this could herald an increase in 'revolutionary criminality'.

43. There are a few extreme nationalists on the criminal fringes in Scotland and Wales who are prepared to use violence. The level of their activity is to some extent dictated by political circumstances. For example, in 1975 the Scottish Tartan Army claimed responsibility for attacks on oil installations. Such incidents may become more frequent as production increases. Dissatisfaction with the outcome of discussions on devolution could encourage extreme nationalism in both Scotland and Wales. The level of activity in Wales, lower at present than in Scotland, could increase when John Barnard JENKINS, a prominent Welsh extremist, is released from prison in the summer.

44. There is a continuing external threat of Arab or Arab-sponsored terrorist activity in the UK, primarily against Israeli targets, and some risk to British targets. Those engaged in such activity could include not only Palestinian Arab revolutionary groups, such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and its offshoots supported by the intelligence services of Arab countries (eg Libya, Iraq and the PDRY), but also non-Arab groups and revolutionaries operating on an agency basis (eg the 'CARLOS' group and the Japanese Red Army (JRA)). The possibility that any of these external groups might be supported by Arabs, non-Arabs or British subjects resident in this country cannot be ruled out.

45. A lesser, but no less persistent threat is presented by the presence here of Croatian and Spanish terrorist elements. Certain Chilean refugees in this country, who in Chile were connected with the revolutionary Left, also pose a continuing problem.

46. There is no evidence that the Soviet Union or any other country in the Soviet bloc exerts any central control or direction of terrorist groups. The Soviet Union openly supports national liberation groups, but not urban guerilla activity, which it regards as 'adventurist'. In certain cases, however, it does give clandestine support to terrorists on an unattributable basis. For example, it provides training and assistance in travel through Soviet bloc countries. The 'CARLOS' group had a support base in East Germany (GDR) to provide arms. 'CARLOS' himself was in Moscow from 1968 - 1970. Opportunities for the training of non-Arab terrorists, including individuals from the UK as well as from Ireland, are provided by Palestinian groups (eg the PFLP) in the Middle East.

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

17

47. There is also an important Cuban dimension to this subject. Since 1970 the Cuban Intelligence Service (DGI) has had a number of KGB advisers in its midst. Its allotted task has been not only to collect intelligence but also to support selected 'national liberation' groups. It is now clear from the 'CARLOS' case that the Cubans are prepared to support certain terrorist groups in Western Europe. They are active 'politically' amongst the ever increasing number of Latin American Left wing extremists reaching Western Europe as refugees.

48. Soviet bloc intelligence services display an interest in the affairs of Trotskyist, Maoist and other revolutionary groups. Through its control of the DGI the KGB has some access to the revolutionary ultra Left, to whom the Cuban revolution has had a particularly emotive appeal.

TOP SECRET

SUBVERSION IN SOME MAJOR UNIONS, THE TUC AND THE SCOTTISH TUCThe National Union of Mineworkers (NUM)

1. Communist influence in the NUM has grown significantly in recent years, not only within the National Executive Committee but also at area level, particularly in the key Yorkshire area, and through an unofficial Communist-dominated organisation, the Miners National Left Club. In the 25 man Executive Committee the Party can rely on the support of six Communists, including McGAHEY, the Vice-President, and four Communist sympathisers. In practice the Party line is generally determined by the Communist Party's Industrial Organiser, RAMELSON, and McGAHEY. The Party has taken increasing care in recent years to ensure that its policies have had the support of the Yorkshire Area President, SCARGILL. Its Industrial Department is seriously concerned at the breakdown in its 'Broad Left' opposition and the breach with SCARGILL which occurred during the NUM Conference in July 1975. Despite RAMELSON's efforts to restore the unity of the 'Left', it is increasingly becoming apparent that SCARGILL is preparing himself to stand for national office in the NUM with or without the support of the CPGB.

2. The Miners National Left Club also makes an important contribution to the framing of Communist policy in the NUM. This unofficial body, which meets annually in Yorkshire, is controlled by leading Communists and sympathisers from the NUM Executive, notably McGAHEY and SCARGILL, and also by Professor Vic ALLEN, a Communist Professor of Industrial Relations at Leeds University. ALLEN, who has published his views on the necessity of conflict in industrial relations in a capitalist society, made a significant contribution to the strategy and tactics of the NUM in its national strikes of 1972 and 1974.

The Amalgamated Union of Engineering Workers (AUEW)

3. The CPGB has in recent years regarded the AUEW as second only in importance to the NUM as a vehicle for Communist influence. RAMELSON attaches great importance to his professional relationship with the AUEW President Hugh SCANLON, and increasingly with Ken GILL, the General Secretary of the Technical and Supervisory Section (TASS).

TOP SECRET

4. The CPGB has in the last 12 months suffered a series of reverses in the AUEW, beginning with the defeat of its candidate, Bob WRIGHT (a Communist sympathiser) by John BOYD, a moderate, in the election for the post of General Secretary, continuing with the frustration by the High Court of attempts to assist other Communist-supported candidates for other offices in the union through violation of the union's rules, and culminating in the defeat of WRIGHT and the Communist Jimmy REID in Executive elections whose results were announced in mid November. In both sets of elections held last year, other Communist-supported candidates for less important posts suffered significant defeats.

5. The Party has recognised the recent results as a major setback to its activities in the AUEW. Despite its public condemnation of 'massive interference' by the media, it admitted privately that previous successes were often artificial on the basis of a low poll (it is in no doubt that the postal ballot is a factor seriously unfavourable to it), and saw in the results an indication of confidence in the Government's counter-inflation policy. Nevertheless the Party has resolved to reinforce its efforts in the AUEW and has particular hopes of securing an improvement of its position in the National Committee of the Engineering Section.

The Transport and General Workers Union (TGWU)

6. Following recent elections to the 39 member General Executive Council the Communist representation has been reduced from nine to four. However, the Party is well satisfied with the increase from two to three Communists in the important eight member Finance and General Purposes Committee. Communist influence in the union continues to be limited by Jack JONES' determination to maintain personal control of the union's policies and there is no likelihood of the Party's restoring its former working relationship with him. During the recent elections JONES indicated that he would welcome a reduction in the number of Communists on the General Executive Council.

The National Union of Seamen (NUS)

7. Following a period in which Communist influence had been in decline in this union, Jim SLATER, a former Communist sympathiser, was elected to the General Secretaryship in 1974.

with the active support of the Communist Party. At the union's Biennial Conference in May 1974, the Communists and their supporters successfully opposed the predominantly moderate platform's resolution on wages, and gained significant influence in the newly elected Negotiating Committee. The Party followed this with a successful election campaign, which resulted in the new Executive Committee of the union, which took office in January 1975, containing four Communists and six sympathisers among its 19 voting members. Nevertheless, the Communists have been disappointed to see that the General Secretary, SLATER, despite his past connection with the Party, now associates with the moderate group on the Executive, and seeks to pursue a conciliatory line.

The Union of Construction, Allied Trades and Technicians

(UCATT)

8. In elections at the end of 1975 for the 15 man General Council the Communist Party fared badly and it now has five Communists and two sympathisers on the Council, compared with its previous representation of eight Communists and three sympathisers. On the 14 man Executive Committee, which is the most influential of the union's governing bodies, there are currently three Communists and one sympathiser. The Party hopes to improve its position in the Executive when elections are held later in the year.

The Associated Society of Locomotive Engineers and Firemen

(ASLEF)

9. In the last two years the Party has significantly improved its position in ASLEF; there are two Communists and two sympathisers in the nine man Executive. Notwithstanding this, the Party has been unable to exercise effective influence over ASLEF policy. This is largely due to the chaotic workings of the ASLEF Executive which make intervention from outside difficult. Leading Communists in ASLEF and the NUR are currently co-operating in their efforts to generate opposition to cuts in railway expenditure. The CPGB will link this issue with its major national campaign against unemployment.

TOP SECRET

The National Union of Railwaymen (NUR)

10. While Communist Party influence in the NUR has declined in recent years, the Party has, nevertheless, managed to maintain significant representation in the union's 24 man Executive Committee where there are currently six Communists and two sympathisers. Following the retirement of Sir Sidney GREENE as General Secretary in 1974 and the arrival of Sidney WEIGHELL, the Party has discerned an increase of militancy within the union, though it has no influence over WEIGHELL himself.

The Civil and Public Services Association (CPSA)

11. Communist influence in the CPSA, which had been slight for many years, increased considerably during 1974 and has remained at this high level. The National Executive Committee of the CPSA now contains five Communists and three Communist sympathisers. The voting strength of the Executive Committee is 29. The Communist Party has also succeeded in forming a 'Broad Left' group within the Executive Committee, consisting of 16 Party members, sympathisers and uncommitted Left-wingers, through which it seeks to extend its influence. As a reaction to this increased Communist influence, a group of moderates have organised themselves to try to counteract the 'Broad Left'. They were partially successful at last year's Annual Delegate Conference where their candidates were elected to the post of President and the two posts of Vice-President. The increase in Communist influence on the CPSA Executive is due in part to competition in militancy between the CPGB and Trotskyist groups.

The TUC General Council

12. Ken GILL, General Secretary of the Technical and Supervisory Section (TASS) of the AUEW, who in September 1974 became the first Communist to gain a seat on the 38 member General Council in a contested election, is now in his second year of office. In addition, there are seven members with varying degrees of Communist sympathy and one Maoist. The Communist Party's Industrial Organiser, RAMELSON, takes advantage of GILL's presence on the General Council to obtain intelligence on its proceedings. He hopes that the Communist sympathisers on the Council will, in due course, establish themselves as a group, taking the lead from GILL.

The STUC General Council

13. The present STUC General Council is substantially dominated by the Communist Party. Six of its 20 members are Communists, two are Communist sympathisers and at least a further two are prepared to act in concert with the Communist Party. In addition, the General Secretary, Jimmy MILNE, is a Communist and the Assistant General Secretary, James KIRKWOOD, is a Communist sympathiser.

International Socialist (IS) influence in white collar unions

14. During the last two years the Trotskyist IS has recognised that its revolutionary aims can be better pursued if it first establishes a position of greater influence in the trade union movement. It has therefore competed more strenuously in trade union elections. Whereas it has not made significant progress in the large and powerful manual unions, it has achieved some success in the professional and white collar unions, particularly in the National Union of Journalists (NUJ), and the National Union of Teachers (NUT) and, to a lesser extent, in the Association of Cinematograph and Television Technicians (ACTT), the Association of Scientific, Technical and Managerial Staffs (ASTMS) and the National Association of Local Government Officers (NALGO). In the NUJ there are now two IS members and two sympathisers in the Union's Executive of 27 members, while in the NUT three of the 44 Executive Committee members belong to IS.

TOP SECRET

DEPARTMENT/SERIES CAB 301	Date and sign
PIECE/ITEM 489 (one piece/item number)	
Extract details: Cover letter: 24 May 1976 Arthur Peterson to Sir John Hunt KCB Annex to appendix A	X
CLOSED UNDER FOI EXEMPTION	
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3(4) OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT 1958	<i>Glenn</i> 14/05/2018
TEMPORARILY RETAINED	
MISSING AT TRANSFER	
NUMBER NOT USED	
MISSING (TNA USE ONLY)	
DOCUMENT PUT IN PLACE (TNA USE ONLY)	

TOP SECRET

28

APPENDIX B

SOVIET Bloc SUBVERSION

Introduction

1. The Soviet Union is a one-Party state, dominated by the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) which, through the Politbureau, exercises control over all elements of Soviet society both at home and abroad, including the Russian Intelligence Services (RIS) (ie the KGB and GRU). Similar situations exist in other Communist-dominated regimes of Eastern Europe which in turn accept direction from the CPSU.

CPSU relations with foreign Communist Parties

2. Doctrinal disputes between the CPSU and many other Communist Parties since 1956 have eroded the CPSU's previously undisputed claim to leadership of the international Communist movement. There is no longer any central organisation, such as the pre-War Comintern, to co-ordinate the activities of national Communist Parties and/or to promote revolutionary activities abroad in association with the RIS.

3. Furthermore, non-governing Communist Parties in the West have their own interests and priorities, some of which diverge from those of the CPSU. Nevertheless, most Western Parties, including the CPGB, which has been amongst the more independent, support the overall aims of Soviet foreign policy in this current era of détente, and are prepared to co-operate with, and to receive financial support from, the CPSU. Whereas they may differ over domestic tactics (one version of these differences was given considerable publicity recently as a result of an article by John GOLLAN in 'Marxism Today') there is no fundamental difference between the CPSU and the CPGB over the basic Marxist/Leninist policy of encouraging the world revolutionary process. It is unlikely that the CPGB's 'Morning Star' (which is well regarded in Moscow) would survive in its present form in the absence of the considerable subsidies it receives from Soviet sources.

7 4. On the other hand, the fact that national Communist Parties, such as the CPGB, stress their ostensible independence of Moscow makes them in some ways a more effective instrument

TOP SECRET

for the achievement of Soviet aims. For its own part, the CPSU remains as anxious as ever to reinforce 'proletarian internationalism' and maintain as much unity of purpose as possible between the Parties. At the same time it seeks to strengthen Party-to-Party links by bilateral and multi-lateral contacts through its own organisations, as well as through the international Communist fronts which it controls. The CPSU effectively controls the World Marxist Review (WMR), published in Prague, which lays down ideological guidelines.

Sovbloc Communist Party contacts with the non-Communist Left

in the UK

5. 'A number of Socialist Parties support class, anti-imperialist positions. The CPSU has developed good friendly relations with them ... also very important is the strengthening of Left wing currents within such Parties as the British Labour Party'.

(Boris PONOMAREV, *Kommunist*, October 1971)

6. Most European non-governing Communist Parties, including the CPGB, are realistic enough to appreciate that their only hope of achieving power is by the exploitation of the conventional democratic processes rather than by a revolution. Thus, the cultivation of temporary alliances with other Parties of the Left is a task of prime importance for all Western European Parties.

7. Since PONOMAREV, a leading CPSU theoretician and Head of the CPSU's International Department, wrote the sentences quoted above in 1971, détente, the growing influence of the trade union movement on UK Government policies and the return to power of the Labour Party have increased the scope for the 'strengthening of Left wing currents'. The CPSU has placed greater emphasis upon the establishment of direct relations with influential members of the non-Communist Left. Such relations may be maintained either through bloc diplomatic representatives in this country, visiting representatives of international or 'specialist' front organisations, or invitations to British subjects to visit the Soviet bloc. By helping to blur the distinctions between Communist and social democratic politics these contacts make an important contribution to the CPSU's subversive attack.

8. At the end of 1974, the CPSU was anxious to obtain an invitation to send an official delegation to the British Labour Party. In the event, this project was not pursued. Early in 1975, representatives of the CPSU made a visit to London to coincide with a one-day Labour Party Conference on the EEC. At the 1975 Labour Party Conference several Communist Governments, including East Germany (GDR), Bulgaria and Romania, were represented for the first time. Since the advent of 'Ostpolitik' and the recognition of the GDR by the West, the East German Communist Party has become an increasingly important instrument of the CPSU.

International Communist Front Organisations

World Federation of Trade Unions

9. International Communist front organisations remain, as they were conceived by the CPSU, an important means of promoting or defending Soviet foreign policy initiatives in non-Communist countries.

10. At the present time, particularly in the context of the 'deepening crisis of capitalism', the trade union movement in Western Europe is a major target for the CPSU. It acts through its subordinate, the All Union Central Council of Trade Unions (AUCCTU), which in turn, together with its satellite counterparts, dominates the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).

11. The WFTU's ultimate aim is to create a single Communist-dominated European trade union organisation. With this end in view, both the WFTU and AUCCTU have striven to re-establish and strengthen their links with Western trade unions and trade unionists at all levels, including those in the UK. WFTU has also exploited the official Soviet presence in the International Labour Organisation (ILO) to engineer East/West trade union gatherings in Geneva.

12. The existing European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC) is itself a target for Communist penetration. The Italian Communist-influenced Confederazione Generale Italiana del Lavoro (CGIL) has succeeded in joining, and the Communist Confederation Generale du Travail (CGT) of France (the other major Western European Associate of WFTU since 1949) wishes to follow suit. The AUCCTU and WFTU doubtless hope that eventually Communist influence within the ETUC may open the door to the admission of trade union 'national centres' from Sovbloc countries. Within the ETUC, the TUC wields considerable influence and its attitude could be a decisive factor in deciding the fate of the CGT initiative.

TOP SECRET

13. There is no suggestion that the TUC itself intends to re-affiliate to WFTU, or even to be officially represented at its meetings. Nevertheless, since 1974, there has been an appreciable increase in the extent of British trade union contacts with WFTU, as well as with the AUCCTU and its counterparts in other bloc countries. In January 1976, under arrangements made by Boris AVERYANOV, the Soviet Secretary of WFTU, Pierre GENSOUS, the General Secretary of WFTU, visited the Scottish TUC and met two leading trade union officials in London. This was the first visit to the UK by a WFTU Secretary since 1949. AVERYANOV hoped that GENSOUS would be received officially by the TUC. In the event, no invitation was forthcoming.

14. The AUCCTU, notwithstanding occasional 'solidarity' payments to British unions, is unlikely to attempt to interfere in British industrial disputes either on its own behalf or through WFTU, or to give tactical guidance to the CPGB. On the contrary, the CPSU will probably be content to see the AUCCTU, WFTU and its supporters in the West unobtrusively consolidating the gains made through détente and seeking further means to increase their influence at all levels in British and other Western European trade unions in support of Soviet foreign policy objectives.

The World Peace Council

15. The CPSU regards its campaign for disarmament as one of its highest priorities in Western Europe at present. Increasing use has been made of the WPC in the implementation of the 'peace programme' adopted by the CPSU at its 24th Congress in 1971. Since the Moscow Peace Congress of October 1973, the WPC has displayed a particular interest in expanding its connections with this country and involving them in international activities on a scale not seen since the days prior to the Sheffield Peace Congress in 1950. In particular the UK was selected as the venue for an International Forum on Disarmament held at the end of March 1976. The Forum was designed to exploit the climate created by the Helsinki Conference on European Security and Co-operation (CESC) of August 1975 and the pressures upon Western countries to reduce expenditure on arms rather than on social services. After leading Soviet bloc representatives, who had hoped to attend a preparatory meeting in January, were refused visas, the WPC withdrew its official sponsorship. It is organising its own 'World Forum' at Helsinki in August.

16. The WPC's activities and its policy towards the UK (and its NATO partners in the wider sphere) constitute a particular security threat. It is effectively controlled, and

largely financed, by the Soviet Union and its East European allies. It seeks to disseminate its propaganda and exploit popular and largely non-Communist support for 'peace' under the pretence that its purposes are unrelated to the requirements of Soviet foreign policy. Those non-Communists and genuine peace groups involved may overlook or fail to appreciate the significance of such activity for the policies and interests of their own Governments.

The World Federation of Scientific Workers

17. The World Federation of Scientific Workers (WFSW) is the only international Communist front organisation to have its headquarters in the UK. It is currently being used in support of the Soviet campaign for disarmament. The most important WFSW activity in 1975 was the symposium which it held in Moscow in July on 'The Role of Scientists in the struggle for Disarmament'. It is to hold a General Assembly in London in September on 'socio-economic developments and their relation to science and technology'.

The International Union of Students

18. For the first time in many years, the Soviet-controlled International Union of Students (IUS) appears to see an opportunity to establish a close relationship with the British National Union of Students (NUS). They arranged a joint international student seminar on Chile held in London from 10 - 14 November 1975. In addition to paying all costs incurred outside the UK, the IUS sent a powerful delegation, supported by representatives of other international front organisations. Since the conference, however, the NUS has censured its Secretary (a Communist) and removed her from her post as its International Organiser on the grounds that the NUS' international policy was one-sided, attacking American but not Soviet imperialism.

The role of the Committee for State Security (KGB) and other Soviet bloc Intelligence Services in the promotion of subversive activities

19. The KGB is an integral part of the Soviet state machine and is represented at the highest levels in both

TOP SECRET

Party and Government structures. Its position in the Soviet hierarchy and its role in the implementation of Soviet policy (it has no parallel in any Western democracy) are reflected in the scale of the resources that it deploys, in the degree of assistance that it is able to draw upon from other Soviet organisations and private citizens, and in the wide objectives that it pursues abroad, ranging from the collection of foreign intelligence to intervention in the internal affairs of other countries.

20. Soviet official missions and agencies abroad provide large numbers of cover posts from which KGB officers, assisted by other Soviet officials co-opted as necessary for intelligence work, engage in subversive activities as well as intelligence gathering. Visits, including those arising out of academic, cultural and scientific exchange programmes, are also exploited in the intelligence and subversive attack.

21. The intelligence services of the Soviet Union and the East European countries have increasingly been harnessed to these political objectives. The significant expansion of the KGB role in the promotion of subversive activities is reflected in the upgrading in 1967 to full directorate status of the component responsible for the co-ordination of these activities. Defectors have reported that there are similar organisations in the East European services and that their activities, in turn controlled and directed by Moscow, play an important part in the overall scheme. In the UK, in particular, the Romanians and Hungarians, and to a lesser extent the other Communist intelligence services, are all known to be engaged in the promotion of subversive activities. The intelligence officers of these services, like the KGB, occupy cover posts in the official missions and agencies of their countries.

22. The Soviet and East European intelligence services seek to achieve their subversive objectives in a number of ways. Amongst them are the manipulation of information, true and false, the circulation of forgeries, the spreading of rumours, and the mounting of discrediting and disruptive operations directed against individuals, Governments and other organisations considered hostile to the Soviet bloc.

23. An important aspect of the subversive attack by the intelligence services of the Soviet bloc is their use of agents of influence - people who are in a position, consciously or unconsciously, to influence Government policy and public opinion in the interests of the Communist countries or to supply inside information about policies, personalities, and parties which can be exploited for disruptive purposes by these services. Amongst these are journalists, Government officials, public figures (including politicians) and employees

TOP SECRET

34

of intelligence services. Trade unionists, in particular those who have visited the Soviet Union or some other country within the Soviet bloc, are also known to be cultivated as agents of influence.

24. While the Soviet bloc intelligence services' overall responsibilities and objectives in the subversive field are quite well documented, it is often difficult to identify and attribute particular cases. ^{former} intelligence officer who defected in 1969, estimated that 300 - 400 such operations are carried out every year by the Soviet bloc services throughout the world.

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

TOP SECRET

TOP SECRET

AND PERSONAL

SP 1367 FILE

CABINET OFFICE
Je 83
7 JUL 1976
FILING INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

Mr. Nicholas,
Mr. Barclay
Mr. CO. M. Yee.
D. M. M. M.
7.7.76

6th July, 1976

Ref. A02231

Copy No. 2 of 9 Copies

As you know, the interdepartmental group for long-term intelligence reports on subversion in public life (SPL) has not formally been disbanded; but it has been inactive for the last two years or so. We had a word about this the other day, and came to the conclusion that the time had come when the group could usefully be reactivated. It remains the case that, as Jimmy Waddell said when the group first met, the episodic reporting of covert intelligence in this field of the kind provided by the Industrial Assessments Group (IAG) and ad hoc by the Security Service can produce a distorted picture unless fitted into periodic and balanced assessments; and the Security Service would, I know, welcome the opportunity to have their periodic studies scrutinised, set in context and assessed by the sort of group that SPL has been.

2. I have been reviewing the terms of reference of the group, which are at present:

"To supervise and direct the collection of intelligence about threats to the internal security of Great Britain arising from subversive activities, particularly in industry; and to make regular reports to the officials concerned".

I think that these should now read:

"To give guidance on the collection and to co-ordinate the assessment of intelligence about threats to the internal security of Great Britain arising from subversive activities, and to make periodic reports to the officials concerned".

3. There are two significant changes here. The first is to bring out the Group's assessment function as well as its role of giving guidance on the direction which collection should take. They need not be precluded from indicating directions in which the assessment may point to the need for some action; but it is not for them to initiate or recommend action. This role used to be discharged by the Subversion (Home) Committee which was dissolved in 1974 and which I propose now to reconstitute with the following terms of reference:-

/ "To advise

Sir Arthur Peterson, KCB, MVO

"To advise Ministers, as necessary, on appropriate measures to counter subversive activities in the United Kingdom (other than those which are within the purview of the Official Committee on Security), and to oversee the work of the interdepartmental Group on Subversion in Public Life (SPL)".

I would again take the chair with the Permanent Secretaries of the Home Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and the Department of Employment, the Director General of the Security Service and the Chairman of SPL as regular members with other Permanent Secretaries being invited as necessary according to the subject under discussion.

4. The second change is to omit the specific reference to subversion in industry. (In this context Robert Armstrong might also look again at the scope of the IAG). We certainly do not need to diminish the attention given to industrial subversion; but we do, I suggest, need also to pay attention to subversion in the public service, in education, and in the media, and to the possible interactions and relationships between subversive elements in these various sectors of the community. For this reason I am inclined to think that the Civil Service Department and the Department of Education and Science should now be added to the list of Departments with permanent (as opposed to ad hoc) representation on the group.

5. I enclose a note of the present composition of the SPL group. We agreed that it should be chaired by Robert Armstrong; I propose that Frank Brenchley should represent the Cabinet Office. I should be grateful if those to whom I am sending copies of this letter would either confirm their representation or let me know whom they nominate instead.

6. I hope that Douglas Allen will agree to nominate someone from the CSD, perhaps Johnny Moore; and that Jim Hamilton will agree that it would now be useful for his Department to be represented on the group, perhaps by John Hudson. I should remind them both that the existence of the group is secret, and knowledge of it and of its product must be confined to officials who are positively vetted and have a need to know; and that reports by the group must not be placed on normal Departmental files but retained in the safe keeping of recipients. If Jim Hamilton wants to think further and discuss the implications before making up his mind whether to accept this invitation, I have asked Robert Armstrong to be available to talk to him.

7. I am sending copies of this letter to Douglas Allen, Michael Palliser, Nick Morrison, Ken Barnes, Jim Hamilton and Michael Hanley. I should be grateful if you would take the lead in consulting Robert Mark about New Scotland Yard's representation on SPL.

TOP SECRET

CABINET

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL GROUP ON SUBVERSION IN PUBLIC LIFE

REVISED COMPOSITION AND TERMS OF REFERENCE

Note by the Secretary of the Cabinet

COMPOSITION

1. The Composition of the Committee is as follows -

Chairman

Mr R T Armstrong, Home Office

Members

~~Mr A S Baker~~ ^{Mr A S Baker}, Foreign and Commonwealth Office
Mr A S Baker, Home Office
Mr D B Smith, Department of Employment
Mr J Hudson, Department of Education and Science
Mr J H Moore, Civil Service Department
Mr Elliot-Bluns, Scottish Office
Sir Michael Hanley, Security Service
Mr D Hamblen, Security Service
Deputy Assistant Commissioner V Gilbert, New Scotland Yard
by chair Rose ~~Mr J S Elliott~~ ^{Mr J S Elliott}, Cabinet Office
Mr J S Elliott, Cabinet Office (Assessment Staff)

TERMS OF REFERENCE

2. To give guidance on the collection and to co-ordinate the assessment of intelligence about threats to the internal security of Great Britain arising from subversive activities and to make periodic reports to the officials concerned.

SECRETARIAL

3. The Secretaries are -

Mr D A Nicholls, Cabinet Office
Mr G L Angel, Home Office
Assessment Officer (for the preparation of reports) -

THIS IS A COPY OF THE ORIGINAL
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 2
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

TOP SECRET

DISTRIBUTION

COPY NO

CIVIL SERVICE DEPARTMENT

Mr J M Moore

HOME OFFICE

Mr R T Armstrong
Mr A S Baker
Mr G L Angel

THIS IS A COPY. THE ORIGINAL IS
RETAINED UNDER SECTION 3 (4)
OF THE PUBLIC RECORDS ACT

FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH OFFICE

~~Mr R W Whitney~~
Mr H G Leahy

5

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

Mr J A Hudson

6

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT

Mr D B Smith

7

SCOTTISH OFFICE

Mr E U E Elliot-Binns

8

NEW SCOTLAND YARD

Deputy Assistant Commissioner V Gilbert

9

SECURITY SERVICE

Sir Michael Hanley
Mr D A Hamblen
Mr D W Ranson

10
11
12
13

CABINET OFFICE

Sir John Hunt
Sir Clive Rose
Mr J S Elliott
Mr D A Nicholls

14
15
16
17

TOP SECRET

CAB 165/46

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

92J

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of.....

SPL(76) 1st Meeting

Copy No.

CABINET

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL GROUP ON SUBVERSION
IN PUBLIC LIFE

MINUTES of a Meeting held in
Room 215, Cabinet Office on
WEDNESDAY 10 NOVEMBER 1976 at 10.30 am

PRESENT

Mr R T Armstrong
Home Office (In the Chair)

Mr J M Moore
Civil Service Department

Mr R W Whitney
Foreign and Commonwealth Office

Department of Education and
Science

Department of Employment

Scottish Office

Deputy Assistant Commissioner
V S Gilbert
New Scotland Yard

Sir Michael Hanley
Security Service

Security Service

Sir Clive Rose
Cabinet Office

Mr J S Elliott
Cabinet Office

THE FOLLOWING WERE ALSO PRESENT

Security Service

Security Service

SECRETARIAT

Mr D A Nicholls
Mr G L Angel

CONTENTS

Subject

Item No

1

RECONSTITUTION OF THE GROUP

2

THE THREAT OF SUBVERSION TO THE UNITED
KINGDOM

1. RECONSTITUTION OF THE INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP ON SUBVERSION IN PUBLIC LIFE (SPL)

THE CHAIRMAN, welcoming members of the reconstituted Group, drew attention to its enlarged membership and the wider scope of its terms of reference: it was now charged with co-ordinating assessments as well as giving guidance on the collection of intelligence about subversive activities across the whole spectrum of national life. Under its terms of reference the SPL could propose new areas for investigation but it would be prudent to seek higher authority where these were of particular political sensitivity. The appropriate body would be the reconstituted Subversion Home (SH) Committee which would oversee the work of the SPL and advise Ministers, as necessary, on appropriate measures for counter subversion in the UK.

The Group -

Took note, with approval, of the Chairman's introductory remarks.

2. THE THREAT OF SUBVERSION TO THE UNITED KINGDOM

The Group had before it SPL(76) 2, a report by the Security Service on the above subject.

THE CHAIRMAN, summing up a general discussion, said that the report provided a useful summary which, while covering the whole range of subversive groups and their activities, emphasized the continuing and significant threat posed by the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB). It would be appropriate for a paper on these lines to be produced regularly and he invited the Security Service to prepare a further report for consideration by the Group in six months' time. In doing so, it would be helpful if account could be taken of their discussion, which had revealed a number of issues that a report of this kind might cover, including the financing of subversion and the links between subversive organisations in this country and their counterparts overseas. Meanwhile, the paper before the Group did not call for amendment or further circulation, but should be used as a background against which to review developments and consider what further action was required.


The Group -

Took note, with approval, of the Chairman's summing up.

The Group then turned to individual sections of the report. THE CHAIRMAN summed up a discussion of these, as follows:-

Subversion in the Labour Movement (paragraphs 1-23, as amended). It was agreed that there were grounds for concern at the growth of subversive influences in the Labour Movement. The group would wish to draw this to the attention of the SH Committee.

The Public Service (paragraphs 24-28). It was agreed that the growth of subversive activity contributed to increased disruption and that this gave rise to concern. The Civil Service Department were examining the problem in consultation with Departments and with the Security Service.

Education (paragraphs 29-33). While the field of education did not, in general, give rise to the same degree of concern as had been expressed about the Public Service, the Group would wish to endorse the increased effort being made to establish the extent of the subversive influences at work.

The Media (paragraphs 34-36). The Group would wish to note that while it was difficult to make any overall assessment of the impact of subversion in this area, the scale of the threat was probably not substantial. They would agree that it was right to maintain a careful watch over developments.

Racial Issues and the Extreme Right (paragraphs 37-40). These two subjects were closely related. Recent developments in this area gave cause for concern. The attempts of subversive groups to exploit the situation called for further investigation; the Security Service, the Metropolitan and other Police Forces were already co-operating in this.

Political Terrorism (paragraphs 41-48, as amended). The Group would note that this subject (which excluded Irish terrorism on which there was

[REDACTED]

separate reporting) was a matter of continuing concern and one to which significant resources were already devoted.

The Group -

Took note, with approval, of the Chairman's summing up.

3. The Group then considered the extent to which it should be concerned with specific measures to counter subversion. It was not for the SPL to initiate specific measures; the SH Committee should be invited to consider whether there was scope for more activity in this field.

THE CHAIRMAN, summing up this part of the discussion, said it was clear that, while the report they had been examining need not be circulated to SH, there would be advantage in reporting to SH the outcome of their discussions and in seeking their advice on the areas of particular difficulty which had been identified. He would arrange for the preparation of a draft report, which, it might be possible to clear out of Committee.

The Group -

Took note, with approval, of the Chairman's summing up.

Cabinet Office

1 December 1976

[REDACTED]

CAB 163 269

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT

114

The circulation of this paper has been strictly limited.
It is issued for the personal use of H. H. Doyne-Ditmas

Copy No. 17

SPL(77)3

8 August, 1977.

CABINET

INTER-DEPARTMENTAL GROUP ON SUBVERSION
IN PUBLIC LIFE

THE NATURE OF TROTSKYISM -
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE UK

The attached Report by the Security Service is
circulated for information.

Signed H. DOYNE-DITMAS
G. L. ANGEL

Cabinet Office
8 August, 1977.

THE NATURE OF TROTSKYISM -
WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO THE UK

Background

1. The dictionary definition of a Trotskyist is:-

"A Communist who supports Trotsky's view that excessive Russian nationalism is incompatible with true international Communism."

Trotskyism then can be said to be, like Maoism, an attempt "to integrate the universal truth of Marxism with concrete practice" (Mao, 6th Plenary of the CCP, 1938). It is not so much a philosophy as a code of practice, not (in Lenin's words) "what is to be done" but how.

2. Trotsky can be regarded as a classical Marxist. According to his biographer, Isaac Deutscher "he represents the Marxist school of thought in all its purity, as it existed before its debasement by the social democratic and Stalinist orthodoxies". The bulk of his revolutionary writings belongs to the period 1929-40 after his exile from Russia and before his murder in Mexico.

3. If there is one theory which is regarded as Trotsky's unique contribution to the Marxist canon, it is the theory of "permanent or continuous revolution". In fact this theory was originated by Marx himself. Nevertheless it resulted in the birth of Trotskyism because it was the cause of the final break between Trotsky and Stalin.

4. Marx saw the revolution as consisting of two stages, the first "nationalist" stage which would be led by the bourgeoisie, and the second "socialist" stage which would result in the overthrow of the bourgeois leaders and the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the Russia of the revolution there was virtually no urban proletariat and the peasantry, said Trotsky, was essentially counter-revolutionary and could not be relied on. Thus, he believed that for the revolution to succeed it would be necessary to win the support of the international proletariat. The revolution had to continue and it made no sense to attempt to limit it to one country, as Stalin wished. This pragmatic conclusion was subsequently elevated into a major revolutionary principle and lies at the heart of Trotskyist dogma.

5. Trotskyists maintain that they are the only pure revolutionary Marxists. They abhor the "Stalinists" (as they call them) and regard Russia, as Trotsky did, as a

/...

"degenerated workers' State". They look with equal disfavour at the "social democrats". In Trotsky's own words, "Social Democracy, which prostitutes Marxism, and Stalinism are both mortal enemies of the proletarian revolution".

6. Trotsky, like Marx, did not regard representative democracy as an essential element of the socialist society which he envisaged. He equated Western parliamentary democracy - what he called the "bourgeois dictatorship" - with capitalism. "It is based on capitalist property; it assures the propertied class of their economic and social supremacy and consequently of their cultural and political predominance". Trotskyism is essentially revolutionary: to quote Trotsky again, "The strategic task of the Fourth International lies not in reforming capitalism but in its overthrow. Its political aim is the conquest of power by the proletariat for the purpose of expropriating the bourgeoisie".

The Transitional Programme

7. A further vital component in Trotskyist theory is the programme Trotsky wrote for the international body he created, the "Fourth International" (which succeeded three earlier Communist internationals) in 1938. This programme is called the "Death Agony of Capitalism" - or, more popularly, the Transitional Programme - and it is today regarded by all Trotskyists as scripture, to be revered in the same way as Marx's Communist Manifesto.

8. It lays down what Trotskyists are to do in the period of transition between the present day and the revolution which Trotsky, like all Marxists, believed to be both inevitable and reasonably imminent. The task of the Fourth International "lies not in reforming capitalism but in its overthrow". The method is to be "the proletarian revolution". The programme lays down precise guidance for a series of transitional demands; the workers are to demand a sliding scale of wage rises, and a progressively diminishing scale of working hours; factory committees are to be established, there is to be workers' control, business secrets are to be abolished, and "key branches of industry vital for national survival" are to be expropriated. In order to guarantee the "inviolability of workers' organisations and meetings", a system of strike pickets is to be established and workers' groups for self defence and an armed and trained workers' militia are to be set up.

9. Throughout, the Transitional Programme makes it clear that the demands being put forward are revolutionary and not an attempt to improve the system by reform. "If capitalism is incapable of satisfying (these) demands, then let it

/...

perish". The whole programme is to build up to a situation in which "dual power" has been established, with the old State on one side and the new workers' soviets on the other. The achievement of this will mark the culminating point of the transitional period. After that, since "Two regimes, the bourgeois and the proletarian, are irreconcilably opposed . . . conflict between them is inevitable". The existing State structure and the "bourgeois dictatorship" of Parliamentary democracy are "not pledges for the future but decayed survivals of the past. The epoch of wars and revolutions will raze them to the ground".

10. Although modern Trotskyism has incorporated other ideas, notably from the revolutionary philosophies of Cuba, these principles remain clearly recognisable in the policies of UK Trotskyist bodies and, indeed, can frequently be used as criteria by which to measure the extent of Trotskyist influence in a body not otherwise overtly Trotskyist.

Trotskyist Organisations in the UK

11. There are more than 20 separate Trotskyist organisations in the UK but only four have a membership of more than 5-600. These are:

The Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP)
Membership c.5000

The Socialist Workers Party (SWP) (formerly
the International Socialists)
Membership c.3500

The 'Militant' Tendency (MT)
Membership c.1000

The International Marxist Group (IMG)
Membership c.750.

12. The first British Trotskyist group emerged out of what was then the British Communist Party in 1932 with a miniscule membership. Various other groups were set up in the years that followed but it was out of the Revolutionary Communist Party (RCP) (established in 1944) that modern British Trotskyism developed. The RCP, which came to an end in 1949, gave birth to three separate bodies all of which were at the time "entrism" groups within the Labour Party.

13. "Entrism", as Trotskyists call it, may be defined as the secret penetration of another organisation aimed at influencing and ultimately controlling its policies. It has always been an integral part of Trotskyist activity and its importance was best expressed by Trotsky himself when he urged that

/...

Trotskyist groups should retain the closest possible contact with the mass movements of the working class. "The Koran says that the mountain came to the prophet Mohammed; Marxism counsels that the prophet should go to the mountain". Some Trotskyist groups regard entrism as a tactic, to be employed or discarded as political circumstances dictate. For others it has become a permanent strategy.

14. Of the three groups which survived the RCP one, led by Gerry HEALY, was expelled from the Labour Party and became the Socialist Labour League in 1959 and the WRP in 1973; the second, led by Tony CLIFF, came out of the Labour Party and became the International Socialists, changing its name to Socialist Workers Party in January 1977; the third, known initially by the names of its leaders as the Grant-Deane Group, became the Revolutionary Socialist League in the mid 1950s. This last group adhered to entrism and in the late 1960s disobeyed the instructions of the United Secretariat of the Fourth International (USFI); the international Trotskyist group of which it was the British affiliate, that it should come out of the Labour Party. It has remained within that party ever since, abandoning its name and becoming increasingly clandestine until it was known only by the name of the Marxist paper, the "Militant", which it controlled and behind which it concealed itself.

15. The fourth of the major British groups, the International Marxist Group, also began as an entrism group in the Labour Party but established itself as an overt group in the late 1960s, becoming the British section of USFI in place of the disaffiliated RSL.

16. Until the middle 1950s all UK Trotskyist groups were very small. The impact of the Soviet intervention in Hungary and of Khrushchev's revelations about the Stalinist period at the 20th Congress of the CPSU began a period of steady though not dramatic growth; recruits came both from disillusioned members of the CPGB and from the ranks of what was then called the "New Left" - those extreme Left wingers who were deterred from joining the CPGB by its inflexibility and its reputation of being under Soviet domination.

17. A diagram illustrating the development of UK Trotskyist groups and the relationship between them is to be found in the Appendix.

Trotskyism and Violence

18. "History down to now has not thought out any other way of carrying mankind further than that of setting up the revolutionary violence of the progressive classes against the conservative violence of the outworn classes".

/...

"The revolution logically does not demand terrorism . . . But the revolution does require of the revolutionary class that it should attain its ends by all methods at its disposal - if necessary, by an armed rising; if required, by terrorism".

Trotsky:
"Terrorism & Communism"


Unlike the Communist Party of Great Britain, Trotskyist groups have never accepted the feasibility of a peaceful British road to socialism. No Trotskyist group in the UK is known so far to have planned either an armed rising or terrorist activity. If questioned on the subject they would without doubt maintain that objective conditions in the UK do not at present require such action; and indeed that such "adventurist" behaviour "would open the door to the most savage oppression of all Left wing groups" (Workers Press: 20 September 1973). Nevertheless Trotskyists adhere to the belief that the working class is continuously oppressed by the violence of the State and that they are wholly justified in using violence against the State in self-defence. "Every capitalist society has an element of institutionalised violence which has become increasingly apparent since the decline of capitalist economy in the late 1960s" (Tariq Ali, August 1973).

19. The violence associated with Trotskyist groups on picket lines and other demonstrations since 1967, their consistent (though qualified and, since the passing of the Prevention of Terrorism Act, muted) sympathy for the aims if not the methods of the IRA, and the WRP's current links with the Libyan Government and with terrorist groups in the Middle East make the possibility of Trotskyist violence a factor to be taken seriously into consideration in any assessment of the significance of their activities in the UK.

SECURITY SERVICE
June 1977

APPENDIX


The British Trotskyist Groups



THE THREAT OF SUBVERSION TO THE UK: APRIL 1977SUMMARYINTRODUCTION

1. This paper up-dates the Security Service survey circulated in October 1976 (SPL(76)2), paying particular attention to the financing of subversive organisations and their overseas links. It concludes that no British Trotskyist organisations derive external support on a scale comparable with that which the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) receives from the international Communist movement. That movement, whose activities the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) seeks to co-ordinate in pursuit of Soviet policy objectives, represents a significant threat to the UK.

COMMUNIST SUBVERSION



The Activities of the CPGB

8. Despite the CPGB's declining membership and poor finances it still has considerable influence within the Labour movement. The CPGB continues to use this influence to promote "Labour-Communist unity", through which it hopes eventually to open the way to a Communist society in the UK.

9. The Labour Party Most of the candidates for whom the CPGB lobbied at the Labour Party's 1976 annual conference were elected to the Labour Party NEC. Publicity given to allegations of extreme Left-wing influences has however led the handful of Labour MPs with whom the CPGB maintains contact to be more circumspect.

10. The bans which prevent Communists gaining direct access to Labour Party bodies remain a major impediment to the CPGB, but Communists are sometimes able to influence the selection of delegates to Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs) and thus to bring indirect Communist pressure to bear on the Labour Party.

/ ...




[REDACTED]

such manoeuvres Communists have secured a significant degree of influence in over 40 CLPs. They support the proposed reforms in Labour Party procedure which would place greater power in the hands of CLPs.

The Trade Union Movement The CPGB continues to exploit its disproportionate influence in certain major trade unions. It has concentrated its efforts on discrediting the social contract and seeking to prevent its renewal in 1977.

TROTSKYIST SUBVERSION



Trotskyists, particularly members of the SWP, are an increasing irritant in the affairs of certain trade unions and some industrial disputes, but at national level they are not

/...

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

able to exercise an influence comparable with that of the CPGB.

14. Most major British Trotskyists groups are members of one or other international Trotskyist grouping but none regularly obtains significant financial aid from such a source. Since Trotskyist parties have nowhere come to power, no British Trotskyist group has an external source of ideological support comparable with that which the Soviet Bloc represents for the CPGB.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Large donations from individual members and sympathisers, notably in the world of entertainment, play a significant part in funding the WRP.

THE EXTREME RIGHT

15. Building its platform primarily on its racial policies, the National Front has grown in size and is attracting on average some 7% of the electorate. Fascist organisations are unable to match the National Front's appeal; membership of the largest, the British Movement, scarcely exceeds 500.

RACIAL ISSUES

16. There have been no major outbreaks of racial unrest since the summer of 1976 but Right-wing and Left-wing extremist groups continue their attempts to exploit racial tension. Neither the CPGB nor Ultra Left-wing groups have made much progress in attracting support among immigrants, while coloured

[REDACTED]

/...

extremists are hampered by the barriers which exist between the different immigrant communities. Only the National Front derives substantial advantage from racial tension at present, but there are some signs of a further deterioration in race relations which may provide Left-wing extremists with greater opportunities for exploitation in the future.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE

17. A recent review has revealed that some 1,125 civil servants have significant security records; of these only 14 have access to information classified above Confidential. Threats of disruption may arise where subversives are concentrated in particular departments or locations, especially if they are able to exercise influence through trade union channels. A study in progress designed to quantify these has so far revealed that the activities of subversives in the CPSA and SCPS below national level may be a particular problem in two Government departments. Subversive organisations retain significant influences in both unions at national level.

EDUCATION

18. Progress has been made in defining the extent to which teachers in schools and higher educational establishments have affiliations with subversive groups. Efforts are also being made to identify establishments where teachers with subversive affiliations are concentrated. In higher education, the CPGB appears more successful than Trotskyist groups in attracting young lecturers. Isolated instances of concerted activity by teacher members of the WRP in a few schools have come to light.

[REDACTED]

Communists and their associates have retained control of the National Union of Students but their reputation among students has been dented.

THE MEDIA


[REDACTED]

POLITICAL TERRORISM

20. No British subversive groups are known to aid Irish Republican extremists in the commission of acts of terrorism, but the WRP has stepped up its propaganda support for the Provisional Republican Movement.

21. No violence-prone revolutionary group in the mould of the Angry Brigade is known to exist but some Anarchist and Maoist groups are continuing to recruit [REDACTED], possibly with the intention of putting their expertise to violence uses.

[REDACTED]





115

CABINET OFFICE
120807
16 AUG 1977
HUNG INSTRUCTIONS
FILE No.

New Scotland Yard,
Broadway,
LONDON, SW1H 0BG

Your reference:
SPL (77) 2

Our reference:
588/72/15D

12 August 1977

H Doyne-Diomas Esq
Cabinet Office

*Mr H Doyne-Diomas Esq
16/8/77*

Dear Sir,

Many thanks for your draft report dated 8 August 1977 and intended for the Subversion (Home) Committee.


From the standpoint of Metropolitan SB I have no comments or alterations to suggest.

Yours ever,

Bob Hughes

Deputy Assistant Commissioner





SECRET

(THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF HER BRITANNIC MAJESTY'S GOVERNMENT)

AC(H)(VG)(67)5

17th October 1967

COPY NO. 10

CABINET

OFFICIAL COMMITTEE ON COMMUNISM (HOME)

WORKING GROUP ON COUNTERMEASURES

SUBVERSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM

Note by the Secretary

Subversive Activities (see AC(H)(VG)(67)5 (Home)) *ds*

A comprehensive paper by the Security Service entitled "Subversion in the United Kingdom Autumn 1967" is attached. This will be considered at a meeting of the Working Group to be held in Sir Burke Trend's room on Friday 20th October at 3 p.m., for which no separate Agenda or Meeting Notice will be issued.

(Signed) D. HEATON

Cabinet Office, S.W.1.

17th October 1967

SECRET

SECRET

SUBVERSION IN THE UNITED KINGDOM - AUTUMN 1967

1967 is the fiftieth anniversary year of the October Revolution. 1968 will mark the twentieth anniversary of the opening salvo of what came to be known as the cold war and also of the creation of the British security system in its present form. In February of that year the Government of Czechoslovakia fell to Communist subversion from within and to the threat of the Red Army from without. In March 1948 the Prime Minister made what has come to be known as the Attlee Declaration. "The Government", he said, had "reached the conclusion that the only prudent course to adopt is to ensure that no one who is known to be a member of the Communist Party, or to be associated with it in such a way as to raise legitimate doubts about his or her reliability, is employed in connection with work the nature of which is vital to the security of the State". A similar ruling applied to Fascists. The aim of this paper is not to treat the current subversive threat historically, still less to suggest policy changes in the handling of it. It does aim however to show that, although the threat has diminished in gravity, it has become more complicated in its nature and in consequence may require more sophisticated treatment. It is for example no longer susceptible to the same relatively simple exposure treatment.

COMMUNISM

2. Over the last twelve months the most significant development in the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) has been a decline in morale brought about by the intensification of the Sino-Soviet dispute, by the hesitations of its leaders and by its manifest failure to exploit the industrial opportunities arising from the country's economic difficulties.

The CPGB and the Sino-Soviet Dispute

3. The CPGB stands to lose as much as any Communist Party from the Sino-Soviet dispute. The KHRUSHCHEV thesis of peaceful co-existence in international terms bears a close relationship to the non-violent and quasi-constitutional domestic manoeuvring of the CPGB as expressed, and recently confirmed, in the "British Road to Socialism" (BRS). The wholesale rejection of this thesis by the Chinese, and by implication of the tactics of the BRS, could hardly fail to raise doubts in the minds of many British Communists. From the outset the Party was aware of this danger. Its inept counter-measures, first to try and conceal the existence of the dispute from its members, then to adopt a policy of dubious neutrality and finally to condemn the Chinese outright have succeeded only in bewildering ordinary Party members. The CPGB now finds itself forced further and further into the Russian camp by the pressure of events, despite the fact that its distrust of Russian tactics continues to increase.

SECRET

4. The crux of the matter is Russian determination to have an international conference of Communist Parties to determine doctrinal differences. The CPGB believes such a conference could have only one result, the expulsion of the Chinese from and the final dissolution of the International Communist Movement (ICM). At the end of September 1967 GOLLAN, the Party's General Secretary, and his principal henchman, MATTHEWS (editor of the "Morning Star") met BREZHNEV in Moscow to read this lesson. BREZHNEV, who seems to have been anxious to win over the CPGB, disclaimed any intention to outlaw China but, pointing to Russian reverses in Indonesia, China and the Middle East and to the awkward attitude of Rumania, argued that there was an urgent need for the Communist Parties of the world to meet and define their line on nationalism. He clearly had in mind national communism. GOLLAN suspected a trap and argued strongly that a conference on national communism was unlikely to be attended by the more national-minded Parties and would inevitably degenerate into an ideological argument over China. Neither side seems to have given much away, and the final communiqué confined itself to a condemnation of Chinese errors and approval of the conference on specific issues, notably American "aggression" in Vietnam. This is a favourite CPGB solution for differences on the ICM. There was moreover no reference in the communiqué to differences between the CPGB and the Russians over the latter's support for the Arabs which at one stage almost brought the meeting to an end. (With its relatively large Jewish membership the CPGB is sensitive on this issue)

5. The CPGB's real position towards the ICM is to be found in the terms of a resolution which will come before its National Congress in November and which clearly has the imprint of GOLLAN's drafting. This states:

- (a) that all Communist Parties have the responsibility for working out their own policies;
- (b) that irrespective of size and of whether they participate in government all Parties have equal rights;
- (c) that the affairs of the International Communist Movement can no longer be conducted on the basis of international conferences which would conflict with the sovereign rights of individual Parties.

This is a far cry from the hegemony of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and no doubt explains the CPGB's obvious reluctance to participate in a conference on national communism.

The CPGB and the Domestic Scene

6. After a brief moment of euphoria, following the electoral defeat of the Conservatives, the CPGB quickly came to the conclusion that a Labour Government which they regarded as committed to making Capitalism work was no improvement on its predecessors. It disagreed with most of the new Government's policies, both foreign and domestic, but in view of the impact of the measures to protect sterling inevitably had to concentrate its attention on the industrial situation.

7. The story of the CPGB's industrial activity during this period is largely that of its new Industrial Organiser RAMELSON, who took office in February 1966. In intellectual and administrative ability RAMELSON is much more formidable than his bumbling predecessor KERRIGAN, and his handling of the Seamen's Strike, where in spite of the Party's negligible numerical strength he was nevertheless able to exercise significant influence, showed tactical skill of a high order. It was to be expected that similar efforts would be made to mobilise opposition to the "July measures" of 1966 and RAMELSON certainly tried. Appeals for strike action were made both to the busmen and to the railwaymen and, later in the autumn, to employees in the motor industry. There was virtually no response and it became plain that however much the unions might disapprove of the new measures they had learned the lesson of the Seamen's Strike and were not prepared to engage in open conflict with the Government itself. This was the advice that RAMELSON received from leading Communist trade union officials who had no more stomach for a fight than had their non-Communist colleagues.

8. The implication of these failures was not lost on RAMELSON, who in any case, as a newcomer to the CPGB's industrial department, was disinclined to accept without question the working practices of its apparatus. The present position seems to be that he has no intention of discarding the well-established policy of penetrating the labour unions at official level and he recognises that from the Party's point of view the dividends to be expected from this policy are not to be despised. Nevertheless he is shrewd enough to see that the advantages are largely political in character, such as anti-Government votes in the Trades Union Congress (TUC), and he does not place very much trust in the capacity of the trade union comrades to undertake industrial action in periods of acute economic stress. He has, therefore, been forced to look elsewhere and now seems to be readier than his predecessors to back unofficial action by shop stewards.

9. RAMELSON's views do not go unchallenged by the more traditionalist members of CPHQ; and the currently divided counsel in the Industrial Department is well illustrated by reference to the Party's behaviour in the London Dock strike. With one important exception the Communist Party leaders never had much enthusiasm for this strike and were strongly critical of RASH's failure to use the trade union machinery. The exception was RAMELSON, who felt that RASH had no choice but to take unofficial action in view of his previous opposition to the modernisation scheme and the fact that the TGMU was fully committed to it.

The State of the Party

10. Until very recently rumours were circulating at Communist Party Headquarters and among the editorial staff of the "Morning Star" that GOLLAN intended to resign. The popular forecast for the date was the National Congress in November 1967. Ultimately MATTHEWS succeeded in eliciting a denial from GOLLAN, but nevertheless the rumours appear to have had some foundation. GOLLAN is in poor health and whenever he surveys the domestic and foreign scene he sees little cause for satisfaction.

11. The readership of the "Morning Star", after a temporary boost, is now almost back to that of the old "Daily Worker", and CPQE nominal membership at 33,000 is at best static. This conceals a qualitative deterioration reflected in the declining activity of the individual member and his increasing failure to pay his Party dues. The worst hit area is London District where the current reluctance of the Jewish members to open their purses constitutes an additional problem. CPHQ has been hard hit by Selective Employment Tax and has had to reduce staff, notably in the industrial department where the normal complement of four officers has been reduced to RAMELSON, who owing to ill health is less mobile than he would wish, with one full-time and one part-time assistant. The foreign scene is little better and there have been occasions recently when GOLLAN has been driven almost to distraction by the importunities of the Russians and the antics of the Chinese.

12. The probability is that GOLLAN will go in the reasonably near future, but his choice of timing will be determined by his wish to ensure that his successor is a man in his own image. MATTHEWS, the editor of the "Morning Star", would be GOLLAN's choice, the principal rival probably being RAMELSON who could be expected to take a much harder line, both at home and abroad. Meanwhile GOLLAN holds that survival must be the

SECRET

CPGB's first priority and he sees no practical alternative to the Party's current non-violent and quasi-constitutional tactics. The "British Road to Socialism" has been re-written with this very much in mind and GOLLAN's vision of the future is a major regrouping of the Left in which the CPGB's role will be that of an equal - doubtless in the Orwellian sense. If, in order to bring this about, the CPGB has to become more nationalist and to pay little more than doctrinal lip service to international communism, this is a price which GOLLAN is prepared to pay.

13. At the end of the annual review in February 1967, YCL membership stood at 5,434 (a rise of 600 on the previous year) and by May had risen to 5,842. While the latter figure doubtless errs on the side of optimism in that it includes a number of YCL members who may have resigned in the interval, it nevertheless reflects the upward trend of previous years. There is also growing confirmation that a relatively high proportion of YCL members joined the organisation to enjoy its social activities and show little interest in its political doctrines.

Students

14. The National Union of Students (NUS) Council met at the beginning of April 1967 and was once again the target of the Radical Student Alliance (RSA), an organisation in which there is considerable Communist influence. In general the NUS Executive withstood the assaults of the RSA supporters, whose only tangible success was the election of two of their number to the Executive. Motions calling for disaffiliation from the International Student Conference (ISC) in favour of joining the Communist-orientated International Union of Students (IUS) were defeated; but the Executive had to give a promise that it would examine allegations that the ISC had received funds from the CIA. The Party, through the RSA, can be expected to return to the charge at the November Council.

CHINESE COMMUNISM

15. The pro-Chinese organisations in the United Kingdom came into existence as a result of the impact of the Sino-Soviet dispute on the CPGB's rank and file. They fall into two distinct types - the so-called mass organisations and the small activist groups. The mass organisations of which there are two, the Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding (SACU) and the Friends of China, are both under Communist influence, but their appeal for friendship and understanding of Maoist China is directed primarily to the non-committed. The activist groups are composed predominantly of past and present members of the CPGB and their ultimate aim is the establishment of a new Communist Party committed to the principles of Maoism and opposed to the revisionist policies of the CPGB.

The Mass Organisations

16. Society for Anglo-Chinese Understanding. SACU was formally inaugurated in May 1965 in the presence of the Chinese charge d'affaires and with the blessing of over 150 sponsors, many of them well-known figures in artistic, academic and cultural circles. It expanded rapidly in its first year and in spite of recent defections is believed still to have a membership of over 2,000. From the outset it was controlled, through its Secretariat, by a small clique of Communist and ex-Communist businessmen with commercial interests in China, of whom the most important is Roland BERGER. BERGER, who is believed to have terminated his membership with the CPGB in about 1964, has a long history of secret Communist activity. SACU soon demonstrated that its appeal for understanding of Mao's China was not to be hampered by impartiality and by the beginning of 1967 Communist control of the organisation became increasingly apparent. Many of the moderate members resigned and since the 1967 Annual General Meeting the Society has made little attempt to conceal its sympathies with Chinese Communism. Typical is its recent statement welcoming the explosion of the Chinese hydrogen bomb. This change of front has not received unanimous support within the Society and there are signs of resistance in some of the provincial branches and of increasing financial difficulties due to the withholding of subscriptions. The Society is now heavily dependent on donations from a few undisclosed sources.

17. The Friends of China. This organisation, which is not to be confused with the Society of the same name which merged in the SACU in 1965, held its inaugural rally in London in February 1967. Its declared aim was "to nail the lies, slanders and distortions" which were alleged to be rife in this country concerning the cultural revolution and the thoughts of Mao Tse Tung. Unlike SACU it was openly pro-Communist Chinese from its inception and there is reason to believe that it enjoys more official Chinese support than does SACU. A noticeable feature is that it lacks intellectual or middle class backing and derives most of its support from coloured immigrants, mostly Indian.

The Activist Groups

18. The activist groups, which change their titles with bewildering frequency, comprise little more than a handful of members. They are perpetually at loggerheads and are united only in their allegiance to Maoist China and their disagreement with the non-violent policies of the CPGB. The CPGB treats them with contempt but, by expelling their associates as soon as they can be identified, ensures that they receive a steady trickle of recruits.

19. Currently the only group of any significance is that operating around the new journal "The Marxist". This first appeared in November 1966, is well produced and of a high polemical standard. Its target is the CPGB, which promptly retaliated by expelling from its ranks the members of its Editorial Board. Financially "The Marxist" is dependent upon Roland BERGER and his associates and is a successor to a similar project - "The Forum" - which also represented the views of BERGER. It encourages its readers to form discussion groups and it has had some limited success in attracting support from the Young Communist League (YCL).

20. The principal problem which faces all these groups is whether to try and work within the CPGB, despite its hostility, or to form a new breakaway Party sympathetic to China. They are deeply divided on this issue, as are the Chinese themselves, without whose assistance a breakaway Party could hardly expect to get off the ground. While this uncertainty remains the various groups tend to compete in militancy in the hope that ultimately they will become the chosen instrument of the Chinese.

TROTSKYISM

21. Saddled with an ideology largely irrelevant to modern industrial conditions and broken up into a number of conflicting groups, the British Trotskyist Movement presents only a limited threat. With an active membership of scarcely 2,000 and about 4,000 constantly-changing young supporters its only hope of exerting significant political influence is by penetrating larger and less militant parties. Its natural target is the Labour Party, but even there its impact is reduced by divided tactics, with some groups trying to work from the inside, and the largest group, the Socialist Labour League (SLL) having no choice but to work from without.

The Socialist Labour League (SLL)

22. This accounts for about half the total Trotskyist strength in the country and its main impact is in the field of youth where it has had considerable success in winning over substantial sections of the Labour Party's Young Socialists. It is undoubtedly helped by a well-devised programme of attractive social activities directed with enthusiasm by its General Secretary, Gerry HEALY. In January 1967 the SLL gained control of the National Association of Labour Student Organisations (NALSO) which soon after was disaffiliated by the Labour Party and deprived of its financial subsidy. A few months later the SLL lost control of NALSO to an alliance of other Trotskyist groups with some CPGB backing but is ready to resume control as soon as an opportunity is presented.

23. In the industrial sphere the SLL contacts are mainly at shop steward rather than at official level in the unions and its principal impact is in the docks and the motor industry. It has taken every opportunity to oppose the new dock labour scheme but, even on Merseyside where the SLL has in the past successfully penetrated the National Amalgamated Stevedores and Dockers (a maverick union in opposition to the Transport and General Workers Union), SLL influence has been limited. The sectional interests of the SLL have been subordinated to the general claims of a large group of militant dockers.

24. There are also a considerable number of SLL contacts in the motor industry in the Midlands, mainly in component suppliers as opposed to assembly plants, and the unofficial Oxford Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions is virtually under SLL control. This SLL apparatus presents a continuing threat to industrial peace in the various plants of British Motor Holdings (BMH).

The International Socialism Group

25. This group led by Ygaol SLUCKSTEIN and Tony CLIFF increased its membership in 1967 from 300 to 400 and now has thirty branches in London and the provinces (mostly in the University towns). CLIFF, who is an able lecturer and a political controversialist of no mean order, puts across a rigid Trotskyist line and makes no concessions to expediency or, for that matter, to commonsense. Nevertheless his doctrinaire Trotskyism seems to have a peculiar fascination for the Socialist university student and the group has made considerable headway in the university Socialist Societies, largely at the expense of the CPGB and the SLL. This gave the Group a decisive influence in wresting control of NAISO from the SLL this year. In industry the Group follows the familiar Trotskyist pattern of concentrating on shop-stewards but its predominantly intellectual and white-collar membership is a disadvantage and it has had relatively little support. The Group has made contacts in the docks and amongst unofficial shop-stewards' committees in London but the Group follows rather than leads in industrial disputes.

26. In general, in a year in which differences of opinion within the Left over foreign and domestic policies might have been expected to provide unusually favourable opportunities, the Trotskyists have made little headway and there has been no significant change in their overall strength. Internal divisions and personality clashes continue to be their most noticeable feature and the short-term triumph of one group over another is still regarded as more important than efforts to pursue a co-ordinated strategy of subversion.

SYNDICALISM

27. The only Syndicalist group of any significance is the Solidarity or Socialist Reaffirmed Group (SRG) which works in close association with the more militant section of the Committee of 100. This Group, which is led by Dr. Christopher PALLIS, concentrates upon activities calculated to receive maximum publicity. Typical were the interruption of the Prime Minister's reading of the lesson at Brighton and the invasion of the Greek Embassy, both of which were planned and organised from PALLIS's house. There have been recent indications that the Group may be shifting its emphasis from political to industrial issues and it is known to have had a hand in recent stoppages in the motor industry. The minor riot in the paint shop at the Vauxhall plant in Luton in June 1967 is very much in line with Solidarity tactics and, although it cannot be established that the disturbance was organised by PALLIS, some of those directly involved are known to have been in contact with him at the time.

28. In practical terms this Group could be written off as no more than a nuisance, were it not for the ability, persistence and ingenuity of PALLIS and the Group's interest, through the Committee of 100, in secret defence installations.

WELSH EXTREMISM

29. Scattered throughout Wales there are tiny groups of extreme Nationalists, some calling themselves the Free Welsh Army, some the Welsh Citizen Army and others operating under no known title. They are in no way co-ordinated and are constantly forming and reforming. The most heavily publicised is the Free ^{Welsh} Welsh Army, ostensibly commanded by Julian CAYO-EVANS, a small farmer of good family who mentally is scarcely an adolescent. Investigation has disproved his claim to have several thousand supporters and the truth is that his Army consists of himself and a handful of associates of much the same calibre. CAYO-EVANS is only too ready to utter threats of sabotage and to claim responsibility for any acts which take place. Nevertheless he is unlikely to be involved and it is doubtful whether he could organise a successful sabotage operation in the unlikely event of his engaging in one.

SECRET

30. He has contacts with the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and has visited Dublin for this purpose. His two principal contacts are low-grade members of the IRA and the most likely explanation of this liaison is that the political wing of IRA, which is interested in promoting Pan-Celtic organisations, including those in Wales, has been misled as to his status by the publicity given to him.

31. The major threat of sabotage is in mid-Wales where there is considerable resentment felt at the flooding of Welsh valleys to provide reservoirs for English cities. This threat comes from individuals who do not form part of any known organisation and who are therefore difficult to identify. It is safe to assume that many of them are connected with the mining industry and have experience in the handling of explosives to which, by the nature of their employment, they can gain access. Their ability to cause considerable damage was demonstrated in September 1967 when an attempt was made to damage two of four pipe-lines which take water to Liverpool. Only one charge succeeded; but, had the other pipe also been damaged, there would have been a serious interruption of Liverpool's water supply.

FASCISM

32. There is no reason to suppose that the Fascist groups have gained in overall strength and the threat they present remains predominantly one to law and order. There are nevertheless some signs that the Movement may be less divided in the future than it has been in the past. In December 1966 the League of Empire Loyalists decided to merge with the National Party led by John BEAN and this union is now effective. At the time the National Party seems to have given an assurance that it would tone down its propaganda and exclude from its ranks individuals who, through their notoriety as Fascists, might bring the new organisation into disrepute. For this reason a similar proposal to include the Racial Preservation Society in the merger fell through. This was in line with an earlier announcement by BEAN that henceforward the National Party would give greater emphasis to economic affairs, less prominence to coloured immigrants and would actively discourage anti-semitism.

33. This diversion into the paths of righteousness did not last long, since in July 1967 the National Party decided to admit to its ranks John TYNEALL, the leader of the Greater Britain Movement (GBM) shortly after his release from jail. The GBM, like its rival JORDAN's National Socialist Movement, is one of the last two refuges of the old type Fascist rabble rouser. The GBM has since gone into dissolution and TYNEALL has advised all his followers to apply for membership of the National Party and, if they succeed, they will do nothing to improve its public image or its behaviour.

SECRET

CONCLUSION

34. The subversive threat has become more diffuse. Phenomena like Protest and Flower People can present a threat to law and order but only become subversive when there is an element of organisation, be it only in a loose anarchical group. The Communist Party remains the most disciplined and highly organised subversive organisation and, with the possible exception of the Socialist Labour League, the only one capable of having a long-term strategy. Despite its pseudo-respectability and its overtures to the Left, it constitutes a threat by its very existence. Dissatisfaction with its gradualist approach, however, and the erosion of its discipline as a result of the Sino-Soviet dispute, have led to an increase in the nuisance value of those extremist organisations which lack the Communist Party's fundamental discipline and are willing to take short-term risks. Here the threat impinges on law-and-order and is primarily a police responsibility. These groups however thrive on publicity and the less they are given the better.

October 1967

PRM 19/28431

Ref. A09451

PRIME MINISTER

Subversion

I attach a paper on the subversive threat in this country. I am afraid it is on the long side but a summary draws attention to the main points. No immediate decisions are called for, but the threat has to be taken seriously and at a convenient opportunity you will probably want to discuss the matter with the Director General of the Security Service and with your colleagues most closely concerned. In the meantime I have agreed that a copy of the paper should go to the new Home Secretary but to no-one else.

*Send
week
please
11th Dec*

*read of
done
head of 6 days
can we then
ask
to Mr. Butler
1st
if necessary*

JH
(John Hunt) 4/5

[REDACTED]

THE THREAT OF SUBVERSION IN THE UK

CONTENTS

	<u>Paragraph</u>
SUMMARY	
INTRODUCTION	1
THE DEFINITION OF SUBVERSION	2-4
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBVERSIVE THREAT	5-10
THE MAJOR SUBVERSIVE ORGANISATIONS	11-34
THE IMPACT OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY IN PUBLIC LIFE	
THE TRADE UNIONS	35-45
THE LABOUR MOVEMENT	46-48
THE PUBLIC SERVICE	49-55
EDUCATION	56-64
THE MASS MEDIA	65-74
RACIAL ISSUES	75-80
CIVIL LIBERTIES	81
CONCLUSIONS	82-86

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

THE THREAT OF SUBVERSION IN THE UK

SUMMARY

An assessment of the threat from subversive activity and an examination of changes in the threat over the last 10 years (para 1).

2. What constitutes subversion? (paragraphs 2-4).
3. Up to the 60s the Communist Party of Great Britain was virtually the only threat, since then rival Ultra-Left has grown (paras 5-10).
4. The major Subversive Organisations.
 - (a) The Communist Party of Great Britain - [REDACTED]
 - (b) The Trotskyists - expanded in the 60s; more militant and violence-prone; now four groups (paragraphs 18-24).
 - (c) Maoists and Anarchists (paragraphs 25-29).
 - (d) The Extreme Right including the National Front (paras 31-33).
5. Impact on Public Life.
 - (a) The Trade Unions. Communist Party of Great Britain influence disproportionate in some leaderships, Trotskyists work on the rank and file. Both seek to exploit grievances and exacerbate tensions (paragraphs 35-45).
 - (b) The Labour Movement. The Labour Party's barriers against Communist penetration are largely effective but both Communists and Trotskyists have had some success in influencing Constituency Labour Parties (paragraphs 46-48).
 - (c) The Public Service. "Vetting" effective in senior and sensitive positions in Civil Service and in the Armed Forces and the Police. But subversives quite important in the largest Civil Service Unions. [REDACTED]
 - (d) Education. In higher education students and staff are subject to subversive influence but this is not particularly effective [REDACTED] Few schools are subject to significant subversive influence. (paragraphs 56-64).
 - (e) Mass Media. A number of subversive individuals but no systematic penetration by organisations (paragraphs 65-74).
 - (f) Racial Issues. The conflict between the National Front and Trotskyist-dominated Anti-Nazi League (paragraphs 75-80).
 - (g) Civil Liberties. The National Council for Civil Liberties is subject to substantial Communist influence at national level (paragraph 81).
6. Conclusions. Any success achieved has come from the exploitation of existing grievances. The rise in support for Trotskyism [REDACTED]

Any
more?

[REDACTED]

offset by the decline in the Communist Party of Great Britain which nevertheless remains the main long-term threat. Taking the position as a whole, though the threat from subversion is serious and in some ways more evident, it is not greater than 10 years ago. (paragraphs 82-86).

Don't know. ←

THE THREAT OF SUBVERSION IN THE UK

INTRODUCTION

1. The main aim of this paper is to assess the threat currently presented by subversive activity in important areas of public life and to examine changes that have taken place in the form and level of the threat over the past ten years. It prefaces that assessment with brief sections on the definition of subversion, on the general development of the subversive threat and on the major subversive organisations. The paper does not deal with Irish extremists or with the tiny minority of Welsh and Scottish nationalists who are prepared to commit acts of sabotage. Nor does it cover the threat from espionage.

THE DEFINITION OF SUBVERSION

2. The Directive to the Director General of the Security Service, which dates from 1952, lays upon the Service the task of defending the realm from actions of persons and organisations "which may be judged to be subversive of the security of the state". "Subversive" is not defined in that Directive. But in practice the Security Service has to work to a definition, acceptable to the Home Secretary, within which its investigations may be pursued. This definition must be consistent with a further injunction in the Directive to the Director General that the Security Service "should be kept absolutely free from any political bias or influence and any suggestion that it is concerned with the interests of any particular section of the community". Since 1972 the following definition has been generally accepted:

"Subversive activities are those which threaten the safety or well being of the State and are intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means".

This definition was accepted by Ministers in the 1970-74 Conservative administration and in subsequent Labour administrations. It was quoted in both Houses of Parliament by Home Office Ministers in 1975 and defended by the Home Secretary in the House of Commons as recently as 1978.

3. The heart of the definition lies in its reference to an intention to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy. Activities hostile to a government or its policies but which are not intended to overthrow the democratic system are excluded. These limitations are designed to

ic. a
with a
system

ensure that the activities of those who are generally regarded as having legitimate political or industrial aims are not classed as subversive; and, in consequence, that the efforts made by Government to assess and counter subversive activity do not give rise to accusations of political bias. This aspect of the definition may be illustrated by examining its application in the industrial field. An industrial dispute in a vital section of industry may be aimed at overturning a particular Government policy; if it is severe enough, it may threaten the well-being of the nation and of its institutions. But the degree to which any such activity is subversive must depend on the extent to which the motivation of those who inspire it is ultimately to overthrow the system of Parliamentary democracy. In practice, although the motivation of the leaders of major industrial action is often not subversive but is primarily concerned with the material aspirations of their memberships, nevertheless it is likely that subversive individuals and organisations would also try to make use of major industrial disputes for subversive political purposes.

4. The definition is nonetheless broad enough to cover a very wide range of activities. It is sometimes suggested, and this has been the thrust of recent criticism of the 1972 definition, that an activity should not be regarded as subversive unless it is also unlawful. But such a view is unduly narrow: it would today exclude from consideration virtually all the activities of the Communist Party of Great Britain and the Fascist parties, and the majority of those of Trotskyist, Maoist and other Ultra Left organisations. Some of these organisations profess their intention of achieving power by entirely legal and constitutional means; but their ultimate aims and intentions are totalitarian or anarchist and would envisage the destruction of our present system of Parliamentary democracy and free elections.

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SUBVERSIVE THREAT

5. From the 1920s until the late 1960s the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) represented easily the most significant subversive threat. The CPGB was founded in 1920 as the British Section of the Soviet-controlled Third Communist International (Comintern). The Party remained subservient to the Soviet Union until the 1950s. Since then it has increasingly asserted its independence; but its policies on major issues are still broadly in line with Soviet objectives and its activities need to be seen against the backdrop of the wider efforts of the Soviet Union and its allies to subvert the Western democracies.

6. Developments since the Second World War, and in particular the denunciation of Stalin by Khrushchev in

/...

1956 and the Soviet invasion of Hungary in the same year and of Czechoslovakia in 1968, have damaged the reputation of the Soviet Union and by extension, those Communist parties in Western Europe regarded as loyal to it; partly as a result membership of the CPGB has slowly declined. These changes facilitated the rise of groups subscribing to different brands of Communism, principally Trotskyism and Maoism, both of which are actively hostile to present Soviet Communism. Both also at present take a more overt militant revolutionary line than either the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), or the CPGB whose present attitude is akin to that of "Eurocommunist" parties (see paragraph 15). These Trotskyist groups further benefited from, and helped to exacerbate, the widespread unrest among students which affected most of Western Europe in the late 1960s. In this country Trotskyist groups have attracted much greater support than Maoist. The combined memberships of Trotskyist and Maoist groups now add up to rather more than half that of the CPGB, and the total is roughly static. Trotskyists and Maoists, together with Anarchists and some other small categories of Left-wing subversives are referred to collectively as the Ultra Left. Membership of all these groups is more volatile than that of the CPGB. Relations between the CPGB and Ultra Left groups, and between Ultra Left groups themselves, are generally poor. They rarely co-operate, and often seek to sabotage each other's initiatives.

7. Fascism attracted some support in this country in the 1930s: at its height in 1939 Sir Oswald Mosley's British Union of Fascists had some 25,000 members. Support fell away rapidly during the Second World War and Fascist organisations have never subsequently attracted a significant following. The total number of active Fascists in this country at present may be no more than 2 to 3,000; they are divided among a number of small and often ephemeral organisations.

8. By far the most significant organisation on the extreme Right is the National Front. The National Front is not, viewed as a whole, a Fascist organisation and its rank and file members support policies which are basically "racist" and not subversive; [redacted] and its activities need to be studied as a subversive threat both on this account and because of the law and order problems they cause.

9. The subversive threat comes essentially from subversive organisations since it is by working with others that subversive individuals are able to make the

/...

greatest impact. For every card-carrying member of a subversive organisation there is at least one other who, while not a member, is sympathetic to the aims of the organisation and prepared to lend it some degree of practical support. These individuals are termed (Communist, Trotskyist, Fascist etc) sympathisers. They range from those whose commitment to the cause of the organisation is at least as firm as that of card-carrying members to those from whom support would only be forthcoming in a small number of particular circumstances.

10. There are, finally, some individuals unconnected with any subversive organisation who are nevertheless known to hold revolutionary or anarchist views. Such people can occasionally represent a significant subversive threat if they hold influential positions, eg investigative journalists.

THE MAJOR SUBVERSIVE ORGANISATIONS

The Communist Party of Great Britain

Similar information to that contained within 'Threat of Subversion to the UK', dated April 1976 concerning membership numbers, finances and political aims of the CPGB (including relationship with the Labour Party through other left-wing groups)

is or
was?

Information about the CPGB's relationship with the Soviet Union

/...

Information about the attempts by the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union to intervene directly in British political life

Trotskyists

18. Trotskyist ideology starts from the belief that Stalin and his successors in the Soviet Union have betrayed the cause of true international Communism. Trotskyists hold that, in the interests of Russian nationalism, Stalin placed a brake on the spread of international revolutionary activity in Europe; and that he allowed state power in the Soviet Union to fall into the hands of a conservative bureaucratic oligarchy. Trotskyists

/...

therefore stress the importance of international revolutionary co-operation and the need for state power to be seized and exercised by the rank and file of the working class. In practice Trotskyists have been able to make little of the first objective, partly because rival international groupings of Trotskyist organisations have sprung up, each claiming to be heirs of Trotsky's Fourth International, and partly because there is nowhere any Trotskyist Party in government which is able to provide the same material and moral support which the CPSU has provided for other Communist parties. The distinctive character of Trotskyism is therefore to be seen in its advocacy of militant agitation at rank and file level, in trade unions and other bodies; and in its reluctance, unlike orthodox Communism, to seek revolutionary change at a slower pace by attempting to dominate such bodies at leadership level. In broad terms, Trotskyists favour action of a more immediately and dramatically revolutionary character than orthodox Communists. They are less inhibited than Communists over the use of violence, since violent tactics are an obvious way of enhancing the impact of typically rank and file activities such as demonstrations and picketing. Trotskyist groups in Britain have not, however, indulged in terrorist activity and would regard such an approach as counter-productive under present conditions.

19. Another distinctive Trotskyist tactic, which also derives from Trotsky's own teachings, is that of "entrism" - working under cover in other political parties in order to influence and ultimately control their policies. In Britain Trotskyist "entrism" activity has always been aimed at the Labour Party. Only one major Trotskyist group is at present using this tactic; but all three of the other main groups have employed it in the past.

20. There have been Trotskyist groups in Britain since the 1930s but they were very small until the 1960s when various factors referred to above (para 6.) favoured their expansion. In the late 1960s the International Marxist Group was the largest group. It has subsequently declined in size and importance and has been surpassed by three other groups: the Socialist Workers Party, the Workers Revolutionary Party and the Militant Tendency. The WRP, the MT and the IMG all belong to rival international Trotskyist organisations - indeed, the WRP and the MT dominate theirs - but these organisations are generally ineffectual and provide little practical support for their British components.

The WRP is also the only group to have developed significant links with non-Trotskyist bodies overseas.

21. The Socialist Workers Party (4,500 members), formerly known as the International Socialists, is now the largest and most effective Trotskyist group in Britain. It is the only Trotskyist group capable of influencing the conduct of industrial disputes at local level, and it has been more successful than its rivals in mobilising support on the streets on other issues, in particular racial problems. It was responsible for creating the Anti-Nazi League, which it still largely dominates at national level. The SWP is the only Trotskyist group to have a separate organisation for students. The Party publishes a weekly paper "Socialist Worker".

22. The Workers Revolutionary Party (3,100 members) is a more rigidly disciplined organisation than the SWP and regards itself as ideologically "purer". It tends to avoid violence in demonstrations partly because of an obsessive belief that such tactics would lead to its suppression by the authorities; but it has recently been making greater efforts to exploit industrial disputes. The WRP shows a greater interest in international issues than other Trotskyist groups; in particular it has espoused the Palestinian cause and gives it lengthy coverage in its daily newspaper "Newsline".

23. The Militant Tendency (1,500 members) has been in existence in various guises since the 1940s but since 1970 has sought to act clandestinely and to penetrate the Labour Party by classic Trotskyist "entrism" methods. Members of MT do not admit to the group's existence in public; but it is known to be organised on similar lines to other Trotskyist groups, with a recognised leadership and effective means of directing the rank and file membership. At present it has over 60 members engaged full-time in Party work (including ancillary functions). The MT's only public face is the weekly paper "Militant" which is presented as a Marxist journal for the Labour movement without a specifically Trotskyist flavour. The facilities for printing, distributing and financing "Militant" provide a framework within which the Party organisation operates covertly. Membership of MT has grown slowly but steadily in recent years.

24. The International Marxist Group (700 members) has never re-captured the prominence it enjoyed in the late 1960s when, under the leadership of Tariq Ali, it helped to rally opposition to the Vietnam War. Its somewhat intellectual image has enabled it to retain some following among students but it has never attracted significant support among trade unionists. Recently it has attempted, with some success, to form an alliance with smaller Trotskyist and Anarchist groups; but there is no prospect that the larger Trotskyist groups will join it. The IMG publishes a weekly newspaper "Socialist Challenge".

Maoists

25. Maoists claim to be loyal to the brand of Communism developed in China by Chairman Mao Ze Dong. They share with Trotskyists a dislike of what they regard as the top-heavy, bureaucratic nature of Soviet Communism. They are attracted to "puritan" Communist values, including simplicity of life, self sacrifice and self criticism. They also believe, following Chairman Mao, in the need for armed struggle in the revolutionary process; this means in practice that they sometimes indulge in violence.

26. In contrast with the position in many other West European countries, Maoist groups in Britain have attracted only a fraction of the support enjoyed by Trotskyist groups. Maoists here are divided between a number of small and unstable groups, of which the largest, the Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist), has only 400 members. Maoists do not have sufficient strength to make a significant impact in any field; but individuals occasionally indulge in violence during demonstrations, especially where there are opportunities for confrontation with authority.

27. Maoist groups in Britain and elsewhere have been in some turmoil since the death of Chairman Mao. Many Maoists do not regard the new regime in China as an appropriate model for Communists; some are transferring their allegiance to Albania.

Anarchists

28. Modern Anarchism derives from the theories of the 19th century Russian revolutionary Michael Bakunin. Anarchists are radical socialists who, unlike Communists, Trotskyists and Maoists, seek the removal of all forms of centralised state control and wish to see society run through the autonomous action of small ad hoc groups. In accordance with this view, Anarchist groups tend to

/...

be ill-defined and temporary in nature and many Anarchists do not seek combinations beyond a few immediate associates.

29. Anarchism has never enjoyed a large following in Britain although support for it increased somewhat in the 1960s when all Ultra Left philosophies were gaining wider currency. The largest of the present groups 'Big Flame' has only 150 members. Anarchists lend their support to a wide range of Left-wing campaigns, without having the numbers or organisation to take important initiatives of their own. The main threat to security comes from a small minority, representing a distinctive viewpoint within Anarchism, who are prepared to use terrorist violence in order to demonstrate their opposition to the authority of the state. This type of activity was first seen in Britain in the Angry Brigade bombings in 1970 and 1971. There was a further small Anarchist bombing campaign in 1973 and in mid 1978 the police apprehended six members of a ten-strong group who appeared to be planning a series of attacks on prominent figures and public buildings. Further conspiracies of this sort may be expected to emerge from time to time. Although, therefore, they are essentially subversive, the main threats posed by Anarchist groups are of a law and order and possibly terrorist nature.

General

30. The combined membership of all Left-wing subversive organisations has fallen slightly in the course of the 1970s. The rise in the support for Trotskyism has been more than balanced by the decline in membership of the CPGB; and it is reasonable to suppose that many who now support Trotskyist and other Ultra Left groups might, in the past, have given their allegiance to the CPGB.

The Extreme Right

31. The reputation acquired by Fascist regimes before and during the Second World War has meant that Fascism has attracted little support in most Western countries in subsequent years. The largest British Fascist organisation, the British Movement, has about 1,000 members. The Union Movement, formed by Sir Oswald Mosley after the War as a successor to the British Union of Fascists, has dwindled to a 200-strong rump. Contemporary British Fascism remains loyal to most of the basic tenets of pre-War Fascism and Nazism, but the vein of anti-Semitism, although still present, has been overshadowed by hatred of coloured immigrants. Nevertheless, while aggregate membership of Fascist groups has shown some slight growth in recent years when racial problems have come to the fore, it has been the National Front rather than Fascists who have benefited significantly by exploiting this issue.

32.

The National Front was founded in 1967. It enjoyed a period of rapid growth in 1972-73, attracting people opposed to the decision to admit Ugandan Asians to the UK, and continued to expand until by early 1978 it had reached a peak of over 15,000 members. Since then support may have begun to fall away. The NF's three principal leaders, TYNDALL, WEBSTER and VERRALL, all have Fascist backgrounds, but the policies of the NF do not coincide with those of the British Movement and the principal political attraction of the NF has been its stand on racial matters. The NF has contested Parliamentary and local elections on an increasing scale, but it has failed to achieve a significant electoral break through.

33. The main threat posed by the National Front and the Fascist parties is to law and order. The National Front is officially opposed to the use of violence and seeks to cultivate the image of a law abiding organisation; but it adopts tactics in demonstrations and other public activities calculated to provoke its Left-wing opponents to break the law. An organised element within the British Movement occasionally indulges in violence during demonstrations, and individual members of the NF and Fascist groups sometimes attack coloured people and Left-wing extremists. A very small fringe on the Extreme Right,

are prepared to contemplate minor acts of terrorist violence. Individuals of this sort were responsible for the series of 7 bombings in the spring and summer of 1978 which included an attack on Conservative Party headquarters.

Britain and Western Europe

34. In conclusion it would be right to compare the number and strength of subversive organisations in this country and elsewhere in Western Europe. Both Communist and Trotskyist parties, but more especially the former, exercise a much greater influence in many Western European countries, notably in France and Italy, than in this country. Fascist activity is also more significant in Italy and Germany than here.

THE IMPACT OF SUBVERSIVE ACTIVITY IN PUBLIC LIFE

THE TRADE UNIONS

35. All the more important Left-wing subversive organisations regard trade unions as vital targets for penetration. Not only are they powerful bodies exercising considerable influence in the economic sphere; they are also, in Britain,

a major channel through which pressure may be brought to bear on the Labour Party. Although some Maoists and Anarchists are active within trade unions, this survey confines itself to the main threat, which is from Communists and Trotskyists.

Communist influence

Information about Communist influence in major trade unions, including statistics and review of CPGB's processes for coordination of union members

Trotskyist influence

38. There was no significant Trotskyist activity in industry before the expansion of Trotskyist groups in the 1960s. While Communists seek to gain positions in the leadership of trade unions, Trotskyists, by and large, seek to exercise influence among the rank and file, where one of their objects is to discredit established union leaders. Some Trotskyists have obtained national office as full-time officials or executive members, usually in white collar unions, but they often find themselves under pressure from fellow Trotskyists to stand down and resume work at lower levels. In recent years the only major unions in which Trotskyists have gained sufficient footing at national level to make any impact have been the CPGB and the NUJ. The degree of Trotskyist influence in trade

unions at national level has remained roughly static overall since the early 1970s.

39. Typically, Trotskyist activity is directed towards agitation at individual work places and through unofficial shop stewards' combines and similar bodies. Trotskyists favour the use of militant forms of industrial action, especially picketing, which may offer opportunities for activists not directly concerned in a dispute to involve themselves and may enable new recruits to be made to Trotskyist groups themselves. Only one group, the Socialist Workers Party, has a full-time industrial organiser and possesses an apparatus somewhat akin to the Communist "advisory" system; this does not enable it to direct its members centrally with any degree of certainty. However, unlike Communists, individual Trotskyists are apt to embark on militant activities without needing directions from Party headquarters. On occasion (the last important instance being the Grunwick dispute in 1977) the Socialist Workers Party is able to make a significant impact in a particular dispute by attracting publicity through violent tactics. Where the headquarters' staff of Trotskyist groups are able to make a contribution to a dispute, it is principally by way of providing publicity for strikers in Trotskyist newspapers and printing strike leaflets. Accounts in the national press of the successes of Trotskyist groups in organising "flying pickets" and similar activities are often exaggerated.

The effect of subversive activity

40. Communists and Trotskyists seek to exploit real or imagined grievances among workers and to exacerbate any industrial action to which these give rise. But they do not of themselves possess sufficient influence to initiate major industrial disputes. This implies that Communist and Trotskyist agitation is likely to have the greatest effect when, for other reasons, the climate of industrial relations is poor; and by and large events over the last 10 years bear this out. In the 1960s Britain's economic problems led successive governments to adopt incomes policies and prompted the unsuccessful efforts of the 1966-70 Labour administration to persuade the trade unions that the framework of industrial relations should be improved by legislation. Relations between trade unions and government were further strained when, in conditions of continuing economic weakness, the 1970-74 Conservative administration introduced its industrial relations legislation. The CPGB was able to exploit the resulting resentment among trade unionists and played some part in stiffening opposition to the legislation through its influence in individual trade unions and through its front organisation, the Liaison Committee for the Defence of Trade Unions. It also used its

influence to exacerbate some of the major strikes of that period, including those on the docks and in the building industry in 1972 and those by the miners in 1972 and 1974.

Trotskyist activity was apparent in some of the disputes between 1970 and 1974 but was nowhere a major factor.

41. Although subversive elements constantly opposed governmental wage restraint policies (as they had always done before) they found themselves out of step with majority opinion within the trade union movement between 1975 and 1977. The swing of opinion among trade unionists away from continued acceptance of pay norms in 1978 cannot be attributed to subversive agitation; and by and large the CPGB and Trotskyist groups had little influence on the course of the various disputes during the period 1977-79. The CPGB did not enjoy significant influence in the leaderships of some of the unions concerned, and in others it was unable to co-ordinate Communist activity effectively. Trotskyists, especially SWP members, sought to stiffen picketing and other rank and file action in the strikes of the lorry drivers and the local authority and Health Service workers. The major intervention of the CPGB and Trotskyist groups in disputes over the recent winter was their use of their newspapers to support militant action; but they are not judged to have affected the overall course of these disputes noticeably.

Prospects

42. Whatever their numbers, Communists and Trotskyists will always have the potential for exercising disproportionate influence in trade unions, unless moderate trade unionists make deliberate and sustained efforts to combat them. Over the past twenty years the CPGB has been able to maintain a fairly steady level of penetration in the leaderships of some major unions despite the downward trend in Party membership. There are signs however that when the present generation of Communist union leaders retire they will not be replaced by an equivalent number of younger Communists. The CPGB itself is aware of, and disturbed by, this prospect. Trotskyist influence in trade unions, having grown in the early 1970s, appears to have reached a plateau; there is no reason to believe that it will increase unless Trotskyist organisations themselves attract much greater support.

43. The impact that subversive elements in trade unions have at any particular time is likely to depend to a large extent on the prevailing economic and political climate. During the serious industrial disputes of the past two years there has been little evidence that subversive

elements have been able to derive substantial benefit from the situation or indeed to have any major influence upon it. But any future situation which could be exploited as a confrontation between the government and the TUC would provide greater scope for subversive activity.

Soviet subversion

SUBVERSIVE INFLUENCE IN THE LABOUR MOVEMENT

Communist influence

46. The CPGB wishes to move the Labour Party in a leftward direction in the hope that it will eventually fall under the domination of Communist sympathisers and implement Communist policies. While the Security Service does not study the Labour Party as such it does study Communist attempts to subvert any organisation and at various times over the past three years Communist influence has come to notice in between

/...

46 and 50 Constituency Labour Parties (CLPs). There is no reason to believe that this number is growing and, historically, the leadership of the Labour Party has been alert to the danger of Communist infiltration. There has been a long-standing ban on members of the CPGB joining the Labour Party. Additionally, after the Second World War Labour Party members were forbidden to join a number of Communist-controlled organisations, including societies promoting "friendship" with Communist countries. These proscriptions were lifted in 1973 but the Labour Party still expects all affiliated and Party organisations to refrain from associating with other political organisations whose aims are not consistent with its own. The CPGB would like to see the removal of all such barriers. Its immediate objective is the repeal of the rule which requires that all members of delegations from affiliated organisations at the Labour Party Conference should themselves be members of the Labour Party. Without this rule, the way might be open for a sizeable number of Communists to attend the Conference as trade union delegates and to take a direct part in Labour Party policy making.

Trotskyist influence

47. Trotskyists do not, as does the CPGB, pin their main hopes of achieving a revolution on the coming to power of a radically transformed Labour Party; indeed, in recent years, most Trotskyists have tended to campaign for the bringing down of Labour administrations. Nevertheless, Trotskyists in Britain have seen advantage in the secret infiltration of the Labour Party ("entrism") at certain times as a tactic for strengthening the general influence of the Ultra Left; and each of the present 4 main Trotskyist groups has at some stage existed as an entrism group in the Labour Party. The Militant Tendency is now the only one of the 4 which devotes its main energies to infiltrating the Labour Party.

THE PUBLIC SERVICE

49. Security procedures in the public service, introduced in 1948 in accordance with the Attlee Declaration primarily to combat espionage, have resulted in the virtual exclusion of subversive individuals from the armed forces and the police. There are no such individuals in the civil service as far as senior grades and other posts affording substantial access to classified information are concerned. But at present some 1,270 individuals in the home civil service are known to have significant subversive affiliations; two thirds are Communists or sympathisers. This figure has grown gradually over the years largely as a result of the expansion of the civil service itself

[REDACTED]

although this does not entirely account for an increase in the number of Trotskyists in the 1970s. The present total represents only 0.17 per cent of all home civil servants - a proportion considerably lower than that in many other major fields of employment. One effect of the vetting procedure has been to concentrate subversive individuals in departments like DHSS which do not handle large quantities of classified material.


50. All subversive organisations recognise the central role of the armed forces, the police and the civil service in maintaining the integrity of the state and would, if they came to power, seek urgently to place persons loyal to themselves in the leading posts within them. But at present none is making systematic attempts to infiltrate any of these bodies; this may be in part because they recognise the efficiency of the present vetting system and (in the case of the CPGB at least) would not wish to risk adverse publicity which would follow the exposure of any such scheme. Since the war there have been almost no instances of subversive activity within the armed forces or the police.

[REDACTED]

Information regarding subversive influence in civil service trade unions and prisons

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]

/...

EDUCATION


56. All subversive organisations recognise the importance of recruiting young people. Many have separate organisations for youth and students; some seek to win the support of schoolchildren. Some Trotskyist groups, in particular the SWP and the IMG, have large proportions of students and recent ex-students among their memberships.

Universities

57. The wave of student unrest in this country in 1968-70, which was much less serious than that on the Continent, stemmed from widely perceived grievances and not from any conspiracy by Trotskyists or other extreme Left activists; but the latter were able to exploit it for a limited time and in certain circumstances. There has been no unrest of comparable dimensions in universities since that time.



Information regarding subversive influence in universities, including membership of Communist and Trotskyist groups amongst students and lecturers



Schools

62. Some 2,000 school teachers (0.4% of the total) have subversive records; just over 50% are Communists and sympathisers, and the remainder are Trotskyists and other Ultra Left activists, except for about 20 who are Fascists. Teachers with subversive records are spread thinly over a large number of schools.

63. It is impossible to assess to what extent subversive teachers seek to propagate their political views in the classroom. In one instance, Trotskyist control of a school department is known in the past to have produced biassed teaching and a decline in academic performance and discipline. But, on the above figures, very few schools can be vulnerable to this degree of subversive influence. Where such symptoms occur in schools the teachers concerned are more likely to lack basic skills or have ill-digested 'progressive' notions than to subscribe to subversive ideologies. Some subversive teachers, however, propagate their political views among pupils outside the classroom and encourage them to join subversive organisations or otherwise involve themselves in subversive activities..



/...

Information regarding subversive influence in teaching unions

THE MASS MEDIA

Information regarding Communist and Trotskyist influence in mainstream newspapers, TV
broadcasting and journalism'





EXPLOITATION OF RACIAL ISSUES

75. Racial tensions arising from coloured immigration have in the last ten years caused major political problems. White extremist organisations of both the Left and the Right, and some coloured extremist groups, have sought to exploit this situation.

76. The National Front has been more successful than any other group in turning racial tension to its own advantage; indeed, it owes its rise in the 1970s almost entirely to its ability to articulate the fears and prejudices aroused by coloured immigration in certain sections of the white population.

But its main support is derived from relatively few areas, usually bordering on centres of coloured population, and it remains largely a one-issue party. The steady reduction in the rate of coloured immigration in the 1970s has largely removed one of the grievances on which it has capitalised.

77. Extreme Left-wing groups, especially Trotskyists, regard racial tensions as a potentially valuable field for exploitation because they see the coloured communities as a disadvantaged minority who can be turned to serve wider revolutionary ends. One means by which they seek to achieve this is to raise the political temperature in society in general by exaggerating in their propaganda the extent of white racial prejudice and depicting it as evidence of Fascist or "Nazi" tendencies. White Communist and Trotskyist groups have, however, failed to extend their influence over the past ten years among coloured people. The Anti-Nazi League, the most effective left wing vehicle for exploiting racial problems, derives only a small part of its support from coloured people; and is regarded with some suspicion and hostility by

the Asian community in the East End of London, which has probably faced more provocation from the National Front than any other section of the coloured population. Moreover, there is no evidence that the SWP or any other major white subversive organisation has significantly increased its coloured membership in recent years. One of the reasons may be that many of the coloured people who are most susceptible to revolutionary ideologies are also most reluctant to give their allegiance to white-dominated organisations.

78. Despite this, the Anti-Nazi League, which was founded by the SWP at the end of 1977 and is still dominated by it at national level, represents a fairly successful effort by Trotskyists to found a broader based organisation and retain substantial influence within it.

Coloured Extremist Groups

79. A number of small coloured extremist groups exist, subscribing either to various forms of Marxist-Leninist theory or to black racial supremacist beliefs ("Black Power") or to a combination of the two. None has attracted significant support within the communities they aspire to represent, and the activities of the National Front and other white racial extremists do not appear to have driven coloured people into their ranks. Moreover, the strong barriers which exist between the different ethnic communities themselves - principally between West Indians and Asians - have prevented the formation of any extremist group with a membership representative of the coloured population as a whole. Coloured extremists have been most successful in exploiting specific local grievances, particularly those arising from alleged police maltreatment of coloured youths. But they have not succeeded in broadening campaigns mounted on this issue into a long-lasting or widespread movement of protest.

Prospects

80. With the ending of large scale coloured immigration to this country, the success with which long term problems associated with the presence of a substantial coloured minority within the community are overcome will determine the level of racial tension and the extent to which subversive organisations can exploit it. So far, Trotskyists, while succeeding in stimulating some degree of positive opposition to the National Front and other extreme Right wing organisations among the white population, have failed to attract much of a following among coloured people. If support for the National Front fades, they will find it difficult to maintain even the existing momentum of protest.

CIVIL LIBERTIES

The National Council for Civil Liberties (NCCL)

81.

Information about Communist influence in NCCL

In the recent past some of the NCCL's campaigns have directly benefited the Extreme Left: they include opposition to the Prevention of Terrorism Act; the publication of proposals for limiting the power of official agencies to hold and use personal information which would severely hamper the activities of the police and the Security Service; and support for subversively inspired investigative journalists (para 72 et seq).

CONCLUSIONS

82. Subversive activity has been more in evidence during the last decade than during the 1960s, partly because of the publicity-seeking tactics of the new subversive groups which have become prominent during this period. The public profile of the CPGB has remained relatively low, but Communist activity was a significant factor in the trade unions, particularly in the early 1970s. Trotskyist activity has become more evident in the Labour Party. Subversive elements have secured a potentially significant foothold in the two largest civil service unions. At the beginning of the period Trotskyists demonstrated their ability to exacerbate student unrest. Extremists of both Left and Right have found that racial problems present fruitful opportunities for exploitation. For the first time, the police and the security and intelligence agencies have come under protracted fire from subversive elements.

83. On the other hand, it should be emphasised that over the period covered in this survey subversive organisations and individuals owe what successes they have enjoyed to their ability to exploit wider social and political problems, none of which can in themselves be attributed to subversive agitation. The two most obvious examples over the past decade have been Britain's continued economic ills and the development of racial tensions but similar problems and grievances may be traced in the other areas of subversive activity outlined in this paper. In broad terms, the

impact of subversive activity is always likely to be dependent to a considerable degree on the general economic and political climate.


84. Although a declining force with an ageing membership and poor morale, the CPGB, with its links with the Soviet Union, still represents a greater long-term subversive threat to this country than any other subversive organisation, largely because of the position it enjoys in trade unions where its influence, though limited, is disproportionately large. The consolidation of Trotskyist parties and their appeal to the younger generation have been important features of the last ten years. Trotskyists have spread their influence into a number of areas of public life. Their distinctively militant approach, particularly in the industrial field and in the exploitation of racial problems, has meant an increase in the amount of street violence attributable to subversive organisations and has thrown greater burdens on the police. This rise in support for Trotskyism has, however, been more than balanced by the decline in membership of the CPGB; and the combined membership of all left-wing subversive organisations has fallen slightly in the course of the 1970s.

85. In terms of subversion, the threat from the Extreme Right is small. But much of the violence associated with racial problems has stemmed directly or indirectly from the activities of the National Front and its supporters.

86. Taking the position as a whole, though the threat from subversion is serious and in some ways more evident, it is not greater than 10 years ago.

May 1979

CAB 301/484 file



Subversion

I understand that you want to have a further word with me about this subject.

2. In advance of our talk I would like, if I may, to sound one note of caution and then to offer a more constructive suggestion.
3. The caution concerns the role of the Security Service. Its Directive says inter alia:-

- (i) "The Security Service is part of the Defence Forces of the country. Its task is the Defence of the Realm as a whole from external and internal dangers arising from attempts at espionage and sabotage or from actions of persons and organisations whether directed from within or without the country, which may be judged to be subversive to the State."
- (ii) "It is essential that the Security Service should be kept absolutely free from any political bias or influence and nothing should be done that might lead colour to any suggestion that it is concerned with the interests of any particular section of the community, or with any other matter than the Defence of the Realm as a whole."

The Directive does not define the word "subversive": but, as the brief on subversion submitted with my minute of 4th May said, the definition, designed to reconcile (i) and (ii), which has hitherto been adopted by both Conservative and Labour Governments (and quoted in the House) is as follows:-

"Subversive activities are those which threaten the safety or wellbeing of the State and are intended to undermine or overthrow Parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means."

The Directive has remained essentially unchanged through successive changes of Government since 1992. It is, I think, important for the Security Service that it should continue to operate strictly within the terms of the Directive.

Any departure from this which could be colourably described as political manipulation could in due course have serious implications for the role and effectiveness of the Security Service, especially if there were to be a change of Government and a new Government was looking for an excuse to reduce or eliminate the Security Service's role in counter-subversion.

4. It is also important to make a sharp distinction between intelligence (i.e. what we can find out) and counter-subversion (i.e. what we can do with the information obtained). While the Security Service would no doubt welcome some additional resources on gathering intelligence about subversion, shortage of intelligence is not the main problem. The real question is what use we can make of what we know, and the responsibility for corrective action - unless it concerns an individual in a sensitive post in the Public Service - does not lie with the Security Service. This is perhaps why Sir Roward Smith may have given you an impression of not doing very much about the threat.

5. Turning now to what active steps could be taken to expose and discredit subversive elements, I think you ought to know that the first steps towards this were undertaken by the Conservative Government in 1972-74 but came to an end with the General Election in 1974. Briefly, Sir Patrick Dean was brought back from retirement to oversee the development of methods, including appropriate publicity and exposure, by which certain types of subversive activity could be countered. He worked in close consultation with HRD in the Foreign Office and one or two other key officials. I think you will get the flavour if you read the attached copy of a minute which I sent to the then Prime Minister on 18th December 1973. The Dean Group did not find their task an altogether easy one but they had some successes. With hindsight I think that perhaps we did not at that time distinguish sufficiently between situations which subversives were seeking to exploit but were not of their making and those which were essentially subversive in origin. Be that as it may, I think it would be worthwhile considering whether some new activity of this kind could be started using, for this purpose, someone who would be able to draw on both

9

[REDACTED]

over and covert information about subversive activities but who would not himself have any line management relationship to, or responsibility for, the Security Service. This would require the services of someone who would be imaginative and inventive in his approach and who would be able to exploit all opportunities to influence the climate of opinion, but who would operate with subtlety and discretion and without attracting attention to his own activities. An apparent Government directed campaign of propaganda could well be self-defeating, but there is plenty of scope for encouraging moderate elements in the unions and elsewhere and for exposing the intentions of subversive element

John Hunt

John Hunt

24th May 1979

150

178



K G Oxford Esq CBE QPM CBIM OstJ
Chief Constable
Merseyside Police
PO Box 59
LIVERPOOL
L69 1JD

HOME OFFICE
QUEEN ANNE'S GATE
LONDON SW1H 9AT
31 March 1983

163

New Ken

SPECIAL BRANCHES

When a number of us met here on 18 March, we agreed that, rather than produce a formal note of the meeting, I would write to you to summarise the present position on the functions of Special Branches and public references to them. You thought that it might be useful for a copy of my letter to go to each chief constable and, to enable that to be done, I am sending a batch of copies to Brian Morrissey so that, if you wish, he could circulate them on your behalf to your colleagues.

For the record, I should mention that you were accompanied by Brian Hayes, Gilbert Kelland, Colin Hewett and Brian Morrissey, and I was accompanied by Joe Pilling and [REDACTED].

We re-affirmed that the terms of reference circulated under cover of your letter of 15 June 1970, on behalf of the ACPO CID Committee to all chief constables, still applied although it was agreed that you and we would discuss with the Security Service whether some revision of the terms of reference might now be appropriate to take account of developments in the last thirteen years. I shall be in touch with you separately about that.

Since 1970, the definition of subversion was expanded somewhat in a statement by Lord Harris of Greenwich in the House of Lords on 26 February 1975. That definition was endorsed by Mr Brittan on behalf of the present Government in a speech in the House of Commons on 7 November 1979. I attach copies of an extract from Lord Harris's speech, and the whole of Mr Brittan's speech.

In the case of public references to Special Branches, the then Home Secretary's (Mr Rees) speech of 24 May 1978 in the House of Commons included the following passage:

"I have no objection to giving the numbers in the Special Branch. Perhaps that has not been done before. The Metropolitan Police Special Branch numbers 400. There are about 850 officers in other forces in England and Wales engaged on what might be regarded as Special Branch work. About 300 of them are employed at the ports, though not all are Special Branch officers."



[REDACTED]

Since 1978, our advice on behalf of successive Home Secretaries has been that in their annual reports, chief constables should give the number of officers serving in the Special Branch. References to the work of Special Branches should be cast in general terms with specific references only to work in relation to the prevention of terrorism, and aliens and naturalisation enquiries.

I hope that this summary and recapitulation of the present position is helpful.

I am copying this letter to Gilbert Kelland and Brian Hayes, as well as to Brian Morrissey.

7 mins seen

[REDACTED]

G H PHILLIPS

BOX 500 REPORT

Copy
no :

Ref :

P2

Date : 28 September 1989

Tel

Subject

THE THREAT FROM SUBVERSION

9 pages attached

Distribution

PLEASE SEE FINAL
PAGE FOR DETAILS

Date of Information

Current

Comments by Originator

Departmental Security Officers Only:

This report is sent to you for your own guidance and that of any Departmental staff concerned with personnel security policy. You may draw on its assessments and conclusions in the preparation of security education material.

UCPI0000036607-1

UCPI0000036607

BOX 500 REPORT

SUMMARY

Introduction

Since the second world war subversive groups have been seen as a covert threat to parliamentary democracy, to classified information and to the safety and well-being of the State. (Paras 1 - 3.)

A Review of the Threat

2. The threat has been reviewed in the light of recent developments and current intelligence about the main subversive groups. These groups have not affected parliamentary democracy nor succeeded in causing serious disruption. Although Militant Tendency's success in winning 3 Parliamentary seats and its strength in the Civil and Public Servants Association gives cause for concern, the activities of subversive groups rarely have any decisive impact on society. They lack effective direction and discipline. They cannot operate effectively under cover

and subversives may still exploit any access to classified or official information to further their cause. (Paras 4 - 16.)

The Current Subversive Scene

3. The subversive population has declined from a post war high of 50,000 to 28,000 today, while the number of subversive groups has proliferated and fragmented. Only [redacted] have a capability and significance to merit detailed study by the Security Service. (Para 17.) A summary of the strength and actions of the main subversive groups is at Annex A.

The Current Threats

4. Currently subversive groups present a very low threat to Parliamentary democracy. (Para 18a.)

5. Subversive groups may take advantage of any access to official or classified information to embarrass government or to further their own aims. This threat is receding as the number of subversives declines. (Para 18b.)

6. Subversive groups do not presently have the capacity to instigate disruptive activity in the Civil Service, nor the strength and influence to achieve their subversive aims through industrial means. (Para 18c and d.)

BOX 500 REPORT

The Threat from Subversion

This report reviews the threat from subversion and the perceptions and assumptions on which this has been based since the end of the second world war. It surveys the present state of the main subversive groups and provides an assessment of the current threat from subversion.

Introduction

2. One of the functions of the Security Service as defined in the Security Service Act, 1989, is the protection of national security from "actions intended to overthrow or undermine parliamentary democracy by political, industrial or violent means". This definition derives from the statement made to Parliament by Lord Harris of Greenwich in 1972. He described subversion as:

"Activities threatening the safety or well-being of the State and intended to undermine or overthrow parliamentary democracy by political, violent or industrial means".

3. Lord Harris's definition and the protective security measures, principally the vetting system, which have been developed since the end of the second world war were shaped in the light of European and British experience in the 1940's, 50's and 60's. This experience suggested that a centrally directed and coordinated minority, as in Czechoslovakia, could manipulate events covertly in key areas of society, possibly with the support of hostile foreign governments; and that subversively motivated individuals would be unreliable custodians of classified information. More specifically:

i. Subversive groups were perceived to pose a threat to parliamentary democracy because:

- a) their purpose was to cause stress and disruption in society;
- b) they operated clandestinely;
- c) they were well-organised and worked to a long-term strategy;
- d) direction, discipline and organisation could give minority groups a capability and power out of all proportion to their numbers;
- e) there was an

/...

- ii. Individual members of subversive groups were perceived to pose a threat to the security of the State because their deep political convictions were at odds, not just with existing policies, but with the whole system of democratic government. They were assumed not to be bound by national loyalties, [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

4. In order to assess the current threat this report reviews these perceptions and assumptions in the light of developments in society brought about by political, economic and social developments at home and abroad, and in the light of current intelligence on the activities of the main subversive groups and their members.

A Review of the Threat

Stress and Disruption

5. There has been little evidence in recent years that subversive groups or individuals have been able to cause stress and disruption by creating trouble in key areas of society. They have, however, shown an ability to capitalise on apathy and to exacerbate existing problems. They have sought to exploit issues such as low pay, racial differences and the community charge for their own ends, in particular to recruit new members and to publicise their own policies. An improving economy and new legislation requiring ballots prior to industrial action have limited the scope for subversives to initiate industrial disputes. [REDACTED]

In 1984/1985 MT were in control of the Civil and Public Servants Association (CPSA) but later lost control of the union's National Executive Committee following further elections.

6. Disruption has otherwise generally occurred on a very small scale and it cannot be assumed that members of subversive groups always cause disruption. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

3

7. Most subversive organisations are non-violent. Although some advocate armed struggle in, for example, Southern Africa, Central America and Northern Ireland, they perceive violence in Great Britain to be counter-productive and will not instigate or participate in violence. The presence of subversive organisations or individuals at protests or demonstrations will not therefore mean that violence is inevitable, or even likely, although occasionally some subversive groups may seek to organise events, often on student or racial issues, so as to make clashes with the Police or between the extreme right and the extreme left inevitable. The disunity and lack of effectiveness or the extreme right in recent years has however made the latter a less and less frequent occurrence. The extreme right itself has always had a reputation for violence, based largely on its elevation of militarism and its use in the active defence of what are conceived of as "British" values. This attracted a violent hooligan element. However, very few of these hooligans have any real idea of the concept of subversion. Genuine subversively motivated violence, directed against property or, occasionally, prominent public figures, appears now to be the prerogative of a few fringe Anarchists and Trotskyist, and nationalist extremists. The latter have included some former members of subversive organisations.

8. Participation by subversive groups and individuals in the day to day events of society seldom remains entirely covert. Most groups eventually become overt in order to win adherents, whilst maintaining secrecy in respect of their organisation, membership and finances. Thus in the end there was no secret about MT's recent period of control in the Liverpool County Council or the National Executive of the Civil and Public Servants Association (CPSA). Although many of the electorate who voted for MT MPs are unlikely to have known of their Trotskyist ideology, their membership of MT has subsequently become well known.

9.

Strategy and Discipline

10. The idea that most subversive groups are well organised to carry out planned stages of a carefully thought-out strategy has long since disappeared. Many of the groups lack a sense of purpose and direction and exist without an agreed long term strategy. Very frequently arguments over future tactics have led to splits and a decline in membership. But MT, the one group that is well able to recruit, while not having a long term strategy as such, has at least a strong sense of purpose. It looks at every issue in a calculated way to see how its intervention can contribute to its revolutionary objectives.

11. Competent direction and sure discipline over members has also declined in many groups. In particular, the industrial organisation of the CPGB, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] is a mere shadow of its former self. No substantial threat of direction or manipulation on a national scale now comes from this quarter. And whilst MT aspires to emulate the CPGB's former industrial base, it has not yet built up an effective industrial organisation.

Capability and Influence

12. The achievement of MT in winning three seats in Parliament and in building up a power base in the CPISA which has in the past given MT control over the union (and could again) are naturally a cause for concern. But the activities of subversive minorities rarely have any decisive impact on the course or outcome of events. No subversive group presently has the capability to instigate political or industrial activities where none have previously existed. The action they provoke is either very small scale and local, or successful on a larger scale because it reflects or articulates the desires of the majority. Minority control where it exists continues only for as long as the majority allows it. There is no evidence of the long term erosion of parliamentary democracy by subversive ideology. Despite the many decades over which subversive individuals have held a variety of influential positions in society the revolution seems further away than ever before.

/...


BOX 500 REPORT

5.



Access to and Misuse of Classified Information

16. Finally, there is no evidence that any subversive group has sought to place existing members where they might be able to obtain access to classified information



The Current Subversive Scene

17. A summary of the strength and activities of the main



/...

UCPI0000036607-7
UCPI0000036607

subversive groups is at Annex A. Overall the number of people prepared to join or become closely involved with subversive organisations has shown an accelerating decline in the post war years. The figure for members and sympathisers fell from about 50,000 at the end of the second world war to about 32,000 in 1988 and now stands at an estimated 28,000. Over the same period subversive organisations have proliferated with the emergence of Trotskyist groups and Maoist (now Marxist-Leninist) organisations. Different types of Trotskyist groups sprang up primarily because of disagreements over revolutionary tactics: some of these groups split and split again. Towards the end of this period similar fragmentation also occurred both in the Communist Party and in the small number of extreme right wing groups. They have all tended to become inward looking, absorbed in faction fighting and to be torn by personality differences. Individuals and small groupings claiming anarchist or nationalist extremist allegiance have sporadically appeared on the scene. There are in Britain today about 70 organisations which can be regarded as subversive. Of these, only some [REDACTED] have a capability, size and significance to merit detailed study by the Security Service.

Assessment of the Current Threat of Subversion

18. It is concluded, therefore, that the threats posed by subversive groups and individuals can be summarised as follows:

a) The Threat to Parliamentary Democracy

Currently subversive groups present only a very low threat to parliamentary democracy. The Communist parties and most of the Trotskyist groups and parties in the UK are increasingly, as organisations, ineffective and riven by internal disputes. Of all these groups, MT presents the strongest potential threat by virtue of its capacity to recruit, its practice of entryism into the Labour Party and the possibility of an increase in its covert representation in Parliament.

b) The Threat to Classified and Other Official Information

i. Subversive groups do not set out to acquire classified or official information. [REDACTED]

BOX 500 REPORT

7.

They may, however, take advantage of opportunities afforded through any access to classified areas of Government work,

They may misuse classified or official information to embarrass government, influence public discussion or generally further their own aims. Those on the subversive right are unlikely to wish to do anything to damage national interests.

ii. Those subversive individuals who are wholehearted supporters of the Soviet Union and its allies, or of other Communist regimes, cannot be regarded as reliable custodians of classified information because they may volunteer information to a hostile intelligence service. The risk that individuals on the subversive right will work for a foreign power is extremely small.

iii. This threat is presently receding as the number of subversives declines and the age and background of some of them lessens the likelihood that they will become candidates for access to classified information. In 1988 the percentage of adverse assessments arising from some 300,000 normal vetting type checks was just under 0.15%.

c) The Threat of Disruption to Government Business

Some members and sympathisers of subversive groups employed in Government or Local Government Departments become involved in disruptive action at work. Neither subversive groups nor individuals have the capacity to instigate such action on a large scale but do try to exacerbate existing grievances, mainly through Trade Union channels, in order to increase their membership and influence; also, more generally, to promote long-term subversive aims.

d) The Threat to the Safety and Well-being of the State

Subversive groups do not at present have sufficient strength and influence to bring about their subversive aims through industrial means and thus cause damage to the well-being of the State. Subversive groups will try to exploit or prolong existing industrial disputes but are now generally unsuccessful because of the very low numbers of members of these subversive groups who are also officials or executive members of trade unions.

19. The conditions which formerly enabled subversive organisations to be more effective than at present may recur. Alternatively a continuing decline may persuade some individual subversives that they will only attain their objectives by violence. This assessment will therefore be reviewed periodically or in the light of new intelligence.

BOX 500 REPORT

ANNEX A

The Main Subversive Groupings: 1989

There are [redacted] subversive groups which are the subject of study and investigation by the Security Service. The groups cover the spectrum of extreme politics and are detailed below according to the main 'philosophy' they follow.

Communists (10,500 members)

2. There are now 3 Communist Parties, the oldest of which is the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) with [redacted] members. But 40% of its members are over the age of 60 [redacted]

The CPGB inclines to the Euro-Communist view of socialism and, because of this, has lost control of the 'Morning Star' newspaper.

3. In 1977 the New Communist Party (NCP) was formed from breakaway members of the CPGB and now has about [redacted] members. It follows hard line and pro-Soviet policies [redacted]

4. In 1988 there was a further split from the CPGB with the formation of the Communist Party of Britain (CPB) which has some [redacted] members. The CPB also follows hard line, pro-Soviet policies and has access to the 'Morning Star' newspaper which, though nominally independent of the CPB, nevertheless supports it in its hard line stance.

Trotskyists (12,500 members)

5. The Trotskyists now represent the single largest subversive philosophy in Britain with some 12,500 adherents. Only two groups, however, represent a threat of any numerical size - Militant Tendency (MT) with a membership of just over [redacted] and the Socialist Workers Party (SWP) with some [redacted] members.

6. MT has followed the practice of entryism into the Labour Party with a view to gaining control of that party, primarily through its constituency organisations. Whilst the Labour Party has continued its purge of MT members in 1989 there are still three Labour Members of Parliament - Dave Nellist, Pat Wall and Terry Fields - who are members of MT and subject to its discipline.

7. Whilst SWP's membership remains fairly constant at about [redacted] it nevertheless has a turnover of approximately 25% each year. This high rate of turnover probably stems from the concentration on recruitment from students in higher education establishments.

8. The remaining 2,500 followers of Trotskyist principles are split into a number of bickering groups, including the [redacted]

once significant Workers Revolutionary Party (WRP) [REDACTED]

Marxist-Leninists (600 members)

9. Marxism-Leninism (formerly Macism) has a number of adherent groups, most of which are very small in number. The two most significant are the Communist Party of Britain (Marxist-Leninist) with about [REDACTED] members and the Revolutionary Communist Party of Britain (Marxist Leninist) with no more than [REDACTED] members.

Anarchists (400 members)

10. Anarchists usually only organise themselves into small groups. There are some 400 members in these groups, the largest of which is Direct Action Movement (DAM) with upwards of [REDACTED] members.

Right Wing Extremism (2,000 members)

11. The three main groups in this category are the National Front Confederacy (NFC) with about [REDACTED] members, the National Front Directorate (NFD) and the British National Party (BNP) both of which have about [REDACTED] members each. Although there has been little overt activity by these groups they still enjoy steady and possibly slightly increasing support.

12. The [REDACTED] main groups described above have a total membership of 26,000. There are about 2,000 others who are members of some [REDACTED] further organisations which are assessed as subversive. This makes a total of 28,000 subversives in 1989.

[REDACTED]

BOX 500 REPORT

DISTRIBUTION

WHITEHALL DISTRIBUTION

CABINET OFFICE

- 1.
- 2.

OFFICE OF THE MINISTER FOR THE CIVIL SERVICE

- 3.
- 4.

HOME OFFICE

- 5. Mr J Chilcot
- 6. Mr S W Boys Smith
- 7. [REDACTED]

FCO

- 8. ID - [REDACTED]
- 9. PUSD [REDACTED]
- 10-12. [REDACTED]
- 13. [REDACTED]
- 14-16. [REDACTED]

GCHQ

- 17-20. [REDACTED]

MOD

- 21. [REDACTED]
 - 22. [REDACTED]
 - 23-30. NAVY [REDACTED]
 - 31-47. ARMY [REDACTED]
 - 48-54. AIR [REDACTED]
 - 55. Director of MOD Security - [REDACTED]
- [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT

56. [REDACTED]

57. [REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

58. [REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

59. [REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY

60. [REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT

61. [REDACTED]

SCOTTISH HOME AND HEALTH DEPARTMENT

62. [REDACTED]

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

63-65. Stormont [REDACTED]

66. London - [REDACTED]

BOX 500 REPORT

SECURITY OFFICERS' DISTRIBUTION

CABINET OFFICE

67.

[REDACTED]

HOME OFFICE

68.

[REDACTED]

FCO

69-70.

Security Dept - [REDACTED]

OVERSEAS DEVELOPMENT ADMINISTRATION

71.

[REDACTED]

GCHQ

72-73.

[REDACTED]

SCOTTISH OFFICE

74.

[REDACTED]

NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE

75.

[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION AND SCIENCE

76.

[REDACTED]

CENTRAL OFFICE OF INFORMATION

77.

[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENT

78.

[REDACTED]

UKAEA

79.

[REDACTED]

BRITISH TELECOM

80.

[REDACTED]

POST OFFICE HQ

81.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

WELSH OFFICE

82.

[REDACTED]

MINISTRY OF AGRICULTURE FISHERIES AND FOOD

83.

[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENTS OF HEALTH AND SOCIAL SECURITY

84-85.

[REDACTED]

PRIVY COUNCIL

86.

[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT

87.

[REDACTED]

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

88.

[REDACTED]

BOARD OF INLAND REVENUE

89.

[REDACTED]

EXPORT CREDITS GUARANTEE DEPT

90.

[REDACTED]

CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITY

91.

[REDACTED]

LORD CHANCELLOR'S DEPT

92.

[REDACTED]

HMSO

93.

[REDACTED]

BRITISH COUNCIL

94.

[REDACTED]

FCO/COMMUNICATIONS ADMIN DEPT

95.

[REDACTED]

HM CUSTOMS AND EXCISE

96.

BOX 500 REPORT

POLICE DISTRIBUTION

- 97-102. HM Chief Inspector and Inspectors
of Constabulary
(England and Wales)
- 103. HM Chief Inspector of Constabulary
(Scotland)
- 104. Assistant to HM Chief Inspector
of Constabulary
- 105-163. All UK Police Forces
- 164. Commandant, Police
Staff College

BOX 500 REPORT

INTERNAL DISTRIBUTION

165.	DG/DDG(0)/DDG(A)	197.	F2B/1
166.	Legal Advisor	198.	F2C/1
167.	H1/0	199.	F2
168.	H	200-202.	F4/0
169.	H	203.	Dir G
70-171.	H	204-205.	G
172.	H	206-207.	G
173.		208.	G
174.	A	209.	G
175.	A	210.	G
76-181.	A	211.	R
182.	A	212.	Reg
183.	A	213.	R
184.		214.	
185.	Dir F	215.	S
186.	C	216.	S
187.	C	217.	H
188.	C	218.	
189.	C	219.	
190.	C	220.	
191.		221.	
192.	K	222.	
193.	K	223.	
194.	F2/0.	224.	SF765
195.	F2A	225.	
196.	F2A		

MASTER COPY:

F2A